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9“The arduous events are outside time, either because the 
immediate past is as if disconnected from the future, or 
because the parts which form these events do not seem to be 
consecutive”
-Emma Zunz, from The Aleph-
Jorge Luis Borges, 1949
 
IT  ALL STARTS WITH A STORy.
A bright orange flash of light. KABOOM!!! ... And everything goes 
dark. I am blown out of my seat. Glass shattering, metal twisting 
and all I can hear is a deafening beep in my ears. Time slows down; 
the seconds seem to last forever, everything happens in an instant. 
I am dirty, covered in black stuff. I feel bruised; blood is starting 
to gush down from cuts in my face. My clothes are ripped and I 
can feel the sharp pain of splintered glass piercing my skin. An 
acidic smell starts to fill my nostrils. I can taste metallic smoke that 
smothers my breathing as it fills my lungs. The heat of a rolling 
fire burns the hair off my arms. Slowly sound returns, muffled but 
audible, I can hear people screaming. They're screaming, their 
screams cut through the smoke and I realize they're burning, 
they're burning alive! The heat is coming closer, rolls over me, and 
envelops me. I realize the fire is closing in on me. This is the end 
of me. It can't be long now. Dear Anna, I love you. I hope you know 
that. I am going to die, but I hope you know that. The flames allow 
me to see through the thick smoke. Next to me a heavily bleeding 
man crawls over the floor. A bit further, in the flicker of the flames, 
I see a woman's leg, dismembered from her body. Why did we have 
that argument? It's so stupid. No time to think about that now. She 
knows I love her. Too bad we won't see each other again though. It's 
the end for me. I look up; metal dark and twisted with jagged edges 
pointing up at the ceiling reveals a ten feet hole. A man climbs out 
through the hole, looks back, shouts at me: "Come on man, get up! 
We need to get out of here! I try to lift myself of the floor. I get up. 
An excruciating pain shoots down my leg. My vision turns blurry as 
white stars flash in front of my eyes. "Hurry up man! This way! We 
can get out this way!" The pain in my leg is unbearable, but I can 
do this. I have to do this. Slowly I stumble forwards towards the 
hole. The man grabs my hand and helps me through the hole. We 
get out. A light shimmers in the distance of the tunnel. It allows 
me to see through the smoke. The tracks are covered with bodies. 
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They don't move, I know they're dead. We walk towards the light in 
the distance. We see more people walking in front of us. "Stay of 
the middle of the track!" says a man in a fluorescent vest who has 
suddenly appeared. The man points: "The platform is that way, only 
a little further." I stumble past him as I feel the energy draining 
from my body. "Are you alright?" I hear. And everything fades.
Slowly I return. "Are you alright Ben?" The armchair I am sitting in is 
comfortable. I can feel my heartbeat slowing down, while I look around 
the office. This is the third time this has happened to me today. "Are you 
alright Ben?" Anna looks at me and I say yes, and highlight the sentence 
on the piece of paper the researcher across the table has put in front of 
me.
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1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION.
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1.1 Introduction
Ben's story is fiction, but inspired by the traumatic events the patients 
suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), that took part in 
studies that are described in the first three chapters of this thesis, wrote 
down. The event described in the story reflects a flashback, moments in 
which PTSD patient relive the experience of their trauma as if it happens 
to them in real-time. This dissociative symptom is specific to PTSD, highly 
stressful and disturbing. Imagine what it must be like to experience 
multiple times per day as if the London underground train you are in get's 
blown up in a terrorist attack.
Emotional experiences are remembered well (1, 2), which is adaptive to 
survival but emotional memory enhancement can also be maladaptive 
and have pathological consequences (3), such as in the case of Ben.  
Affective disorders, including anxiety disorders such as PTSD, rank among 
the leading causes of disability worldwide, significantly contributing to 
the global disease burden (4). Therefore, optimizing understanding and 
treatment of affective disorders is of great importance.
Over the last decades, research on patients and studies on fear learning 
and memory in healthy humans and non-human animals has provided 
a wealth of insight into the neural mechanisms that support enhanced 
memory for emotional experiences and the dysfunctions that occur in 
this network in pathological states. A central role in the acquisition and 
expression of emotions is envisioned for the amygdala (5-7), a collection 
of nuclei deep in the brain (Figure 1.1 red). The amygdala is considered 
to be critical for the formation of associations between stimuli and 
emotional outcomes, and projects to brain regions such as the brainstem 
(Figure 1.1 light green) and hypothalamus that initiate the defensive 
behaviours (e.g. freezing, fleeing, fighting), autonomic changes (e.g. 
changes in heart rate and blood pressure), and endocrine changes (e.g. 
release of neuromodulators and stress hormones) that are part of an 
emotional response (5, 8). Additionally, emotions are accompanied by 
changes in action readiness coordinated by the striatum (Figure 1.1 blue). 
15
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Furthermore, emotional responses are often context-dependent and 
contextual information is thought to be provided by the hippocampus 
((9), Figure 1.1 green). Control over fear and regulation of the amygdala 
is considered to be mediated by the medial prefrontal cortex (Figure 
1.1 pink), and specifically the ventral (lower) part of this region (10-12). 
The cingulate cortex (Figure 1.1 purple) appears to be important for 
the integration of emotional responses with higher cognitive aspects of 
emotions, and regulation of emotions (13, 14), and the lateral prefrontal 
cortex (Figure 1.1 yellow) with attention regulation towards emotional 
stimuli (15). Finally, the insula (Figure 1.1 orange) has been implicated 
in pain perception (16), the anticipation of aversive stimuli (17), with 
the introceptive awareness of visceral responses (18, 19), and subjective 
feeling states (20). Thus, a set of brain regions interacts as a network 
supporting learning, expression, and regulation of emotions. Interestingly, 
it is this network that shows evidence of dysfunction in pathological 
states like PTSD (21-24). Furthermore, effective treatment by cognitive 
behavioural therapy and psycho-pharmaceutical treatment appears to 
restore functioning of this network (25, 26).
The effectiveness of pharmacological treatment in affective disorders 
provided the first indications for a critical role of neuromodulators 
such as serotonin, dopamine and noradrenaline in emotional responses 
and the enhancement for emotional experiences (27). As mentioned, 
emotions are accompanied by endocrine responses. Within the brain, 
the neuromodulator serotonin is released from the raphe nuclei, 
dopamine from the ventral tegmental area, and noradrenaline from the 
Figure 1.1 The neural network supporting emotions and memory
Several brain regions involved in emotions and memory include the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (yellow), 
insula (orange), hippocampus (dark green), amygdala (red), striatum (blue), medial prefrontal cortex 
(pink), cingulate cortex (purple), and midbrain (light green).
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locus coeruleus (12). Additionally, through the so-called hypothalamus-
pituitary-adrenal pathway stress hormones such as cortisol are released 
peripherally and feedback on the brain (28). These neuromodulators 
and stress hormones play a critical role in the expression of emotions 
and modulate memory resulting in enhanced memory for emotional 
experiences (29-31). More specifically, research has shown that memories 
are initially labile and sensitive to disruption but stabilize over time, 
a process known as consolidation (30). Neuromodulators such as 
encoding consolidation retrieval
information
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Figure 1.2 The classical view of memory formation and the dominant model for memory enhancement by 
emotions.
A) The classical view on memory formation states that information is initially encoded and labile, but 
stabilizes over time during a process known as consolidation. Subsequently, memories can be retrieved 
but are considered to remain stabile and stored, insensitive to further alterations. B) The dominant model 
for memory enhancement by emotions considers that at the time of encoding salient or emotional stimuli 
activate the amygdala and neuromodulatory systems such as the locus coeruleus (the central source of 
noradrenaline), which upregulate processing of stimulus features in sensory cortices and the formation of 
emotional memories within the amygdala. Subsequently, for episodic memories, the amygdala is thought 
to upregulate neural processing in the hippocampus through a noradrenergic mechanism resulting in 
enhanced consolidation of memory for emotional experiences.
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noradrenaline are thought to affect both encoding and consolidation 
processes leading to enhanced memory for emotional experiences (30, 
32, 33). The classical view of memory formation (Figure 1.2A) dictates 
that incoming information is first encoded, stabilizes over time during 
consolidation, and is subsequently retrieved (30). Further, the most 
prominent model of memory enhancement by emotions (Figure 1.2 
B) considers that emotional or salient stimuli activate the amygdala 
and noradrenergic system that contribute to the enhanced processing 
of the sensory features of a stimulus at the time of encoding (34-36). 
Subsequently, the amygdala is thought to upregulate neural processing in 
the hippocampus (37, 38) through a noradrenergic mechanism (29, 33, 39, 
40).
For a long time a central dogma in neuroscience was that once memories 
were consolidated they were relative insensitive to further change or 
disturbances (30). This was considered to contribute to the difficulty 
in treating affective disorders and the high rates of relapse (41). For 
example, during cognitive behavioural therapy a patient may learn to 
control his fears, but this is thought to be the result of the formation 
of a new 'safety' memory that competes with the old fear memory for 
behavioural expression (42, 43). However, the risk of the return of fear is 
probable, because the original fear memory is not altered and still exists. 
Recent research on reconsolidation questions the stability of memory 
following consolidation (44). Reconsolidation refers to the process 
whereby memories become instable upon reactivation and require 
restabilization to be maintained (45-50). Reconsolidation has attracted 
much interest as it principally allows the alteration or deletion of memory 
for emotional experiences opening up new avenues for the treatment of 
affective disorders.
Beyond the classical view of memory formation (Figure 1.2 A) and the 
dominant model for memory enhancement by emotions (Figure 1.2 
B), little is known about the neural mechanisms that support memory 
retrieval, and more specifically about the neuromodulatory systems 
that may enhance retrieval of emotional memories. Further, the neural 
18
mechanisms that determine the fate of memories following retrieval 
are highly underexplored. Following retrieval new memory traces may 
be formed that compete with old memory traces (e.g. extinction), the 
retrieved memory may be encoded again in combination with new 
information (secondary encoding), or may destabilize and require 
restabilization (reconsolidation). The neural mechanisms that support 
these memory functions and the effects of neuromodulators on these 
mechanisms are topic of investigation in this thesis. By extending 
the classical view of memory formation and the dominant model that 
support memory enhancement by emotions and increasing fundamental 
understanding of the neural mechanisms that support memory for 
emotional experiences we hope to gain novel insight into the possibilities 
to alter memory for emotional experiences. In addition, by studying 
the overlap between these neural systems and the brain abnormalities 
observed in patients with anxiety disorders insight may be obtained into 
the development of novel treatment methods.
In sum, this thesis addresses the question what happens in the brains 
of patients with anxiety disorders, specifically related to maladaptive 
memories for emotional experiences. Further, the possibilities to 
alter memory for emotional experiences are explored. A prominent 
focus here is on the possibility to target specific memory processes in 
combination with pharmacological medication. Combined, the studies 
in this thesis are aimed at increasing fundamental understanding of the 
neural mechanisms that support memory for emotional experiences 
by extending the classical view of memory formation and the dominant 
model for memory enhancement by emotions. Together this thesis 
aims to provide further understanding and open up novel avenues for 
optimized treatment for patients like Ben.
1.2 Thesis Outline
The first part of this dissertation describes a set of studies investigating 
structural and functional brain abnormalities in patients with PTSD or 
depression (Chapter 2). Both patient groups are found to exhibit changes 
19
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in brain structure in regions implicated in memory and emotional 
regulation. Further, a symptom specific to PTSD is the re-experiencing of 
traumatic events from memory during so-called flashback episodes. The 
prevalence and occurrence of flashbacks were found to be associated with 
structural (Chapter 3) and functional (Chapter 4) brain abnormalities in 
regions implicated in memory and emotion regulation. Having identified 
brain regions displaying abnormalities in affective disorders, the question 
rises whether it is possible to alter functioning in these regions as it 
relates to emotional processes.
Generally, affective disorders, including PTSD and depression, are treated 
with antidepressant medication and their actions have been implicated 
to affect the monoamine systems of serotonin and noradrenaline. In 
the second part of the thesis we describe a study showing that food 
optimized to increase the uptake of the serotonin precursor tryptophan 
into the brain, lifts mood by affecting mood-regulating neurocircuits via a 
serotonergic mechanism (Chapter 5). Thus, by targeting the serotonergic 
system it is possible to affect emotion related processes in brain regions 
that show abnormal responses in affective disorders, yet an open 
question remains whether these neural systems could be targeted to 
achieve permanent alteration of memory for emotional experiences.
Although antidepressant medication and psychotherapy can reduce 
symptom severity in affective disorders, both treatments leave the 
patients susceptible to relapse. The ability to reduce or erase memory for 
a traumatic experience is of considerable interest, as this may prevent 
relapse. This is especially true in cases where the aetiology of disease 
onset can be attributed to a specific emotional experience. Although 
the idea that well consolidated memories are stable and insensitive to 
changes has been a central dogma in neuroscience for decades, recent 
neuroscientific studies indicate that memories remain flexible even 
after consolidation. In the third section of this thesis the dynamic neural 
systems that enable adaptive and flexible memories are discussed 
(Chapter 6). The dynamic neural systems that enable adaptive and 
flexible memories principally open up novel avenues to permanently 
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alter memory for emotional experiences, yet an outstanding question is 
whether this can be achieved in practice.
In the final section of this thesis studies aimed at permanently altering 
or erasing memories for emotional experiences are presented. The 
first study provides evidence that episodic memory can be disrupted 
upon reactivation in humans, that this process is time-dependent and 
persists for at least six days, in line with a reconsolidation hypothesis 
(Chapter 7). The second study shows that reconsolidation of episodic 
memory for emotional experiences can be disrupted by electroconvulsive 
shock in humans, and thus provides causal evidence that interference 
with brain function after reactivation can erase memories by altering 
a reconsolidation process (Chapter 8). Erasing memories may prevent 
relapse, yet erasing or attenuating only the emotional aspect of a 
memory trace with treatment would be more optimal. The noradrenergic 
system has long been implicated in the enhancement of memory for 
emotional experiences, and more recently also in the reconsolidation 
of memories for emotional events. In a third study we show that 
administration of the beta-adrenergic receptor antagonist propranolol 
at memory retrieval abolishes an episodic memory enhancement for 
emotional items, and critically, that this effect persists in the absence of 
propranolol 24h later (Chapter 9). Although memories are susceptible 
to alteration upon reactivation, possibly through reconsolidation 
mechanisms, most cognitive behavioural therapies employed in 
treating affective disorder incorporate methods where patients are 
repeatedly required to retrieve memories of emotional experiences and 
actively learn to reduce their fear responses. These treatments rely on 
extinction learning mechanisms. Alternative hypotheses predicted that 
noradrenaline blockade during extinction learning would either result 
in a loss of fear or in the persistence of fear. Testing these hypotheses 
in a fourth study, we show that beta-adrenergic blockade abolishes 
differentially conditioned responses during extinction learning and 
subsequently prevents the return of fear 24 hours later. These effects 
are attributable to specific changes in the neural network involved in 
extinction learning (Chapter 10). This finding provides support to an 
21
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optimized treatment of affective disorders by specific combinations of 
psychotherapy and psychopharmacology. Optimization of treatments 
also requires understanding of vulnerability factors such as genetic 
variations on brain functioning as this holds the promise to tailor 
psychiatric treatment to individual needs. In Chapter 11, we show that 
the serotonin transported-linked polymorphic region (5-HTTLPR) that 
has been associated with anxiety and depressive disorders may increase 
vulnerability by determining functioning of the neural network involved in 
fear and safety learning. Together Chapters 7-11 provide evidence for the 
occurrence of reconsolidation in humans, reveal a role for noradrenaline 
in the retrieval of memory for emotional experiences and a deterministic 
effect of noradrenaline on the faith of such memories following retrieval, 
and influences of noradrenaline and serotonin on the neural networks 
that support extinction. These studies highlight the possibility to alter 
memory for emotional experiences.
This thesis will conclude with a discussion (Chapter 12) of the described 
studies and present and extension of the classical view of memory 
formation and an innovative neural model of memory enhancement by 
emotions via neuromodulatory systems as revealed by the work in this 
thesis, which significantly advances the field of cognitive neuroscience 
of memory and emotions. In addition, the overlap between the neural 
systems that support the alteration of memory for emotional experiences 
and the brain abnormalities observed in patients with affective disorders 
will be highlighted. Furthermore, the limitations of the presented studies 
will be discussed together with outstanding questions for future research.
Together this thesis provides insight into the neural mechanisms 
that underlie emotional memory and contribute to the aetiology and 
persistence of affective disorders, presents evidence for the ability to 
alter memory for emotional experiences, and hopes to contribute to 
the development of novel strategies to optimize treatment of affective 
disorders.
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2 STRUCTURAL BRAIN ABNORMALITIES 
COMMON TO POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS 
DISORDER AND DEPRESSION.
2.1 Published as:
Kroes MCW, Rugg, MD, Whalley MG, and Brewin CR (2011). Structural brain abnor-
malities common to posttraumatic stress disorder and depression. Journal of Psychia-
try and Neuroscience, 36(4), 256-265. DOI: 10.1503/jpn.100077
2.2 Abstract
Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and major depression (MDD) are associated 
with reductions in brain volume in markedly similar areas. To date no volumetric 
studies have directly contrasted these conditions. We investigated which grey 
matter reductions would be uniquely associated with each disorder. We also 
investigated more subtle independent effects: specifically, correlations between 
brain volume and self-report measures of psychopathology. We obtained 
structural magnetic resonance imaging scans from participants with PTSD 
(N=24), MDD (N=29) and healthy controls (N=29) exposed to trauma. Participants 
completed standardized self-report measures of anxiety and depression. We used 
voxel-based morphometry to identify associated volumetric changes. The clinical 
groups had regions of markedly smaller volume, particularly in prefrontal areas, 
but did not differ from each other. Greater self-reported anxiety was inversely 
related to volume in several areas, particularly the inferior temporal cortex, 
among patients with PTSD, but was associated with some volume increases in 
patients with MDD. Greater self-reported depression showed similar effects, 
being inversely related to brain volume in patients with PTSD but positively 
related to volume in the cuneus and precuneus of those with major depression. 
As such, we identified commonalities in areas of brain volume in patients with 
PTSD and those with MDD, suggesting that existing findings concerning volume 
reductions may not be specific to PTSD but rather related to features of the 
disorder that are shared with other conditions, such as MDD. More subtle 
differences between patients with PTSD and those with MDD were represented by 
distinct structural correlates of self-reported anxiety and depression.
23
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2.3 Introduction
Structural brain abnormalities in individuals with posttraumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD) and major depression show a marked overlap. Thus, 
meta-analyses of structural MRI studies on individuals with both PTSD 
and unipolar depression have consistently identified reductions in 
hippocampal size relative to healthy controls (51-53). This overlap is hard 
to interpret since PTSD and depression have a number of symptoms in 
common and are frequently comorbid (54). For example, in one study 
reduced hippocampal size was only found in depressed individuals if they 
also reported early childhood trauma, but two thirds of this group had 
comorbid PTSD (55). For these reasons it is not known at present to what 
extent structural changes found in PTSD are accounted for by comorbid 
depression. The present study used voxel-based morphometry (VBM) to 
test directly for the first time to what extent there are commonalities 
in brain volume reductions and whether there is evidence for structural 
changes that are unique to one or other disorder.
In addition to reduced hippocampal size, PTSD has been associated with 
reductions in dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (56-59), and insular cortex 
(56, 60, 61). Differences in rostral ACC have also been reported (60, 62), 
although one study suggested apparent differences in the latter were 
more a reflection of shape than volume (61). In addition to a smaller 
ACC, a meta-analysis (51) found evidence for a reduction in the left 
amygdala of adult PTSD patients, and in the frontal/prefrontal cortex (but 
not the hippocampus) of paediatric PTSD samples. As such it has been 
suggested that PTSD is associated with abnormalities in multiple frontal-
limbic structures. Studies of unipolar and psychotic depression have 
similarly found reduced volume in several regions of ACC (25, 63), and 
more specifically in subgenual ACC (64-69). Other areas of reduced grey 
matter concentration or reduced volume include the amygdala (67, 69-71), 
orbitofrontal cortex (63, 72, 73), thalamus (73, 74), striatum (74, 75), and 
several additional prefrontal areas (25).
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2. Structural brain abnormalitieS common to poSttraumatic StreSS diSorder and depreSSion
Understanding these similar sets of results in both diagnoses is made 
difficult by the fact that there is typically a high level of comorbidity 
between PTSD and other anxiety disorders, and more particularly 
with depression. Any attempt to identify 'pure' cases of PTSD would 
therefore result in a small, highly unrepresentative sample (76). Another 
complication is that because of a substantial degree of overlap in the 
diagnostic criteria many of these comorbidities may be more apparent 
than real. Attempts to control for comorbidity in consequence risk 
removing effects that are actually those of interest. Our strategy, based 
on our previous work (77), was therefore to compare PTSD patients 
regardless of comorbid depression with a similar group who met criteria 
for unipolar depression in the absence of PTSD. Our intention was to have 
two groups typical of those seen in clinical practice, matched as closely 
as possible on all relevant variables, e.g. severity of depression, use of 
antidepressants, and early trauma, and differing only in the presence or 
absence of PTSD. A third, psychiatrically healthy, group provided a control 
for the effects of trauma exposure. 
We hypothesized decreased grey matter volume in fronto-limbic 
structures and specifically the hippocampus and ACC in both clinical 
groups compared to the trauma control group. Previous research has 
also suggested the existence of more subtle structural effects relevant 
to psychopathology, independent of overall differences in volume, such 
as a correlation between self-reported anxiety and hippocampal volumes 
in depressed patients and healthy controls (78). Both self-reported 
anxiety and depression are likely to be elevated, relative to controls, in 
samples with PTSD and major depressive disorder. We therefore sought 
to investigate whether any group differences in brain structure were 
accounted for by current levels of anxiety and depression and whether, 
independent of overall difference in volume, correlations between 
brain structure and self-reported anxiety and depression differed in the 
depressed and PTSD samples. In order to improve the sensitivity of VBM 
we used the Dartel algorithm, an improved registration method applied 
to one of the pre-processing steps, which has recently been developed 
within SPM. A study with acutely depressed patients confirmed that VBM-
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DARTEL was more sensitive than standard VBM in detecting hippocampal 
abnormalities (79). 
2.4 Methods
2.4.1 Participants
T1-weighted magnetic resonance images of 82 subjects were collected as 
part of two functional magnetic resonance imaging studies. Participants 
were right-handed, under age 50, were not currently abusing substances, 
and had no history of head injury, neurological disorders, or other 
major medical conditions. The PTSD group consisted of 24 individuals 
(9 men) with an average age of 35.9 years (range 25-47 years). All met 
diagnostic criteria for current PTSD when assessed with the Structured 
Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (80). They had experienced a range of 
traumas, including exposure to traumatic death (n=11), robbery/assault 
(n=5), accidents (n=1), abuse in childhood (n=6), and other (n=1). Ten 
were currently taking antidepressant medication. The depressed group 
consisted of 29 individuals (8 men) with an average age of 33.4 years 
(range 24 to 47 years). All met diagnostic criteria for current major 
depressive disorder but not for PTSD when assessed with the SCID. 
They reported exposure to traumatic death (n=4), robbery/assault 
(n=5), and abuse in childhood (n=3). Twenty-two were currently taking 
antidepressant medication. The trauma control group consisted of 29 
individuals (13 men) with an average age of 32.45 years (range 21-49 
years). None met diagnostic criteria for any psychiatric disorder when 
assessed with the SCID and none were currently taking any psychotropic 
medication. They reported exposure to traumatic death (n=13), robbery/
assault (n=7), accidents (n=7), and other (n=2). All participants gave 
written informed consent, and all procedures were approved by the 
National Hospital for Neurology and Neurosurgery & Institute of 
Neurology Joint Research Ethics Committee.
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2.5 Measures
The Beck Anxiety Inventory (81) is a widely used self-report measure 
of the severity of physiological and cognitive components of anxiety. It 
contains 21 items that are scored on a 4-point scale (possible range 0-63). 
Participants were instructed to rate their mood over the past week.
The Beck Depression Inventory 2 (82) is a widely-used 21-item self-report 
measure of depression severity. It contains 21 items that are scored on a 
4-point scale (possible range 0-63). Participants were instructed to rate 
their mood over the past week. 
The Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale (83) is a widely-used 17-item measure 
for use after a specific traumatic event. It assesses the frequency with 
which each symptom of PTSD has been experienced over the past month. 
Items are scored on a 4-point scale (possible range 0-51).
2.6 MRI acquisition
T1-weighted images were acquired on a Siemens 1.5 T Sonata whole body 
scanner (Siemens Medical Systems, Erlangen, Germany), using a whole-
body coil for RF transmission and a head coil for signal reception. Whole-
brain structural scans were acquired using a Modified Driven Equilibrium 
Fourier Transform (MDEFT) sequence (84) with optimized parameters as 
described in the literature (85). For each volunteer, 176 sagittal partitions 
were acquired with an image matrix of 256x224 (Read x Phase). Two-fold 
over-sampling was performed in read direction (head/foot direction) 
to prevent aliasing. The isotropic spatial resolution was 1 mm. Relevant 
imaging parameters were TR/TE/TI = 12.24 ms/3.56 ms/530 ms, BW = 106 
Hz/Px, Î± = 23Â°.  The total duration was 12 min. Spin tagging in the neck 
was performed to avoid flow artefacts in the vicinity of blood vessels. The 
flip angle of the tagging pulse was chosen to be 110Â° to account for B1 
losses in the neck. Special RF excitation pulses were used to compensate 
for B1 inhomogeneities of the transmit coil in superior/inferior (86) 
and anterior/posterior (87) directions. Images were reconstructed by 
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performing a standard 3D Fourier Transform, followed by modulus 
calculation. No data filtering was applied either in k-space or in the image 
domain.
2.7 MRI Processing
T1-weighted image registration was achieved using the diffeomorphic 
registration algorithm implemented in the DARTEL toolbox (88) for SPM5 
(Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London, UK; http://www.fil.
ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Dartel has been found to optimize the sensitivity 
of such analyses (79, 89). First, the anatomical images were manually 
reoriented so that the mm coordinate of the AC matched the origin 
[0,0,0], and the orientation approximated MNI space. Next T1-weighted 
images were classified into grey matter (GM), white matter (WM) and 
cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) using the segmentation routine implemented 
in SPM5 applying standard settings. The resulting parameter files were 
imported into the DARTEL procedure to produce rigidly aligned grey and 
white matter tissue classes resliced to 1.5x1.5x1.5 mm voxel size. After the 
affine transformation the rigidly aligned tissue class images were used 
to estimate the nonlinear deformations to best align all images. During 
this estimation stage, DARTEL iterates between building a template and 
registering tissue class images using the template. The resulting flow-
fields, which specify the parameterized deformations, were used to warp 
white and grey matter images for each subject. The spatially normalized 
images were rescaled by the Jacobian determinants of the deformations, 
using 64 time points for solving the partial differential equations. 7-th 
degree B-spline interpolation was used when writing the normalized 
images. In order to obtain meaningful coordinates of volume alterations, 
the final DARTEL template was normalized to MNI space and the resulting 
deformations applied to the grey matter images of each subject using a 
Matlab script downloaded from the SPM email list (https://www.jiscmail.
ac.uk/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0807&L=SPM&P=R34150%20032749). Finally 
the images were smoothed using an 8x8x8 mm Gaussian smoothing 
kernel. The input features for the subsequent analysis were the smoothed, 
modulated and normalized GM images.
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2.8 Statistical analyses
Grey matter group differences were modelled using a factorial design 
with the factor Group having 3 levels (PTSD, depressed, trauma control). 
We followed up a significant main effect of Group was followed up with 
comparisons between individual groups, inclusively masked with the 
results of the original Group effect (at uncorrected mask p = 0.05) to 
avoid type-I errors. Measurements were assumed to be independent 
between levels, but variance was assumed to be unequal. Error 
covariance components were estimated by restricted maximum likelihood 
(REML) by SPM5, and used for inference and to adjust the degrees of 
freedom. We used absolute threshold masking at 0.05 to specify the 
voxels within the image volume that were to be assessed. As non-
stationarity is problematic in cluster-level inferences in VBM data (90, 91) 
and requires adjustment of cluster sizes according to local smoothness 
of data (90, 92), we adjusted our cluster-level results according to this 
method as implemented in the VBM5 toolbox developed by C. Gaser 
(http://dbm.neuro.uni-jena.de/vbm/download/). Additionally, we created 
hippocampus and ACC region-of-interest (ROI) masks using the PickAtlas 
toolbox (93) and applied as small volume correction. For each region two 
masks were created, one based on the WFU atlas and one on the AAL 
atlas (94).
To examine the explanatory power of the continuous measures of anxiety 
and depression, the above analyses were repeated including the BAI and 
BDI as covariates, centred to the overall mean. Finally, to investigate 
differential effects of BAI and BDI on PTSD and depression, we converted 
the BAI and BDI scores to z-scores for each group separately. We excluded 
the control group from this analysis as there were floor effects on the 
BAI and BDI and hence little explanatory variance for either measure. The 
z-scores (with scores for one group reversed, i.e. times -1) were then used 
to specify regressors testing the interaction of Group (PTSD, depressed) 
with anxiety and depression respectively, with effects thresholded at 
p<0.001. The effects of group differences in antidepressant use were 
additionally controlled for in the analyses. In order to restrict type-I 
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errors, significant interactions were saved as threshold images and used 
to inclusively mask explanatory analyses of the effects of the BAI and BDI 
within each group separately.
2.9 Results
2.9.1 Participants
PTSD group consisted of 24 individuals (9 men) with a mean age of 35.9 
(range 25-47) years. They had experienced a range of traumas, including 
exposure to traumatic death (n = 11), robbery/assault (n = 5), accidents 
(n = 1), abuse in childhood (n = 6) and other (n = 1). Ten were currently 
taking antidepressant medication. The major depression group consisted 
of 29 individuals (8 men) with a mean age of 33.4 (range 24-47) years. 
They reported exposure to traumatic death (n = 4), robbery/assault (n 
= 5) and abuse in childhood (n = 3). Twenty-two were currently taking 
antidepressant medication. The control group consisted of 29 individuals 
(13 men) with a mean age of 32.45 (range 21-49) years. They reported 
exposure to traumatic death (n = 13), robbery/assault (n = 7), accidents (n 
= 7) and other (n = 2).
2.9.2 Demographic and symptom measures
The groups did not differ in sex composition, Χ2
2
 = 1.87 (p = 0.39), or 
age, F
2, 79
 = 1.77, (p = 0.18). There were no group differences in estimated 
lifetime units of alcohol consumed, F
2, 77
 = 2.92 (p = 0.06), but the 
depressed group was significantly more likely than the PTSD group to be 
taking antidepressant medication, Χ2
1
 = 6.40, P = 0.011. We conducted 
an initial group (PTSD, Depression) x medication (on medication, off 
medication) analysis test for effects of antidepressant treatment on grey 
matter volume. No cluster-level significant main effect or interaction 
involving medication was found.  In comparisons of grey matter volume 
between the PTSD and major depression groups, use of medication was 
modelled as a covariate of no interest owing to the relative small groups 
(medication-free depression patients , n = 7). The PTSD group scored 
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significantly higher than the trauma controls on the PDS (t(51) = 12.33, 
P < 0.001, PTSD mean: 35.58, SD: 9.90; trauma control mean: 8.48, SD: 
5.92:). Scores in the PTSD group were slightly in excess of those expected 
according to the authors of the PDS (83). There were group differences on 
the BAI (F
2, 78
 = 36.79, P < 0.001, PTSD mean: 30.39, SD: 14.44; depressed 
mean: 18.76, SD: 9.45; trauma control mean: 6.14, SD: 5.91). Post-hoc 
least significant difference tests indicated that all three groups differed 
significantly from each other. There were also group differences on the 
BDI (F
2, 79
 = 76.76, P < 0.001, PTSD mean: 31.12, SD: 11.49; depressed mean: 
30.00, SD: 8.34; trauma control mean: 5.21, SD: 6.55). Post-hoc least 
significant difference tests indicated that the controls scored significantly 
lower than the two clinical groups, who did not differ from each other. 
The patients with PTSD were at least mildly depressed, scoring in the 
range 14-61 on the BDI. Thus the two clinical groups were matched on 
relevant variables including severity of depression and differed primarily 
on the variable of interest, PTSD symptoms.
2.9.3 VBM group differences: Combined clinical groups show 
reduced volume compared to the control group
The one-way ANOVA showed a significant overall effect of Group. Tests 
did not indicate any significant differences in brain volume between the 
depressed and PTSD groups, and subsequent analysis therefore focused 
A B C
Figure 2.1 Volume reduction in the combined clinical groups compared to controls
Reduced grey matter volume in the combined clinical groups compared to the trauma control group is 
displayed on the normalised Dartel grey matter template over all three groups. Volume reductions in the 
middle cingulate gyrus and medial prefrontal cortex (A), anterior cingulate gyrus and orbitofrontal cortex 
(B), and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (C) are observed, thresholded at p = 0.001.
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on the contrast between the combined clinical groups and the trauma 
control group. As shown in Table S1.1 and Figure 2.1, the clinical groups 
show clusters of decreased brain volume compared with controls in the 
middle cingulate cortex; in the medial prefrontal gyrus extending from 
the medial portions of the superior frontal gyrus at the precentral gyrus 
to the orbitofrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex; and in an area 
within the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex spanning the middle frontal 
gyrus and superior frontal gyrus. Several other areas are significant at 
cluster level but fail to survive FWE correction. Applying small volume 
corrections (SVC) reveals an additional cluster of volumetric reduction in 
the ACC.
A B
C D
E F
Figure 2.2 Volume reductions in the PTSD group associated with increasing BAI scores
Increased BAI scores are associated with grey matter volume decreases in the PTSD group. Analyses are 
inclusively masked with the BAI x Group (PTSD, depressed) interaction effect and results are displayed on 
the normalised Dartel grey matter template over all three groups. Volume reduction in the fusiform gyrus 
(A), middle frontal gyrus (B), inferior temporal gyrus (C), transverse gyrus (D), putamen (E, and D right), 
middle temporal gyrus (F) are presented, thresholded at p = 0.001.
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2.9.4 BAI and BDI scores explain away volumetric reductions in 
combined clinical groups compared with the control group
To identify explanations for the observed volume reduction, we 
investigated morphological differences between the combined clinical 
groups and the control group controlling for individual scores on the BAI 
and BDI. These contrasts yielded no voxel-level significant results which 
survived FWE correction for the whole-brain volume. Additionally, no 
differences were found using SVC for the ACC and hippocampus. Inclusion 
of continuous psychopathology scores as a covariate thus explained away 
group differences.
2.9.5 Group x BAI interaction effect
To investigate differences between the groups in correlations between 
brain structure and self-reported anxiety, independent of overall 
differences in brain volume, we tested the Group (PTSD, depressed) x BAI 
interaction. This revealed a cluster including anterior areas of the left 
inferior temporal gyrus and middle temporal gyrus spanning the temporal 
pole; a left sided cluster including the fusiform gyrus, lingual gyrus 
and cerebellar vermis; a right sided cluster across the anterior inferior 
temporal gyrus and temporal pole; and a posterior cluster in the inferior 
temporal gyrus spreading to the middle temporal gyrus (Table S1.2 and 
BA
Figure 2.3 Volume increases in the depressed group associated with increasing BAI scores
Increased BAI scores are associated with grey matter volume increases in the depressed group. Analyses 
are inclusively masked with the BAI x Group (PTSD, depressed) interaction effect and results are displayed 
on the normalised Dartel grey matter template over all three groups. Volume increases in the middle 
temporal gyrus (A) and superior frontal gyrus (B) are presented, thresholded at p = 0.001.
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Supplemental Figure 2.1). Several other areas are significant at cluster 
level but fail to survive FWE correction.
Further analysis of this interaction by assessing volumetric changes within 
each group individually, inclusively masked by the overall interaction 
effect, reveals that for the PTSD group BAI scores are inversely associated 
with grey matter volumes in the fusiform gyrus, middle frontal gyrus, 
inferior temporal gyrus, transverse gyrus, cerebellum, middle temporal 
gyrus, putamen, and frontal operculum (Table S1.3 and Figure 2.2). In 
contrast, the depressed group shows a positive association between BAI 
scores and grey matter volumes in middle temporal gyrus and superior 
frontal gyrus (Table 2.4 and Figure 2.3). 
2.9.6 Group x BDI interaction effect
To investigate similar differences between the groups in correlations 
between brain structure and self-reported depression, we tested the 
Group (PTSD, depressed) x BDI interaction on grey matter volume. This 
revealed a cluster including the right lingual gyrus, bilateral cuneus and 
right precuneus; and a cluster within the left fusiform gyrus (Table 2.5, 
A B
C D
Figure 2.4 Volume reductions in the PTSD group associated with increasing BDI scores
Increased BDI scores are associated with grey matter volume decreases in the PTSD group. Analyses are 
inclusively masked with the BDI x Group (PTSD, depressed) interaction effect and results are displayed on 
the normalised Dartel grey matter template over all three groups. Volume decreases in the superior frontal 
gyrus (A), fusiform gyrus (B), lingual gyrus (C), and cuneus (D) are presented, thresholded at p = 0.001.
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Supplemental Figure 2.2). Several other areas are significant at cluster 
level but fail to survive FWE correction.
Following the masking approach used to examine the earlier interaction, 
BDI scores in the PTSD group were inversely associated with grey matter 
volumes in the superior frontal gyrus, fusiform gyrus, lingual gyrus, and 
cuneus (Table 2.6 and Figure 2.4). In contrast, BDI scores in the depressed 
group were positively associated with grey matter volumes in the cuneus 
and precuneus, fusiform gyrus, and middle frontal gyrus (Table 2.7 and 
Figure 2.5). 
2.10 Discussion
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to have directly 
compared brain volumes in matched samples of PTSD and depressed 
patients, with similar levels of depression and differing only in the 
presence of PTSD. Consistent with the marked overlap in areas of 
brain volume reduction identified in previous studies of each disorder 
separately, we were not able to find evidence for unique structural 
changes associated with PTSD. Volume reductions were found in common 
A B
C
Figure 2.5 Volume increases in the depressed group associated with increasing BDI scores
Increased BDI scores are associated with grey matter volume increases in the depressed group. Analyses 
are inclusively masked with the BDI x Group (PTSD, depressed) interaction effect and results are displayed 
on the normalised Dartel grey matter template over all three groups. Volume increases in the cuneus/pre-
cuneus (A), fusiform gyrus (B), and again cuneus and precuneus depicting locations in both regions (C).
36
predominantly in frontal areas such as the dorsal ACC, consistent with 
prior studies of PTSD (56-59)  and depression (63). Reductions in rostral 
ACC also mirrored previous findings in PTSD (60, 62) and depression (64, 
65, 67-69). Other areas in which we detected reduced volume in common 
included medial orbitofrontal cortex, as previously implicated in PTSD 
(95) and depression (63, 72, 73). Reduced DLPFC volume has previously 
been found in young adults exposed to harsh physical punishment (96) 
and PTSD patients show abnormal recruitment of DLPFC activity during a 
working-memory updating task (97). The DLPFC is also implicated in the 
pathophysiology of depression (25). 
Of note is the absence of evidence for hippocampal reduction in the 
clinical samples. Findings concerning hippocampal volume have been 
heterogeneous, with many studies of PTSD failing to report abnormalities 
in this area (98-102). There may be as yet undetected associations such 
that specific trauma histories, e.g. prolonged or childhood trauma, are 
more likely to be associated with changes in these areas. Hippocampal 
reduction may also be a preexisting vulnerability factor rather than a 
general consequence of PTSD (103).
As previously noted, (62) the convergent structural neuroimaging 
findings in PTSD and depression raise issues about whether models of the 
neurocircuitry of PTSD (104) reflect common vulnerabilities to different 
types of psychopathology. Similar models have also been put forward to 
account for mood alterations in depression (25, 66). Our findings could be 
taken to suggest that many of the neurobiological observations in PTSD 
do indeed relate to common mechanisms of emotional control rather than 
being specific to PTSD, or alternatively that they are better explained as 
being due to comorbid depression.
Despite the overall lack of differences in brain volume, PTSD and 
depression could be distinguished by more subtle effects involving the 
association between scores on the continuous measures of anxiety 
and depression and brain volume. This adds to a previous study that 
found differences in functional responses to script-driven imagery in 
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PTSD patients with and without comorbid major depression (105). In 
our data, BAI scores were inversely associated in PTSD with volumes in 
a number of areas, primarily involving the inferior temporal lobes but 
also including frontal areas, the frontal operculum, and other temporal 
areas. Neuroanatomical experiments in monkeys have shown that the 
orbital and medial prefrontal cortex is associated with an extended 
cortical circuit (‘‘the orbital prefrontal network’’), which includes visual 
association areas in the inferior temporal cortex and somatic-sensory 
association areas in the insula and frontal operculum (25). The functions 
of this network, which is likely to be implicated in PTSD, are thought to 
include sensory integration and affective coding.
Integration of visual stimuli is performed by the inferior temporal 
structures that form part of the ventral visual stream, allowing visual 
events to be placed with a general temporal and spatial context. Unlike 
the dorsal visual stream, which supports egocentric representations of 
visual experience that retain a close link with the original perceptual 
input, visual processing in the ventral stream and related structures 
allows allocentric representations of scenes to be manipulated and 
combined in novel ways (106, 107). It has recently been proposed 
(108, 109) that flashbacks in PTSD arise from egocentric trauma 
representations within the dorsal stream that have received inadequate 
contextualization within the ventral visual stream. The fact that flashbacks 
are a symptom associated with PTSD and not depression (110) may be 
related to the differential patterns of correlation identified in this study
BDI scores were inversely associated in PTSD with volumes in similar 
regions, as well as in the superior frontal gyrus. This area has been 
implicated in the selection of action sets (111), and response inhibition 
(112). More strikingly, however, BDI scores were positively associated in 
the depressed group with volumes in the cuneus and precuneus, areas 
involved in visual processing and imagery. It is well-established that 
intrusive imagery involving past life stressors is extremely common in 
depression (110), and more frequent intrusions are regularly associated 
with higher depression scores on the BDI (113, 114).
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Among the limitations of our study was that the sample consisted of 
individuals with PTSD arising from a variety of sources and was too small 
to permit the analysis of subgroups. Although this suggests the results 
are more likely to be generalizable, it leaves open the possibility that 
different results would be obtained in more homogeneous samples. A 
limitation of our analysis of the group effect of antidepressant use was 
the relatively small groups (medication-free patients with depression, 
n=7). Much of the available literature is based on samples of combat 
veterans or sexual abuse survivors, and this may account for the fact 
that we did not detect volume changes in some previously identified 
areas such as the hippocampus. Given the evidence that prior trauma, 
particularly in childhood, is a risk factor for PTSD (115, 116), and that 
cumulative childhood trauma predicts greater symptom complexity (117), 
future studies should collect separate samples of PTSD following single 
and multiple traumatic exposure, and separately evaluate the effects of 
childhood trauma.
In summary, we were unable to identify differences between regions of 
reduced brain volumes specifically associated with PTSD and depression. 
Overall, areas of volume reduction are very similar; suggesting some 
shared deficits in mechanisms for regulating emotion. Nevertheless, 
each disorder reveals a distinct pattern in the relation of brain volume to 
continuous measures of anxiety and depression, with anxiety inversely 
associated with inferior temporal volumes in PTSD and depression 
positively associated with volumes in the cuneus and precuneus of 
depressed patients. The findings underscore the fact that despite high 
levels of comorbidity PTSD and depression appear to be different kinds 
of disorders, and emphasize the need for more investigations that study 
both conditions simultaneously and attempt to isolate their unique 
pathophysiological mechanisms.
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3 ASSOCIATION BETWEEN FLASHBACKS AND 
STRUCTURAL BRAIN ABNORMALITIES IN 
POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER.
3.1 Published as:
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3.2 Abstract
Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is reliably associated with reduced brain 
volume relative to healthy controls, in areas similar to those found in depression. 
We investigated whether in a PTSD sample brain volumes in these areas were 
related to reporting specific symptoms of PTSD or to overall symptom severity. 
Structural MRI scans were obtained from 28 participants diagnosed with PTSD 
according to DSM-IV-TR. Participants reported the extent of individual PTSD 
symptoms using the Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale. Voxel-based morphometry 
applying the Dartel algorithm implemented within SPM5 was used to identify 
volumetric changes, related to PTSD total, symptom cluster, and individual 
symptom scores. Brain volume was unrelated to overall PTSD severity, but 
greater reexperiencing scores predicted reduced volumes in the middle temporal 
and inferior occipital cortices. Increased reports of flashbacks predicted reduced 
volume in the insula/parietal operculum and in the inferior temporal gyrus. 
The data illustrate the value of analyses at the symptom level within a patient 
population to supplement group comparisons of patients and healthy controls. 
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3.3 Introduction
The study of structural brain variation in posttraumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD) has almost exclusively been based on comparisons of overall 
volume levels with samples exposed to trauma but who have not 
developed PTSD. The abnormalities that have been found, mainly 
reduced volumes in frontal and limbic areas, are similar to those 
implicated in major depressive disorder, raising the question of whether 
they correspond to specific characteristics of PTSD or reflect common 
difficulties, for example in emotion regulation (25, 118). A complementary 
strategy is to investigate the relationship between brain volume and 
the individual symptom clusters and symptoms of PTSD. This addresses 
the question of whether certain brain areas are relevant to variations 
in clinical presentation within PTSD samples, including overall severity. 
Such relations may exist regardless of whether these areas are reduced 
in volume compared to controls. The results may help to explain the 
function within PTSD of areas that are already known to be reduced in 
volume. They may also identify new areas that could be considered as 
regions of interest in future investigations, or indicate how specific brain 
regions of normal volume contribute to symptom expression.
Meta-analyses of structural MRI studies on individuals with posttraumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD) have consistently identified reductions in brain 
volume (51, 52), most prominently in the hippocampus. In addition, 
reductions in dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) (56-59), rostral 
ACC (60, 119), and insular cortex (56, 60, 61) have been implicated 
in PTSD. A meta-analysis (51) found further evidence for a reduction 
in the left amygdala of adult PTSD patients, and in the frontal cortex 
(but not the hippocampus) of paediatric PTSD samples. The results of 
individual studies of brain volume in PTSD have shown wide variability, 
however, usually attributed to the type of trauma, prescan duration of 
the illness, or MRI methodology (120, 121). Studies of depressed patients 
have identified volume reductions in similar areas, including subgenual, 
pregenual, and posterior ACC, dorsal medial/lateral PFC, orbital and 
ventrolateral PFC, hippocampus, and amygdala (122).
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Unlike other anxiety disorders and major depression, there are as yet 
no “core symptoms” that are essential for a diagnosis of PTSD in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR), 
with individuals rather having to report one out of five symptoms from 
cluster B (reexperiencing), three out of seven symptoms from cluster 
C (avoidance and numbing), and two out of five symptoms from cluster 
D (hyperarousal). As a result individual clinical presentations may vary 
widely, creating diagnostic heterogeneity. Faced with this heterogeneity, 
as well as with the frequently noted high levels of comorbidity, PTSD 
researchers have suggested that some symptoms are more highly 
diagnostic of the condition than others. The two groups of symptoms 
so identified are the avoidance and numbing symptoms (123) and the 
reexperiencing symptoms of flashbacks and traumatic nightmares (110).
In the current study we investigated whether structural brain variation 
in a PTSD sample was related to overall symptom severity and to the 
intensity of symptoms in specific PTSD clusters such as avoidance/
numbing and reexperiencing. We applied voxel-based morphometry to 
the structural MRI images using SPM5 and the Dartel toolbox, which 
has been found to optimize the sensitivity of such analyses (79, 89). We 
demonstrate no grey matter volume alterations related to overall PTSD 
severity, but do report an inverse relation between grey matter volume 
in the middle temporal and inferior occipital cortices and reexperiencing 
symptom cluster scores. Of the individual reexperiencing symptoms, 
reports of flashbacks were related to volume reductions, predominantly 
in the inferior temporal gyrus and parietal operculum/insula. Limited 
evidence was found for volumetric changes related to reports of 
nightmares and experiencing distress on trauma reminders. 
3.4 Methods and Materials
3.4.1 Participants
Participants were a mixed sample of individuals meeting diagnostic 
criteria for current PTSD. The majority of participants were outpatients 
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recruited from a specialist traumatic stress clinic, where diagnoses were 
independently confirmed, and the remainder from advertisements. 
Exclusion criteria were a history of head injury, neurological disorders, 
psychosis, or other major medical conditions, as well as current substance 
abuse. PTSD diagnoses were confirmed with the Structured Clinical 
Interview for DSM-IV (80), administered by a trained postdoctoral 
psychologist under the supervision of a clinical psychologist expert in 
trauma and PTSD. Demographic and clinical characteristics of the 28 
right-handed individuals who met inclusion criteria are reported in Table 
3.1. All patients gave written informed consent, and all procedures were 
approved by the National Hospital for Neurology and Neurosurgery & 
Institute of Neurology Joint Research Ethics Committee. 
3.4.2 Measures
The Posttraumatic Diagnostic Scale (PDS) (83) is a widely-used self-report 
measure with high reliability and validity. Items measuring each of the 
17 PTSD symptoms are rated on a 0-3 scale and can be summed to yield 
subscores for the reexperiencing, avoidance/numbing, and hyperarousal 
symptom clusters as well as a total score. In this sample the mean PDS 
score (see Table 3.1) was above the average of 33.59 scored by individuals 
diagnosed with DSM-IV PTSD in the original validation sample (83). PDS 
scores were higher in those currently on antidepressant medication, r(28) 
= .50, p < .01.
The Beck Depression Inventory 2 (82) is a widely-used 21-item self-report 
measure of depression severity. Items are scored on a 4-point scale 
(possible range 0-63). Participants were instructed to rate their mood 
over the past week. The average score in the sample (see Table 3.1) 
indicated a mood state associated with severe depression (81).
3.4.3 MRI acquisition
T1-weighted images were acquired on a Siemens 1.5 T Sonata whole body 
scanner (Siemens Medical Systems, Erlangen, Germany), using a whole-
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body coil for RF transmission and a head coil for signal reception. Whole-
brain structural scans were acquired using a Modified Driven Equilibrium 
Fourier Transform (MDEFT) sequence (84) with optimized parameters as 
described in the literature (85). For each volunteer, 176 sagittal partitions 
were acquired with an image matrix of 256x224 (Read x Phase). Two-fold 
over-sampling was performed in read direction (head/foot direction) 
to prevent aliasing. The isotropic spatial resolution was 1 mm. Relevant 
imaging parameters were TR/TE/TI = 12.24 ms/3.56 ms/530 ms, BW = 106 
Hz/Px, Î± = 23Â°.  The total duration was 12 min. Spin tagging in the neck 
was performed to avoid flow artefacts in the vicinity of blood vessels. The 
flip angle of the tagging pulse was chosen to be 110Â° to account for B1 
losses in the neck. Special RF excitation pulses were used to compensate 
for B1 inhomogeneities of the transmit coil in superior/inferior (86) 
and anterior/posterior (87) directions. Images were reconstructed by 
performing a standard 3D Fourier Transform, followed by modulus 
calculation. No data filtering was applied either in k-space or in the image 
domain.
3.4.4 MRI Processing
T1-weighted image registration was achieved using the diffeomorphic 
registration algorithm implemented in the Dartel toolbox (88) for 
SPM5 (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London, UK; http://
www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). First, the anatomical images were manually 
reoriented so that the mm coordinate of the AC matched the origin 
[0,0,0], and the orientation approximated MNI space. Next T1-weighted 
images were classified into grey matter (GM), white matter (WM) and 
cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) using the segmentation routine implemented 
in SPM5 applying standard settings. The resulting parameter files were 
imported into the Dartel procedure to produce rigidly aligned grey and 
white matter tissue classes resliced to 1.5x1.5x1.5 mm voxel size. After the 
affine transformation the rigidly aligned tissue class images were used 
to estimate the nonlinear deformations to best align all images. During 
this estimation stage, Dartel iterates between building a template and 
registering tissue class images using the template. The resulting flow-
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fields, which specify the parameterized deformations, were used to warp 
white and grey matter images for each subject. The spatially normalized 
images were rescaled by the Jacobian determinants of the deformations, 
using 64 time points for solving the partial differential equations. 7-th 
degree B-spline interpolation was used when writing the normalized 
images. In order to obtain meaningful coordinates of activation, the 
final Dartel template was normalized to MNI space and the resulting 
deformations applied to the grey matter images of each subject using a 
Matlab script downloaded from the SPM email list (https://www.jiscmail.
ac.uk/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0807&L=SPM&P=R34150%20032749). Finally 
the images were smoothing using an 8x8x8 mm Gaussian smoothing 
kernel. The input features for the subsequent analysis were the smoothed, 
modulated and normalized GM images.
3.4.5 Analysis
Regression was used to relate PTSD total, symptom cluster, and individual 
symptom scores to brain morphology. Where appropriate covariate 
vector scores were centred to the overall mean and no interactions were 
modelled. Multiple regression was used to analyze the unique effects of 
each symptom cluster controlling for the other two clusters. Given the 
relatively small variance in the symptom scores more detailed analyses 
at the symptom level used simple regression. We report regions that 
survive cluster-level corrections for multiple comparisons (family-wise 
error, FWE) across the whole brain at p<0.05, with individual voxels 
thresholded at p<0.001, unless otherwise specified. As non-stationarity 
is problematic in cluster-level inferences in VBM data (90, 91) requiring 
adjustment of cluster sizes according to local smoothness of data (90, 
92), we have adjusted our cluster level results according to this method 
as implemented in the VBM5 toolbox developed by C. Gaser (http://dbm.
neuro.uni-jena.de/vbm/download/). One subject was considered an outlier 
with an overall PDS score of 19, more than twice the standard deviation 
below the mean, but repetition of the analysis excluding this person did 
not affect the results.
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3.5 Results
3.5.1 3.1 Overall Severity of PTSD
Analysis of the total PDS score did not reveal any significant grey matter 
volume decreases or increases that survived cluster level correction (see 
above).
3.5.2 PTSD Symptom Clusters
Grey matter volume alterations were uniquely predicted by 
reexperiencing scores, but not by any other symptom cluster scores. 
Reexperiencing scores predicted reduced grey matter volume in the left 
middle temporal gyrus and right inferior occipital gyrus (Table 3.2, Figure 
3.1). For illustrative purposes the adjusted data at the peak voxel (y-axis) 
plotted against the reexperiencing scores (X-axis) are depicted in Figure 
3.1. The plot shows a strong linear effect indicating that the volume 
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Figure 3.1 Reductions in brain volume with increasing reexperiencing cluster scores
Increased scores on the reexperiencing cluster predict decreased grey matter volume in the left middle 
temporal gyrus (A) and right inferior occipital gyrus (B). Results are displayed on the normalized Dartel 
grey matter template (image thresholded at p < .001, uncor.).  Right: The adjusted responses at the peak 
voxel (Y-axis) are plotted against the reexperiencing scores (X-axis) for each individual subject.
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Figure 3.2 Reductions in brain volume with increasing flashback scores
Increased flashback scores predict decreased grey matter volume in the inferior temporal gyrus (A), 
parietal operculum (B), cerebellum (C), superior medial gyrus (D), and middle temporal gyrus (E). Results 
are displayed on the normalized Dartel grey matter template (image thresholded at p < .001, uncor.). 
Right: The adjusted responses at the peak voxel for each region displayed (Y-axis) are plotted against the 
flashback scores (X-axis) for each individual subject.
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reductions are associated with overall increases in reexperiencing scores. 
Although two possible outliers can be detected, exclusion of these cases 
increased the strength of the effect.
In additional analyses (Tables 3.3-3.6) we examined the effects of 
controlling for age, gender, education level, and Beck Depression 
Inventory scores. Reductions in the middle temporal area were still 
observed when controlling for BDI scores, but reduction in right occipital 
areas were no longer detected. In all additional analyses there was strong 
and consistent evidence for a relationship between reexperiencing and a 
reduction in the size of right inferior temporal cortex (BA20).
3.5.3 PTSD Reexperiencing Symptoms
Simple regressions conducted on the five reexperiencing symptoms 
separately revealed marked effects only for flashback scores (symptom 
B3). Increasing reports of flashbacks predicted reduced grey matter 
volume in the right inferior temporal gyrus and left parietal operculum 
(Table 3.7, Figure 3.2) as well as a cerebellar region. In addition reduced 
volumes within the medial extent of the superior frontal gyrus, the right 
middle temporal gyrus, the left inferior temporal gyrus, the right inferior 
occipital gyrus, the left middle occipital gyrus, and the left inferior 
frontal gyrus were cluster-level significant but did not survive whole-
brain correction. Again for illustrative purposes plotting the adjusted 
data at the peak voxel against the flashback scores of any of the detected 
voxel-clusters reveals strong linear effects indicating that the volume 
reductions are associated with overall increases in flashback scores and 
are not driven by outliers. Flashback scores were unrelated to gender, 
age, or lifetime units of alcohol, largest r(28) = .17, p > .10.
In additional analyses (Tables 3.8-3.11) we examined the effects of 
controlling for age, gender, education level, and Beck Depression 
Inventory scores. Reductions in the right inferior temporal gyrus (BA20) 
and left parietal operculum, but not the cerebellum, were still consistently 
observed. In contrast, increasing reports of nightmares predicted volume 
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reductions in the right precentral gyrus and right inferior occipital gyrus 
that failed to reach significance after whole-brain correction (Table 3.12). 
Increasing reports of distress on trauma reminders predicted significant 
volume reductions in the right cerebellum. They also predicted volume 
reductions in the right superior orbital gyrus but these did not survive 
whole-brain correction (Table 3.13).
3.6 Discussion
Previous structural brain imaging studies of patients suffering either from 
PTSD or depression have identified reduced volume in similar frontal and 
limbic areas, including the hippocampus. Contrary to the assumption 
that the overall level of PTSD symptoms is linearly related to structural 
changes in the brain, we were unable to find any evidence that volume 
in these areas was related to overall symptom severity in a sample all 
diagnosed with PTSD. As previously noted, volumetric alterations related 
to symptom levels within a PTSD sample may or may not be present 
despite overall volume differences relative to healthy samples. PTSD 
is a highly heterogeneous disorder, encompassing intrusive cognition, 
deliberate avoidance, emotional numbing, and increased arousal. Our 
data indicated that smaller grey matter volumes were specifically related 
to reporting more symptoms from the reexperiencing cluster and, within 
that cluster, predominantly with flashback symptoms.
Symptom cluster analyses revealed two areas where volume was inversely 
related to increased rexperiencing scores, one being the left middle 
temporal gyrus (BA 21). This area has previously been linked to semantic 
processing (124) and to the retrieval of autobiographical memories (125), 
as well as being part of the 'default network' of brain areas that are 
active at rest and are thought to be involved in processing self-related 
information and introspective memory retrieval and has been found 
to be disregulated in PTSD (126-128). A recent functional MRI study of 
individuals with PTSD related to early life trauma found significantly 
reduced middle temporal activity in BA 21 compared to healthy controls 
(129). Stress-induced dissociative psychopathology has also been linked to 
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reduced middle temporal activity (130). The other area with significantly 
reduced volume was the right inferior occipital gyrus (BA 18). This 
area is part of the ventral visual stream, involved in the selection and 
classification of visual information. As explained in greater detail below, 
it has been suggested that in PTSD processing of traumatic scenes by the 
ventral stream is impaired (131).
Flashbacks were the symptom within the reexperiencing cluster to 
be most clearly related to reductions in brain volume. Flashbacks 
refer to intrusive memories in which the traumatic incident, including 
accompanying emotions and bodily reactions, are subjectively 
reexperienced in the present. These features, along with the fact that 
retrieval is involuntary, have generally been attributed to the underlying 
memory representations lacking adequate contextualization (104, 132-
134). Compared to ordinary autobiographical memories flashbacks are 
typified by prominent sensory and somatosensory features such as pain 
(107, 135). They may vary in intensity from a transient sense of reliving 
the past while simultaneously being aware of the present to a full-blown 
reliving accompanied by a complete loss of connection with the outside 
world. This sense of reliving in the present distinguishes the intrusive 
sensory memories found in PTSD from those found in other disorders 
such as depression (136).
We found that flashbacks were inversely related to volume in an area 
including the insula and the parietal operculum. The insula has previously 
found to have a reduced volume in PTSD (56, 60, 61), and both areas 
are strongly implicated in somatosensory processing. A functional MRI 
investigation of PTSD patients using PET has reported that flashback 
intensity was positively related to bilateral activity in the insula, as well 
as being negatively related to activity in the bilateral superior frontal 
cortices, right medial temporal cortex, and right fusiform cortex (137.
We found flashback scores to be inversely related to the volume of 
lateral ventral regions of the right temporal cortex. The inferior temporal 
cortex is part of the ventral visual stream, and is thought to be involved 
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in coding abstract features of visual scenes. Along with other temporal 
lobe structures such as the hippocampus, activity in this region allows 
events to be placed with a general temporal and spatial context. Unlike 
the dorsal stream, which supports egocentric representations of visual 
experience that retain a close link with the original perceptual input, 
visual processing in the ventral stream and related structures allows 
allocentric representations of scenes to be manipulated and combined 
in novel ways (106, 107). Consistent with evidence that PTSD may be 
associated with a preexisting deficit in allocentric processing (103), it has 
recently been proposed that flashbacks in PTSD arise from egocentric 
trauma representations within the dorsal stream that have received 
inadequate contextualization within the ventral visual stream (131). An 
inverse association between more flashbacks and the volume of ventral 
temporal cortex is consistent with this theory.
Among the limitations of the present findings are the modest sample size 
and use of 1.5T MRI, both of which may have reduced the power to detect 
other significant effects. We also draw attention to the lower reliability 
and relatively small variance in the scores of the independent variable 
when analyses are conducted at the level of individual symptoms. This 
underscores the need for replication and could be overcome in future 
studies by including a more extensive assessment involving multiple 
items targeting the symptoms of most theoretical interest. Our sample 
also consisted of individuals with PTSD arising from a variety of sources 
and was too small to permit the analysis of subgroups. Although this 
suggests the results are more likely to be generalizable, it leaves open 
the possibility that, for example, effects may be stronger in civilian than 
military trauma. The data are also silent about whether there are volume 
differences in the identified areas compared to healthy controls, but 
they do identify regions of interest for future studies. A final limitation 
is uncertainty about the possible direction of any causal effects. Our 
data are consistent both with the experience of repeated reexperiencing 
or flashbacks causing reductions in brain volume and with preexisting 
volume reductions in these regions leading to increased symptoms, 
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although recent human imaging data suggests that prolonged stress can 
have a causal long-lasting effect on brain function (138).
In contrast to what might have been predicted from previous research, 
our data did not identify the hippocampus as a site in which brain volume 
varied with symptom intensity. There are various explanations of this. 
For example, hippocampal reduction has also been found in several other 
disorders, particularly depression, and may be a marker for more general 
psychopathology rather than PTSD symptoms specifically. Alternatively, 
the relation between hippocampal volume and symptom expression may 
be more variable across participants. Our data did nevertheless identify 
brain regions that may be involved in specific PTSD symptoms. Further, 
they suggest that variability in the findings of structural imaging studies 
in PTSD, and conceivably in other disorders as well, may be accounted for 
by in part by heterogeneity in the constituent symptoms.
In summary, volumetric studies at the symptom level have the ability 
to complement studies of participants defined by an overall syndrome. 
Because the analyses focus on relation to individual symptoms, they may 
identify areas where volumetric reductions are significant predictors of 
symptom expression without characterizing the disorder as a whole (and 
without necessarily demonstrating differences with healthy controls). We 
have shown that such analyses can identify new regions of interest that 
are consistent with a neurobiological model of flashbacks (103, 139).
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4 AN FMRI INVESTIGATION OF POSTTRAUMATIC 
FLASHBACKS.
4.1 Published as:
Whalley MG, Kroes MCW, Huntley Z, Rugg, MD, and Brewin CR (2013). An fMRI 
Investigation of Posttraumatic Flashbacks. Brain and Cognition, 81, 151-159.
4.2 Abstract
Flashbacks are a defining feature of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), but 
there have been few studies of their neural basis. We tested predictions from 
a dual representation model of PTSD that, compared with ordinary episodic 
memories of the same traumatic event, flashbacks would be associated with 
activity in dorsal visual stream and related areas rather than in the medial 
temporal lobe. Participants with PTSD, with depression but not PTSD, and healthy 
controls were scanned during a recognition task with personally relevant stimuli. 
The contrast of flashbacks versus ordinary episodic trauma memories in PTSD 
was associated with increased activation in sensory and motor areas including 
the insula, precentral gyrus, supplementary motor area, and mid-occipital 
cortex. The same contrast was associated with decreased activation in the 
midbrain, parahippocampal gyrus, and precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex. The 
results are discussed in terms of theories of PTSD and dual-process models of 
recognition. 
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4.3 Introduction
Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) has frequently been characterised 
as a disorder of memory (140, 141). PTSD patients typically experience 
flashbacks, involuntary sensory images of the traumatic scene. 
These images are vivid, detailed, and lack temporal context, being 
re-experienced as though they were happening in the present (135). 
Flashbacks co-exist with ordinary episodic memories of the trauma that 
can be deliberately retrieved and communicated. The dual representation 
theory of PTSD (132, 133) makes an unusual prediction that, despite 
flashbacks being extremely vivid, they should involve less rather than 
more medial temporal lobe (MTL) activity. We carried out a preliminary 
test of this hypothesis by contrasting neural responses to stimuli eliciting 
either flashbacks or ordinary episodic memories of the same traumatic 
event in PTSD patients.
Previous research on the functional neuroanatomy of voluntary auto-
biographical memory has identified a core network of predominantly 
left-lateralized regions including the prefrontal cortex, MTL (in particular 
the hippocampus), and posterior cingulate (142). Emotional memories, in 
contrast, are associated with bilateral activation and engage additional 
areas such as the amygdala and insula (142, 143). Emotion is thought to 
enhance recollection, and increased recollective qualities such as level 
of detail, personal significance, and emotionality have been found to be 
accompanied by increased MTL and hippocampal activity (144-146). 
Research on healthy participants therefore suggests that particularly 
detailed and emotional memories should be accompanied by high levels 
of activation in networks including hippocampal and parahippocampal 
regions. In contrast, the dual representation theory of PTSD distinguishes 
normal episodic memories, supported by flexible, contextualised 
representations, from flashbacks, supported by representations that 
are inflexible and lacking in context (131). Although there is no formal 
definition of a flashback, they are commonly thought to involve an 
intense sensory and emotional re-experiencing of the traumatic event 
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that exists on a continuum, ranging from complete loss of awareness of 
surroundings to a milder experience of reliving in the present (140). This 
continuum view is part of the definition proposed for the upcoming fifth 
revision of the American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual (DSM-V) (147). In the context of a basically intact episodic 
memory system, (visual) flashbacks are hypothesized (131) to reflect the 
dominance during the traumatic event of activity in the dorsal visual 
stream, extending from posterior visual to superior parietal regions, 
that processes sensation-near representations of experience designed to 
facilitate action. These dorsal visual stream representations are thought 
to be strongly associated with activity in motor cortex as well as with 
activity in the insula and amygdala. Dorsal stream activity is hypothesized 
to take precedence over activity in the ventral visual stream, including 
inferior and middle temporal regions, that ordinarily provides memories 
with their context.
Most previous neuroimaging studies of PTSD have employed the script-
driven imagery paradigm, in which participants simultaneously recall and 
imagine a traumatic event, a process which typically elicits additional 
involuntary trauma memories (148). A case study was reported (149) in 
which a Vietnam veteran experienced a flashback during the perfusion 
phase of a SPECT scan. Relative to his own baseline, and to that of a 
PTSD sample who did not experience flashbacks, he exhibited decreases 
in blood flow to a wide range of cortical and subcortical regions. More 
recently subjective flashback intensity was correlated with rCBF in 
eleven PTSD patients (137). They observed flashback-related increases 
in left inferior frontal cortex and bilateral insula, and flashback-related 
decreases in right medial temporal, right fusiform, and bilateral superior 
frontal cortices. Increased flashback reports in PTSD patients have also 
been found to be correlated with reduced brain volume in the left insula/
parietal operculum and in the right inferior temporal gyrus (150).
What are so far lacking are studies that directly compare flashbacks with 
ordinary episodic memories of the same traumatic event. In this study 
PTSD patients wrote a narrative account of their traumatic event, and 
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identified which sections were and were not accompanied by flashbacks 
(151, 152). We subsequently presented them with words and phrases from 
these flashback and episodic memory sections mixed with stimuli from 
another narrative. In order to determine which patterns of observed 
activity were unique to PTSD, we employed control groups of depressed 
patients and healthy controls who had experienced a traumatic event. 
We predicted that recognition of own versus other stimuli should show 
common effects across groups in previously identified areas, reflecting 
an intact episodic memory system. We also predicted that the flashback-
episodic trauma memory contrast in PTSD patients would be distinguished 
from trauma memory processing in the two control groups by an absence 
of common effects, and by increased dorsal stream and decreased ventral 
stream activity.
4.4 Methods and Materials
4.4.1 Participants
Participants were 39 right-handed individuals without a history of 
head injury, neurological disorders, or other major medical conditions, 
assessed using the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV (80). Ten 
patients met DSM-IV criteria for current PTSD (PTSD group). Fifteen 
participants had experienced traumatic events similar in magnitude to 
the PTSD group, but had not developed PTSD (trauma-exposed Control 
group). Fourteen patients meeting DSM-IV criteria for current major 
depression but not PTSD were also tested (Depressed group). Patients 
in the PTSD and control groups had experienced a range of traumas, 
including involvement in the July 7th 2005 London bombings and other 
terrorist attacks (PTSD= 2; control=7), road traffic accidents (PTSD= 1; 
control=3), interpersonal violence (PTSD= 5; control=3), the 2004 Asian 
tsunami (PTSD=2; control=1). Time since index trauma ranged from 2 
months to 24 years, with a median of 2 years. Depressed patients had 
experienced a range of severe negative life events including some 
meeting PTSD Criterion A.
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4.4.2 Task
All participants visited the lab approximately a week prior to the scan 
and wrote a narrative account of their traumatic or most distressing 
event, starting from just before they knew something was wrong until 
the point where the event had resolved. Participants were prompted to 
include description of what they could see, hear, touch smell, taste, and 
feel at each stage of the incident, and also to describe their thoughts and 
emotions. For participants who reported multiple distressing experiences 
the event was chosen which bothered them most. At completion 
participants were invited to highlight any sections of the narrative during 
the writing of which they had experienced flashbacks. Flashbacks were 
defined for participants in the following way: “A type of memory that 
you experience as markedly different from those memories of an event 
that you can retrieve at will. The difference might be a marked sense of 
reliving of the traumatic experience(s). Some report complete reliving, 
whereas others report more momentary or partial reliving of perhaps 
just one aspect of the original experience. For some, flashback memories 
take them by surprise or swamp their mind. Finally, some report a sense 
of time-distortion and, for example, react to the flashback memory as 
though it was an event that was happening in the present.” Only PTSD 
patients identified flashbacks. Numbers of flashbacks were not counted 
separately.
Participants completed an autobiographical retrieval task, using stimuli 
culled from the written narratives, whilst brain activity was measured 
with fMRI. Participants were presented with items from their own 
narrative (Own), interspersed with items from another PTSD patient's 
narrative thematically unrelated to their own (Other), and were asked 
to identify Own items. This type of cue-word task has previously been 
used in neuroimaging studies of autobiographical retrieval (153-155). For 
PTSD participants, Own items were additionally either associated with 
flashbacks they had of events (Flashback), or were simply normal episodic 
memories of the event (Episodic). Analyses were conducted to investigate 
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successful autobiographical retrieval (Own>Other) and activity specific to 
flashbacks (OwnFlashback>OwnEpisodic).
4.4.3 Stimuli
Words (task 1) and phrases (task 2) were included to increase the number 
of stimuli that could be used without directly repeating items. Words and 
phrases (typically 2-8 words long) were chosen to be descriptive of key 
components of each narrative. Words were matched to 'master lists' (see 
later) on variables of word frequency and number of letters per word, and 
phrases was matched on the variables of number of words and letters 
per sentence (examples of master list items are given in supplementary 
materials). Two 'master lists’ were generated to serve as control stimuli. 
One participant with PTSD had survived the July 2005 London bombings, 
the other had survived the December 2004 Asian Tsunami. If a participant 
being tested had experienced one of these events then the alternative 
list was used. Certain words such as ‘blood' or 'helpless' were common to 
many narratives, and words on the master list were substituted out on a 
case-by-case basis whenever overlap was identified. 
4.4.4 Procedure
Stimuli were presented via a mirror mounted on the head coil of 
the scanner, in direct view of the supine participant, at a distance of 
approximately 50cm from the projection screen. Participants used an 
MR-compatible button-box in their right hand to respond and were 
instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as possible. For both tasks 
the presentation of an item was preceded by an asterisk (*) for 500ms, 
followed by the item for (1000ms in task 1, 1700ms in task 2), followed 
by a fixation cross for (1000ms in task 1, and 2000ms in task 2). These 
sequences of events gave SOAs for tasks 1 and 2 of 3500ms, and 4200ms 
respectively. 'Null events' consisted of a fixation cross presented for an 
entire SOA.
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In task 1 72 Own words and 72 Other words from one of the master lists 
were presented in the centre of the screen in uppercase Arial font. 72 
null-events were included whereby a fixation cross was presented for an 
entire SOA. Task 2 was identical but with a longer SOA to accommodate 
time for additional reading. Sixty Own phrases were presented along with 
60 Other phrases in lowercase Arial font. After the scan PTSD participants 
were given lists of all the stimuli they had seen during the test and were 
required to identify whether or not each item had led to the experience of 
a flashback during the scan
4.4.5 MRI acquisition
MRI data were acquired on a 1.5 T whole body scanner (Magnetom Sonata, 
Siemens Medical, Erlangen, Germany) operated with an 8-channel phased 
array receive coil and the standard body transmit coil. The manufacturer's 
standard automatic 3D-shim procedure was performed at the beginning 
of each experiment. The participants were scanned with a single-shot 
gradient-echo EPI sequence sensitive to the blood-oxygen level dependent 
(BOLD) effect using the following imaging parameters: 30 oblique 
transverse slices, slice thickness = 2.5 mm, gap between slices = 1.25 mm, 
repetition time TR = 3 s, flip angle α = 90o, echo time TE = 50 ms, readout 
bandwidth BW = 2298 Hz/pixel, bandwidth in PE direction BWPE = 31.3 
Hz/pixel, phase-encoding (PE) direction anterior-posterior, field of view 
FOV = 192x192 mm2, matrix size 64x64, fat suppression. BOLD sensitivity 
losses in the orbitofrontal cortex and the amygdala due to susceptibility 
artifacts were minimised by applying a z-shim gradient moment of -0.8 
mT/m*ms, a slice tilt of -300 and a positive PE gradient polarity (156). 
EPI magnitude images were reconstructed from the complex k-space raw 
data using a generalised reconstruction method based on the measured 
EPI k-space trajectory to minimise ghosting (157), combining the single 
coil images by sum of squares (158). EPI data acquisition was monitored 
on-line using a real-time reconstruction and quality assurance system 
(159). Data were acquired during two separate sessions, with the first five 
volumes of each session discarded to allow for T1 equilibration effects. 
A magnetic (B0) field map image was collected before the first session 
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and was used to unwarp the echo-planar images (160, 161). Subjects were 
placed in a light head restraint within the scanner to limit head movement 
during acquisition. A 3D MDEFT T1-weighted structural image was also 
acquired following the functional acquisition for superimposing statistical 
maps over anatomy. Whole-brain structural scans were acquired using a 
Modified Driven Equilibrium Fourier Transform (MDEFT) sequence (Ugurbil 
et al, 1993) with optimized parameters as described in the literature (85). 
For each volunteer, 176 sagittal partitions were acquired with an image 
matrix of 256x224 (Read x Phase). Two-fold over-sampling was performed 
in read direction (head/foot direction) to prevent aliasing. The isotropic 
spatial resolution was 1 mm. Relevant imaging parameters were: TR/TE/TI 
= 12.24 ms/3.56 ms/530 ms.
4.4.6 MRI Processing
fMRI data were processed and analysed using the statistical software 
package SPM5 (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London, UK; 
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The first 5 EPI volumes were discarded 
to allow for T1 equilibration. The remaining functional images from 
each subject were realigned using rigid-body transformation to correct 
for head movements to the mean functional image using 7nd-degree 
B-spline interpolation, unwarped, and coregistered to the anatomical 
T1-weighted MR image using a normalized mutual information function. 
Next, structural images were segmented and normalized into a common 
stereotactic space (MNI 152 T1-template). Subsequently, the normalization 
parameters were applied to the functional images and these were 
resampled to 3 *3 *3-mm3 isotropic voxels 7nd-degree B-spline 
interpolation. Finally, spatial smoothing was applied with an isotropic 3D 
Gaussian kernel of 8 mm full-width half-maximum. 
4.4.7 Analysis
Statistical analysis was performed in two stages of a mixed effects model. 
In the first stage the neural activity was modeled by a stick function 
(impulse event) at stimulus onset (task 1 - words) or an epoch with a 
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duration of 1.5s (task 2 - phrases). The ensuing BOLD response was 
modeled with a canonical haemodynamic response function (HRF) (162). 
An AR(1) model was used to estimate and correct for non-sphericity of 
the error covariance (163). For each voxel, the image time-series was high 
pass filtered to 1/128 Hz.
The resulting general linear model (GLM) was used to obtain parameter 
estimates representing the activity elicited by the events of interest. 
Four event types were defined, consisting of correct responses to 'Own 
Flashback' items, correct responses to 'Own Episodic' item, correct 
rejections to 'Other Flashback' items, and correct rejections to 'Other 
Episodic' items. For PTSD patients the Flashback/Episodic distinction 
was made by combining pre- and post-scan reports of which items 
were associated with flashbacks. Thus for this group any items which 
led to reports of a flashback, either during the narrative or while being 
scanned, were assigned to the 'own flashback' category. For control and 
depressed participants items were randomly assigned to 'flashback' and 
episodic' categories in order to allow identical data analysis procedures. 
Participants' performance was high enough such that it was not possible 
to model misses. Also included for each session were six covariates to 
capture residual movement-related artifacts (three rigid-body translation, 
and three for rotation).
Contrasts for effects of interest were specified at the first level, and 
entered in to a full-factorial model at the second level. Run 1 (words) and 
run 2 (phrases) were included as separate sessions within the second-
level model, but to maximize power, and because we had no a-priori 
hypotheses requiring separate analyses, all results presented here are 
reported for the combination of words and sentences tasks. Based on an 
analysis of demographic data covariates of no interest 'length of time 
since trauma, and'BDI'were included in the model.
All effects were thresholded at p<0.001 with an extent of k>5 unless 
otherwise specified. Between-group effects were generated by 
interrogating the model discussed above. Common effects (effects 
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common to the PTSD, control and depressed groups) were obtained by an 
inclusive mask of activity in each of the three groups, each thresholded 
at p<0.025 to give a conjoint threshold, via Fisher's procedure, of p<0.001 
(conjunction null) (164).
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Demographics and behavioural data
Patient demographics and scores on clinical measures are given in Table 
4.1. Groups did not differ according to age or the age at which they left 
full-time education, but post-hoc tests indicated that the depressed 
group had experienced their index event significantly longer ago than the 
controls. BDI and BAI scores for the PTSD and Depressed groups did not 
differ, but both were significantly higher than the controls. Participants 
in the PTSD group scored significantly higher than controls on the PDS. 
Nine of the depressed group, 3 of the PTSD group, and none of the control 
group were taking antidepressant medication.
Memory performance is given in Table 4.2. Pr provides an unbiased 
estimate of accuracy in the response to old and new items, where higher 
values correspond to greater accuracy. Br is an index of response bias, 
the tendency to respond "old" or "new" regardless of accuracy (165). 
There was a main effect of task on Pr, (F
1, 36
 = 283.42, p < 0.001), but no 
main effect of group or task by group interaction. Pr was significantly 
higher for phrases than for words (t(38 )= 16.77, p<0.001, phrases mean 
0.79, SD 0.09; words mean 0.55, SD 0.12). There was also a main effect of 
task on Br (F
1, 36
 =17.02,  p< 0.001), but no main effect of group or task by 
group interaction. Br was significantly higher for words than for phrases, 
(t(38) = 4.366, p<0.001, words mean 0.47, SD 0.14; phrases mean 0.32, SD 
0.22). Response bias for the words task was neutral but for the sentences 
task was <0.5, indicating a propensity for participants to respond "new". 
This pattern is driven by the very low rate of false alarms: participants 
were very accurate in correctly rejecting phrases from another 
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individual's narrative but were more cautious identifying phrases as being 
from their own narrative.
Patients in the PTSD group reported flashbacks to an average of 50.4 out 
of a total of 264 individual stimuli. Of these, an average of 31.6 were to 
words or phrases that had been reported as eliciting a flashback during 
the narrative task, and an average of 15.5 were to words or phrases 
that had not been reported as eliciting a flashback during the narrative 
task. The remaining 3.3 flashbacks were to words or phrases from the 
control (Other) narrative. As the focus of interest was the experience of a 
flashback, all these items were included in the analyses.
4.5.2 Common fMRI results of successful retrieval
Analyses were first directed at finding activity common to all three groups 
during the successful retrieval of autobiographical memories. Subsequent 
analyses aimed to delineate between-group differences. Unless otherwise 
specified all contrasts reported here include the variables'BDI and'time 
since trauma as covariates of no interest. Effects common to all three 
groups for the Own>Other contrast (i.e hits > correct rejections) are 
given in Table 4.3 and Figure 4.1. There was significant activity in the left 
middle, superior medial, and superior frontal cortices. Bilateral posterior 
cingulate, right caudate, left insula, left retrosplenial cortex, and left 
middle temporal cortex also demonstrated activation. Minimal between-
group effects were observed for the Own>Other contrast. Relative to the 
depressed and control groups, the PTSD group demonstrated increased 
activity in a 5-voxel region of the right mid-cingulate cortex (x=9, y=9, 
z=45), and decreased activity in an 8-voxel region of the right inferior 
frontal gyrus (x=45, y=33, z=-3).
4.5.3 Increased fMRI effects for flashback vs episodic memory 
retrieval in the PTSD group
We next examined activity associated with the OwnFlashback>OwnEpisodic 
contrast. There were no effects common to all three groups. Table 4.4 and 
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Figure 4.2 report activations associated with flashbacks versus episodic 
memories in the PTSD group only. Flashback-associated increases in 
activations were evident in left anterior cingulate (ACC) and middle 
occipital cortices, right supplementary motor area (SMA) and medial 
prefrontal cortex, and bilaterally in precentral areas, inferior parietal 
(supramarginal) cortices, and the insula.
4.5.4 fMRI effects flashback vs episodic memory retrieval across 
groups
We further investigated regions demonstrating flashback-associated 
increases or decreases in the PTSD group relative to the control and 
depressed groups. These are given in Table 4.5 and Figure 4.3. Parameter 
estimates for each group are given in Figure 4.4. There was a substantial 
overlap with the preceding analysis, PTSD patients showing significantly 
greater flashback-specific activity in regions of the right SMA, left middle 
Common effects
x=0 y=45
Figure 4.1: Effects common to all three groups for the Own>Other contrast.
Results thresholded at p<0.001, k>5. 
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occipital gyrus and precentral cortex, and right insula. In addition PTSD 
PTSD
OwnFlashback > OwnEpisodic
L ACC
x=-3
R SMA
z=48
L Precentral
y=-9
L Mid Occipital
z=12
R insula
z=-12
L Supramarginal
x=48
L insula
z=0
R Precentral
y=-39
x=6
R PFC
R Supramarginal
x=63
L Precentral
x=-57
Figure 4.2: Flashback-specific activity in the PTSD group.
Results thresholded at p<0.001, k>5.
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Flashback-related increases: PTSD > (Depressed + Control)
R Insula L Middle Occipital Gyrus
L Precentral Gyrus R SMA
Midbrain 
R Precuneus / PCC
L Parahippocampal Gyrus
Flashback-related decreases: (Depressed + Control) > PTSD
y=21 z=15
y=-9 y=6
x=3 y=-27
Figure 4.3: Flashback-specific between-groups differences.
Results thresholded at p<0.001, k>5.
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patients showed reduced flashback-specific activity in the midbrain, left 
fusiform / parahippocampal gyrus, and right precuneus / PCC.
4.6 Discussion
Behavioural results indicated that participants in all groups were able to 
identify their own autobiographical events with a high degree of accuracy. 
This contrasts with evidence for an overall deficit in PTSD in learning 
neutral material (166). Effects common to all three groups during the 
successful retrieval of autobiographical memories were observed in 
several prefrontal areas as well as the posterior cingulate, precuneus, 
and retrosplenial cortex, regions identified as primary areas of the 
autobiographical memory system (142, 167). As in previous studies of 
emotional memory (142, 143), insula activity was also common to all 
groups. Between-group differences for the Own>Other contrast were 
much more limited. Relative to the other groups PTSD patients showed 
increased activity in the right mid-cingulate cortex, and reduced activity 
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Figure 4.4: Parameter estimates extracted from the peak voxel of each of the key regions identified in the 
between-subjects flashbacks analysis.
Error bars show 95% confidence interval.
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in the right inferior frontal cortex. This limited pattern of differential 
activity is consistent with previous work (77) in suggesting a substantially 
intact neural system supporting episodic retrieval.
As predicted, given the absence of flashbacks reported by depressed 
patients and controls, there were no effects common to all three groups 
for the OwnFlashback>OwnEpisodic contrast. Relative to the depressed 
and control groups, PTSD participants exhibited flashback-specific 
increases in the right insula, left mid-occipital cortex, left precentral 
cortex, and right SMA. Consistent with the hypotheses, many of these 
interconnected areas are involved in translating dorsal visual stream 
activity into motor movements. For example, a connectivity analysis (168) 
linked body orientation in space to the SMA, precentral gyrus, and related 
areas.
Analyses within the PTSD group alone found additional evidence for 
greater activation of motor cortex and other closely connected regions 
involved in response selection such as dorsal ACC. This is of particular 
interest as dorsal ACC is thought to modulate fear expression in humans 
(169). It appears to be hyperresponsive in PTSD, and there is evidence 
for hyperresponsivity in some areas of dorsal ACC being a familial risk 
factor for PTSD (170). Other analyses in the PTSD group also revealed 
bilateral activation in the supramarginal gyrus. This inferior parietal area 
is hypothesized to be involved in the capture of attention bottom-up by 
behaviourally-relevant stimuli (171). The 'Attention to Memory model' 
specifically hypothesized that involuntary remembering would activate 
this area (171), but to our knowledge our findings are among the first to 
confirm their prediction.
The PTSD flashback-specific decreases were observed in the midbrain, 
the left parahippocampal gyrus, and the right precuneus. The precuneus 
is a complex area subserving a number of different functions. Whereas 
the anterior precuneus is mainly connected to sensorimotor areas, also 
including a projection to the insula, the central precuneus is viewed as a 
cognitive/association area (172). It has been argued that the precuneus 
73
4. An fMRI InvestIgAtIon of posttRAuMAtIc flAshbAcks
is part of an important network subserving awareness, and that during 
aversive sensations there may be efforts to terminate self-reflection, 
resulting in decreased processing in the precuneus (173). Flashbacks are 
certainly experienced as aversive by PTSD patients, as indicated by the 
fact that avoidance of involuntary trauma memories forms part of the 
diagnostic criteria. Alternatively, reduced precuneus activation may be 
connected with the involuntary nature of memory retrieval (174). The 
parahippocampal gyrus is a ventral visual stream region thought to be 
involved in allocentric scene information (106) and predicted to be less 
active during flashbacks (131).
The midbrain region contains a large number of nuclei critical to the 
neuromodulation of brain function. Additionally this region is part of a 
stress-related brain network that is modulated by noradrenaline (175), 
and noradrenaline levels are increased in PTSD (176). The alterations in 
midbrain processing for flashbacks in PTSD patients may reflect stress-
related changes in attention and arousal.
The neural activity distinguishing the OwnFlashback>OwnEpisodic contrast 
in PTSD patients has some striking similarities with the neural correlates 
of recollection and familiarity (177). These authors identified precuneus 
activity that was common to recollection and familiarity, but found that 
it was lower for familiarity than for recollection. They also reported 
that hippocampal and parahippocampal activation was associated 
with recollection but not familiarity, whereas supplementary motor 
area activity was more strongly associated with familiarity than with 
recollection. This suggests there may be some connection between the 
experience of a flashback and a familiarity judgement.
Memory studies using healthy controls and stimuli of low to average 
personal significance have found that recollection of the learning event, 
accompanied by its contextual detail, is normally associated with greater 
MTL activity. In addition the posterior midline region, medial prefrontal 
cortex, and posterior parietal cortex contribute to a separate network 
related to decisions concerning retrieval success (178-180). Although 
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it is unclear whether activity in these regions reflects episodic long-
term memory or simply retrieval confidence, it has been suggested that 
they could support judgments that a retrieval cue was familiar in the 
absence of actual recollection. For example, the mnemonic accumulator 
hypothesis (180) proposed that this region integrates and accumulates 
available mnemonic evidence relevant to decisions about whether a cue is 
old versus new.
It is natural to assume that very intensely experienced memories such 
as flashbacks would exemplify a particularly strong form of recollection, 
particularly since in the average laboratory study familiarity judgments 
are usually made in the absence of any detail. Recent evidence indicates, 
however, that in some instances familiarity judgements may also be very 
strong (181). Posttraumatic stress disorder is similarly characterized by 
richly detailed and persistent images that can potentially provide strong 
mnemonic evidence that a traumatic event has occurred. It is possible 
that when such images are retrieved they are treated like the cues 
presented in standard recognition studies, only eliciting a decision about 
their familiarity rather than any further elaboration and recollection. 
Consistent with the idea that elaboration of a very negative memory 
would be aversive, a cardinal symptom of PTSD is avoidance of thoughts 
and memories concerning the trauma, a tendency that is specifically 
counteracted in trauma-focused cognitive-behavior therapy (182). We 
propose therefore that successful identification of flashbacks is based on 
a strong feeling of familiarity. Full recollection is not required because 
the detailed sensory dorsal-stream representations enable the individual 
to identify the images rapidly and with great confidence without further 
memory search.
This preliminary study was subject to a number of significant limitations. 
The number of PTSD patients that could be included in this study is 
relatively small. Possibly due to this small sample size standard statistical 
analyses used for fMRI data yielded limited results. As we did wish 
to explore the data to its fullest extent, inclusive masking analyses 
were used. Although this method did yield results they are in need of 
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replication. Further, participants had experienced a heterogeneous mix of 
trauma exposure, and they included a mix of medicated and unmedicated 
patients. Although it has been argued that neuroimaging studies should 
include medicated and unmedicated patients in order to reflect the 
general PTSD population (76), not enough is known about potential 
interactions of drug and task. There were insufficient numbers in this 
study to examine drug effects statistically. There was also significant 
comorbidity in our patient sample, with high levels of depressive 
symptoms, although our use of a separate depressed group as well as the 
inclusion of depression as a covariate attempted to control for this.
Not all PTSD participants had flashbacks in the scanner. Limiting 
our analyses purely to items which were associated with in-scanner 
flashbacks would have been desirable but there were insufficient data. 
Our 'flashback' category was therefore an amalgam of items which led 
to flashbacks during the writing of the narrative and items which caused 
a flashback in the scanner (generally an Own but occasionally an Other 
item). As mentioned, confirmation of our findings must await replication 
with a larger sample that can offer more statistical power. Finally, we did 
not gather data about how participants were responding to flashbacks. 
There is a considerable literature examining attempts to suppress or 
reappraise emotional memories which could be applied to this question
Our results support the idea that the episodic memory system in PTSD 
is likely intact, and provide preliminary evidence that flashbacks may 
be associated with increases in activity associated with dorsal visual 
stream and related areas coupled with decreases in ventral stream 
activity. Our data also support previous indications that PTSD patients 
can discriminate the occurrence of flashbacks during written narratives 
(151, 152). Consistent with the fact that the parts of narratives that involve 
flashbacks contain more motion words (152), the increased activations in 
numerous areas of motor cortex may suggest that flashbacks are a form 
of memory that facilitates action on the environment (such as fight or 
flight). 
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The data may also have a bearing on the controversy concerning dual-
process models of recognition memory. Although comparisons of 
recollection and familiarity are often confounded with strong and weak 
memories respectively (183, 184), these two processes may nevertheless 
have separate neural substrates (177, 185, 186). Our findings suggest 
that even intense autobiographical memories, experienced with extreme 
clarity and vividness, may sometimes demonstrate a neural signature that 
more closely resembles familiarity than recollection.
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Interlude A.
In Chapter 2, 3, and 4 we have provided results that indicate that PTSD 
and depression are accompanied by specific structural and functional 
alterations of the neural network that supports emotions and memory. 
One question that arises from these findings is whether it would be 
possible to change functioning of the neural network and possibly 
alleviate symptomatology. Pharmacological treatments may provide 
the possibility to affect neural functioning, but other options may also 
be available. In Chapter 5 we will explore the possibility to lift mood by 
affecting mood-regulating neurocircuits with a specific food product.
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5 FOOD CAN LIFT MOOD By AFFECTING MOOD-
REGULATING NEUROCIRCUITS.
5.1 Under review as:
Kroes MCW, van Wingen GA, Wittwer J, Mohajeri MH, Kloek J, Fernández G (Under 
Rev.). Food can lift mood by affecting mood-regulating neurocircuits.
5.2 Abstract
It is commonly assumed that food can affect mood. One prevalent notion is 
that food containing tryptophan increases serotonin levels in the brain and 
alters neural processing in mood-regulating neurocircuits. However, tryptophan 
competes with other long-neutral-amino-acids (LNAA) for transport across 
the blood-brain-barrier, a limitation that can be mitigated by increasing the 
tryptophan/LNAA ratio. We therefore tested whether a drink with a favourable 
tryptophan/LNAA ratio improves mood and modulates specific brain processes 
as assessed by functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). In a double-
blind, placebo-controlled crossover study we show that one serving of this drink 
increases the tryptophan/LNAA ratio in blood plasma, lifts mood in young, 
healthy women and alters task-specific and resting-state processing in brain 
regions implicated in mood regulation. Thus, we provide initial, controlled 
evidence for a food effect on mood, and mood-related neural processing via a 
serotonergic mechanism.
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5.3 Introduction
Primarily, food is required to meet basic nutritional requirements. 
However, in societies where these requirements appear safely met, 
attention has shifted towards healthy diets including biologically 
active components potentially reducing disease risks and optimizing 
physical as well as mental well-being (187). Stress-resilience and good, 
stable mood are essential to both health and well-being and there is a 
common assumption which holds that food can improve mood as readily 
revealed by entering "Food" and "Mood" into an internet search engine. 
However, this link is poorly investigated empirically in humans and no 
proven mechanism that can explain how food affects mood directly is 
known. Food could potentially affect mood in many ways. For example, 
food consumption may increase feelings of satiety and vigour through 
systems regulating energy homeostasis such as glucose, insulin, leptin, 
and ghrelin, but may also affect hedonic experiences through opiod and 
dopamine release (188). More directly, biologically active nutritional 
ingredients could affect neural processes in brain regions central to 
mood regulation like the prefrontal cortex, cingulate cortex, amygdala, 
hippocampus and striatum (3, 189). Mood disturbances and attenuations 
in this neural network have been associated with altered serotonin levels 
(190-192). Therefore, it has been proposed, based on pharmacological 
research, that food containing the serotonin precursor tryptophan (Trp) 
increases serotonin levels in the brain, and modulates processing in the 
neurocircuit regulating mood in a way that is beneficial for mood (192).
In line with this hypothesis, reducing serotonin through tryptophan 
depletion is well-known to affect mood negatively (190-192). However, the 
results of such drug studies do not simply generalize to food. Food is a 
product or substance that can reasonably be expected to be ingested by 
humans and normally occurs in the existing food chain (193). Moreover, 
attempting to lift mood by ingesting food with high tryptophan levels is 
not as straightforward. Tryptophan competes with other long-neutral-
amino-acids (LNAA) for a transport molecule that allows entry into 
the brain (194), thus limiting the possibility of food to increase brain 
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tryptophan levels. Although dietary effects on plasma Trp/LNAA ratio 
have been reported, these, and the resulting behavioural changes, have 
been modest (192). However, the ingestion of food with optimized Trp/
LNAA ratio produced by a hydrolyzed egg protein can result in substantial 
increases in plasma Trp/LNAA ratio. Preliminary data indicate that such 
nutrition may improve mood and motor control, and reduce cortisol 
responses to stress (192), yet the neurobiological mechanisms underlying 
these effects are currently unknown.
We therefore tested whether a Test-drink with a Trp/LNAA ratio 
favourable to Trp uptake into the brain leads to mood improvements 
and changes in a set of neural processes implicated in mood regulation. 
Given the networks implicated in mood disturbances, of specific 
interest here are the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vMPFC), cingulate 
cortex, striatum, and amygdala. Considering recent suggestions on the 
functional interaction of serotonin and dopamine (191), we predicted that 
increasing tonic serotonin levels by heightened availability augments 
neural responses in areas exhibiting cognitive control over negative 
affect, down-scales activity in the striatum related to response-priming 
during reward anticipation, and reduces emotion associated responses 
in the amygdala. Such a set of functional changes is assumed to result in 
mood improvements through inhibition of negative thoughts or, in other 
words, a general cognitive bias towards positive and away from negative 
emotions.
5.4 Methods and Materials
A brief description of the methods and materials is presented in 
this section. For a full and detailed description, please refer to the 
Supplemental Information.
5.4.1 Participants
Thirty-two healthy young women (age-range: 18-39 yr, mean: 22.387, SD: 
3.955) were included in the study, and were tested during the second 
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week of their menstrual cycle. The study was approved by the institutional 
ethics committee (CMO Regio Arnhem-Nijmegen, The Netherlands) and all 
subjects provided written informed consent.
5.4.2 Food
Subjects consumed drinks (300ml) containing an equal amount of basis 
protein, but differential tryptophan and LNAA concentrations. The 
Control-drink contained 20g casein protein hydrolysate with 0.4g Trp 
and 10g Long-Neutral-Amino-Acids (LNAA; Valine, Isoleucine, Leucine, 
Tyrosine, and Phenylalanine). The Test-drink (lumiVidaTM: DSM Nutritional 
Product, Switzerland) contained a hydrolyzed enzymatic digest of egg 
white with 0.8g Trp and 4g LNAA. A sweetener (0.10g acesulfame) was 
added to both drinks to make the formulations more palatable.
5.4.3 Behavioural tasks
Participants were subjected to three behavioural tasks while BOLD 
fMRI data was acquired. The reward anticipation task (Figure S4.1) is 
a modified version of the monetary incentive delay task (195) in which 
cues are presented that signal trials that are either potentially rewarding 
or non-rewarding. Subjects respond to the appearance of a target by 
pressing a button, and if pressed fast enough receive a euro on reward 
trials, but not on non-reward trials. The threat-of-shock task (Figure S4.2) 
was based on a previous fear-potentiated startle paradigm (196). In the 
task, cues were presented that either signalled periods during which 
an electrical shock might be received or signalled periods of safety. A 
mild electrical shock was delivered only once in the first session. In the 
Emotion processing paradigm (Figure S4.3) subjects were presented 
with blocks of trials consisting of angry and fearful stimuli in Emotion 
blocks, or ellipses (that consisted of scrambles of the same face stimuli) 
in visuo-motor Control blocks (197). Subjects indicated which of the 
two images presented at the bottom of the screen matched a target at 
the top of the screen in term of orientation (Control trial) or emotional 
expression (Emotion trial). The Baseline checkerboard paradigm (Figure 
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S4.4) constituted interleaved presentation of Fixation blocks and blocks of 
visual stimulation by a rapidly alternating Checkerboard pattern.
5.4.4 Blood plasma Trp/LNAA ratio analyses
Blood samples were collected in duplicates of 5 ml vacutainer tubes 
containing sodium heparine and centrifuged at 1550 g for 5 min at 4°C. 
The supernatant lithium heparine plasma (750 µl) was mixed with 120 µl 
sulfasalicyl acid in duplo and stored at -80°C until analysis. Plasma amino 
acid analysis was conducted with high-pressure liquid chromatography 
(HPLC), making use of a 2- to 3- µm Bischof Spherisorb ODS II column. The 
plasma tryptophan to LNAA ratio was calculated by dividing the plasma 
tryptophan concentration (in µmol/L) by the sum of the other long neutral 
amino acids, i.e. valine, isoleucine, leucine, tyrosine, and phenylaline, and 
averaging over the two samples.
5.4.5 Mood questionnaires
The short-form Profile of Mood States questionnaire (POMS-SF) measured 
mood along 5 dimensions: Fatigue, Tension, Depression, Anger, and 
Vigor (198). Total negative mood wasa calculated from these domains as 
Depression + Tension + Anger + Fatigue + (24-Vigor) (199). The State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory (STAI) measured anxiety in a specific situation (state) 
or as a more general long lasting quality (trait) (200), where the latter 
was applied in this study. The Well-being Questionnaire measured current 
physiological distress. All reported T-tests were tested two-sided.
5.4.6 Functional magnetic resonance image acquisition
MR data was acquired on a 1.5 T MR scanner (Avanto, Siemens, Medical, 
Erlangen, Germany) equipped with an 8-channel transmit-receiver head 
coil. Functional images related to the tasks described and resting state 
were acquired with gradient echo-planar imaging (EPI) sensitive to 
the blood-oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) response. A structural 
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scan with a 3D magnetization-prepared rapid gradient echo (MPRAGE) 
sequence was acquired for normalization procedures.
5.4.7 Functional magnetic resonance data analyses
fMRI data were processed and analysed using the statistical software 
package SPM5 (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London, UK; 
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The first 5 EPI volumes were discarded 
to allow for T1 equilibration. The remaining functional images from 
each subject were realigned using rigid-body transformation to the 
mean functional image, and coregistered to the anatomical T1-weighted 
MR image. Next, images were slice-time corrected to the mean slice, 
subsequently spatially normalized into a common stereotactic space (MNI 
152 T1-template) and resampled to 2 x 2 x 2-mm3 isotropic voxels, and 
finally smoothed with an  isotropic 3D Gaussian kernel of 8 mm FWHM.
The data were modelled voxel-wise, using a general linear model. 
Condition-specific effects were modelled by trains of stick- or boxcar 
functions and convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response 
basis function of SPM5. Additionally, realignment parameters were 
included to model potential movement artefacts. The data were high-
pass filtered (cut-off 128s) to remove low-frequency signal drifts, and 
a first-order autoregressive model was used to model the remaining 
serial correlations. Contrast images of from testing parameter estimates 
encoding condition-specific effects were created for each subject and 
session. The single-subject contrast images were entered into voxel-wise 
one-sample t-tests to assess main effects of task (See Supplemental 
Information for model descriptions), and paired-samples t-tests to assess 
task by drug interactions, implemented in a second-level random effects 
analysis. We report regions that survive cluster-level correction for 
multiple comparisons (family-wise error, FWE) across the whole brain at 
p<0.05 using an initial height threshold of p < 0.001. See Supplementary 
Information for model description of each task. Seed-region analysis was 
used to assess functional connectivity of the vMPFC with the rest of the 
brain under resting state conditions.
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5.4.8 Procedures
5.4.8.1 Visit 1: Screening
During the first visit subjects signed an informed consent form upon 
which they filled out a demographics and medical history questionnaire, 
and underwent a physical screening. When subject met all inclusion 
criteria and none of the exclusion criteria they were randomly assigned 
to an order of drink administration in a double blind cross-over paradigm 
(Figure 5.1).
5.4.8.2 Visit 2 & 3: Experimental manipulation
On the day of the second and third visit subjects had a light breakfast free 
of dairy products or caffeine. Number of days since last menstruation was 
documented and vital signs were measured. Then, at time-point 1 (T1) 
POMS and STAI-S questionnaires were administered and a blood sample 
for Trp/LNAA determination was obtained (Figure 5.1). Subsequently, the 
Visit 1 Visit 2 Visit 3
Informed Conset
Vital Signs
Urinanalysis
Alcohol-breath Test
Blood Chemistry Test
Blood Hematology Test
t (min)0 90 150Scanning
Mood
Blood
Drink
Mood
Blood
Mood
Blood
< Min-Max: 1-4 Months >
Figure 5.1 Study Procedures. 
The study was conducted over 3 visits. During Visit 1 subjects were screened. Next, subjects were tested in 
a double-blind, placebo-controlled study on Visit 2 and Visit 3. During Visit 2 and Visit 3, mood question-
naires were administered and blood was sampled for Trp/LNAA determination at three time-points. T1: 
prior to consumption of either the Test-drink or Control-drink; T2: 90 minutes after consumption just prior 
to fMRI scanning, T3: post-scanning 150 minutes after consumption.
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Test- or Control-drink was consumed. Thawing of samples took place in 
a fridge over night before the start of the study. Thawed samples were 
consumed within 4 hrs after thawing. Samples were consumed cold. 
After 90 minutes, at time-point 2 (T2), POMS and STAI questionnaires 
were again administered and another blood sample for Trp/LNAA 
determination obtained. Next, subjects entered the MR scanner and 
tasks were conducted in the following order: Emotional processing task, 
Resting-state scan, Reward anticipation task, structural T1-weighted scan, 
Fear processing task, Checkerboard task (Figure S5.1-S5.4). Tasks were 
presented using Presentation software (Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc., 
Albany, CA, USA). Upon exiting the scanner (approximately 150 minutes 
after drink ingestion), at time-point 3 (T3) subjects filled out POMS and 
STAI questionnaires, a blood sample for Trp/LNAA determination was 
obtained and a well-being questionnaire administered. Visit 2 followed 
the same procedure with the exception that the other Test-/Control-
drink was consumed and no structural T1-weighted scan was obtained. 
Following completion of the study subjects were debriefed on the aims 
and details of the study.
5.5 Results
5.5.1 Test-drink consumption increases blood plasma Trp/LNAA 
ratio
The test-drink substantially increased plasma Trp/LNAA ratio 90 min 
(T2) after ingestion, and this remained raised until the end of the study 
procedures (T3; Figure 5.2A). Testing for the percentage change in Trp/
LNAA ratio relative to baseline (T1) at time-point 2 and 3 (ΔT2, ΔT3), a 
Food (Test-drink, Control-drink) x Time (ΔT2, ΔT3) repeated measure 
ANOVA revealed a main effect of Food (F
1, 29
 = 337.35, P < 0.001), a 
main effect of Time (F
1, 29
 = 240.59, P < 0.001), and an interaction effect 
between Food x Time (F
1, 29
 = 257.02, P < 0.001). Paired T-tests revealed 
a Trp/LNAA ratio increase following Test-drink consumption relative to 
Control-drink consumption for both ΔT2 (t(29) = 26.03, P < 0.001; Test-
drink Mean: 119.72, s.e.m.: 4.67, Control-drink Mean: -21.15, s.e.m.: 1.60) 
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Figure 5.2 The ratio of tryptophan to other long-neutral-amino-acids (Trp/LNAA) in plasma is increased 
following Test-drink consumption. 
(A) Following Test-drink consumption the mean Trp/LNAA ratio in plasma is more than twofold increased. 
(B) Change in plasma Trp/LNAA ratio is highly consistent across subjects. For each subject changes in 
Trp/LNAA ratio relative to time point 1 (ΔT2, ΔT3) are depicted following Test-drink (dotted lines) and 
Control-drink (solid lines) consumption. Subjects are coded by the same colour lines. T1: prior to ingestion, 
T2: pre-scan, 90 minutes after ingestion, T3: post-scan, 150 minutes later. Error bars reflect s.e.m. in all 
figures.
and ΔT3 (t(29) = 9.43, P < 0.001; Test-drink Mean: 43.84, s.e.m.: 6.07, 
Control-drink Mean: -23.12, s.e.m.: 2.00), and a significant difference 
between ΔT2 and ΔT3 following Test-drink consumption (t(29) = 16.48, P < 
0.001). On average, the consumption of the Test-drink caused a more than 
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2-fold increase in Trp/LNAA ratio plasma levels. Although some variance 
existed in the changes induced by the Test-drink, the increase was highly 
consistent across subjects (Figure 5.2B).
5.5.2 Test-drink consumption lifts mood
Having demonstrated a positive effect of Test-drink on plasma Trp/LNAA 
ratio, we next determined whether the Test-drink affected mood. In line 
with our hypothesis, mood improved following Test-drink consumption 
(Figure 5.3). Assessing the changes in Negative Mood, a Food (Test-drink, 
Control-drink) x Time (ΔT2, ΔT3) repeated measure ANOVA on a multi-
dimensional Negative Mood score based on the short-form of the Profile 
of Mood States questionnaire (POMS-SF) revealed a main effect of Food 
(F
1, 29
 = 8.77, P = 0.006), with no other main effects or interactions (Figure 
5.3). Paired T-tests revealed reduced Negative Mood following Test-drink 
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Figure 5.3 Mood improves following Test-drink consumption. 
Mood improves following Test-drink consumption. Negative mood changes from baseline (T1) are depicted 
for Test-drink (Red) and Control-drink (Blue) in percentages at T2 and T3 (ΔT2, ΔT3). For display purposes 
the Negative Mood scores have been inverted so that positive scores reflect improved mood.
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consumption for ΔT2 compared to Control-drink consumption (t(29) = 
-2.13, P < 0.042; Test-drink ΔT2 Mean: -9.35, s.e.m.: 3.22, Control-drink 
ΔT2 Mean: -1.22, s.e.m.: 2.71), and reduced Negative mood following 
Test-drink consumption for ΔT3 compared to Control-drink consumption 
(t(29) = -2.69, P < 0.012; Test-drink ΔT3 Mean: -7.20, s.e.m.: 4.45, Control-
drink ΔT3 Mean: 6.65, s.e.m.: 5.37). Comparable, albeit more modest, 
results were obtained for anxiety, in the sense that state anxiety scores 
appeared to be reduced after Test-drink consumption (see supplemental 
Information and Figure S5.5). Thus, food that increased the plasma Trp/
LNAA ratio resulted in a clear improvement of mood.
If the drink would have affected the physical state of subjects, this 
could have contributed indirectly to possible differences in mood and 
neural processing. However, this interpretation is unlikely as Test-drink 
consumption did not affect ratings of well-being reflecting measures of 
physiological distress, such as nausea, dizziness, headache, etc. (Wilcoxon 
signed ranks test; Z = -1.507, P = 0.132).
5.5.3 Test-drink consumption affects neural processing of reward 
anticipation
In view of the positive effects of Test-drink on serum Trp/LNAA ratios 
and mood, we next examined Test-drink effects on neuronal responses 
in the network implicated in mood regulation. We first investigated the 
influence of drink consumption on reward related neural processing, 
using a reaction time task that is modulated by the anticipation of reward 
(195). Consistent with previous studies (195, 201), across all participants 
this task successfully engaged striatal regions, middle cingulate cortex, 
supplementary motor areas, and middle frontal gyrus (Figure 5.4A and 
Table 5.1). Critically, Test-drink consumption reduced reward anticipation-
related activity within the dorsal caudate nucleus (Figure 5.4A and 
Table 1; all statistics are corrected for multiple comparisons across the 
whole brain (P<0.05)), without affecting speed or accuracy of responses 
(see supporting online material). The region affected by Test-drink 
consumption is within those regions showing a main effect of reward 
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Figure 5.4 Food consumption affects neural processing in regions involved in mood regulation. 
Test-drink consumption reduces responses during reward anticipation in the dorsal caudate nucleus (A), 
increases responses during threat-of-shock in the middle cingulate cortex (B), and increases connectivity 
between the vMPFC and lateral PFC under resting-state conditions (C). (A&B): Main effect of task (Grey) 
and Task x Food interaction (Yellow-Red). (C) Positive (Green) and negative (Blue) correlations with vMPFC 
activity, and the effect of the Test-drink on connectivity with the vMPFC (Yellow-Red). Bars indicate T-val-
ues of main effects, activation cluster significant at p < 0.05 FWE corrected or SVC, are displayed overlaid 
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anticipation (Figure 5.4A). Thus, Test-drink consumption affected neural 
processing associated with reward anticipation.
5.5.4 Test-drink consumption affects neural processing of fear
Next we tested for the effect of Test-drink consumption on neural 
processing of fear, by using a threat-of-shock procedure. Consistent with 
previous studies, this task activated anterior insula, cingulate cortex, 
amygdala, medial frontal gyrus, striatal regions, and cerebellum, i.e. the 
'pain matrix' (196, 202), (Figure 5.4B and Table 5.2). Crucially, greater 
activity in the middle cingulate gyrus during threat periods was detected 
following Test-drink consumption (Figure 5.4B and Table 5.2). Again, this 
region was within the network involved in fear processing (Figure 5.4B). 
Thus, Test-drink consumption influenced neural processing associated 
with fear.
5.5.5 Test-drink consumption affects neural resting-state 
connectivity
Finally, as connectivity patterns with the vMPFC under resting-state 
conditions have been implicated in mood regulation (26), we examined 
the influence of Test-drink consumption on resting-state connectivity 
with this region. Functional connectivity analysis revealed a network 
of regions displaying positive correlations with blood oxygenation level 
dependent (BOLD) signal fluctuations of the vMPFC known as the 'default 
mode network', which included the middle orbitofrontal cortex, posterior- 
and anterior- cingulate cortex, insula, inferior and medial parietal 
cortex, superior frontal cortex, cerebellum, amygdala, hippocampus, and 
striatum. Negative correlations were observed for the precentral gyrus, 
inferior parietal cortex, middle occipital cortex, inferior- and superior- 
temporal cortices (Figure 5.4C and Table 5.3). Critically, greater positive 
correlation with the BOLD signal fluctuation of the vMPFC following 
on selective slices of a template brain, and tresholded at p<0.001. Display view follows neurological 
convention, i.e. right hemisphere is depicted on the right. 
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Test-drink consumption was detected in the inferior-, and middle- frontal 
gyrus (Figure 5.4C and Table 5.3). Hence, Test-drink consumption affected 
resting-state connectivity of the vMPFC with the lateral PFC. Ingestion 
of the Test-drink thus influenced functional connectivity between brain 
regions associated with mood regulation.
5.5.6 Test-drink consumption did not affect neural responses on the 
emotion processing task and control task 
Test-drink consumption was not found to affect neural responses on the 
emotion processing task and baseline checkerboard task (Figure S5.6a 
and Table 5.4; Figure S5.6b and Table 5.5, respectively). For result and 
discussion see Supplemental Information.
5.6 Discussion
Results of blood plasma, subjective mood questionnaires, and brain 
activity collectively suggest that food targeted at raising Trp/LNAA 
levels can improve mood and affect neural processing in neurocircuits 
implicated in mood regulation. We thus present initial empirical support 
for the common assumption that food can improve mood by affecting 
brain function via a serotonin mediated mechanism.
These effects occurred regardless of subjects ability to report the type of 
drink consumed, and cannot be explained by changes in physical well-
being following drink consumption. The effects were obtained with a 
serving size that does not exceed normal amount of food consumption, 
yet increases in Trp/LNAA ratios were detected that are as large as 
observed following synthetic tryptophan administration (203). As 
this large change in Trp/LNAA ratio would increase the probability 
of tryptophan to be transported into the brain (194), these changes 
presumably resulted in increased central serotonin levels (192). Further, 
the effects were obtained in a healthy subject population; effects of food 
on mood may be even greater in populations experiencing reduced mood 
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(192). As such we infer that these results are relevant to normal human 
food consumption.
Food modulated brain activity on a specific set of tasks probing the 
neural circuitry of mood regulation. Following Test-drink consumption 
we found reduced activity in the dorsal caudate nucleus in a reward 
anticipation task. This region has been associated with higher order 
cognitive processes (204), and its connectivity pattern allows for an 
integration of initial emotional responses with cognitive information and 
motor output (201). In support of this suggestion, the dorsal striatum has 
been associated with the monitoring of value over long delays, a process 
improved by higher serotonin levels and reflected in plasma tryptophan 
levels (190). Thus, reduced dorsal caudate signals by increased serotonin 
levels may echo a more stable maintenance of goals over longer periods 
of time, which may go along with increased concentration and reduced 
distractibility (191).
Similarly, we demonstrate that Test-drink consumption resulted in an 
increase of activity in the middle cingulate cortex during fear processing. 
This region has been associated with the integration of emotional 
responses with cognitive information and motor output (205), and often 
been associated with the cognitive control over emotional responses (14). 
To our knowledge we provide the first evidence for the involvement of 
serotonin in the anticipation of aversive outcomes in a threat-of shock 
task. Our findings fit with reports of increased activity in the cingulate 
cortex following SSRI treatment of patients with mood disorders (3). 
Increased activation in the cingulate area reported here has been 
associated with lower neuroticism scores (196), found to correlate with 
a drop in negative affect due to reappraisal (14), decreased amygdala 
activity and physiological arousal responses (14).Given these reports, 
it is interesting to note that we found reduced amygdala activity with 
increases in middle cingulate activity under resting state conditions (see 
supplemental Information, Figure S5.4c, and Table 5.6). Hence, Test-drink 
consumption altered neural processing of fear in a network associated 
with the regulation of negative mood.
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Finally, Test-drink consumption increased resting-state connectivity 
between the vMPFC and lateral PFC. The involvement of the vMPFC in  
control over emotional responses, fear and anxiety is well described (11), 
and connectivity patterns of the vMPFC under resting-state conditions 
have been implicated in mood regulation (26). The lateral PFC has 
been suggested to provide cognitive control over attention directed to 
emotional processing and in doing so regulates the vMPFC's inhibitory 
control over the amygdala and emotional responses (15). Additionally, 
the lateral PFC has been associated with reappraisal of emotional stimuli, 
leading to reduced amygdala responses and decreased negative affect 
(14). Thus, Test-drink consumption lead to changes in a network involved 
in cognitive control over affect centred on the vMPFC.
Although the diverse behavioural tests elicited commonly expected 
behaviour amongst the subjects, the Test-drink did not affect behaviour. 
Additionally, the drink had no effects on a task probing general neural 
processing. Hence, food induced differences in behaviour or general 
neural functioning are unlikely to explain reported brain results.
These findings generate specific questions for future research: May other 
food substances also affect mood, possibly through other mechanisms 
than serotonin? May other parts of the neural network involved in mood 
regulation also be modulated by the food tested, and do these effects 
extend beyond cognitive control over mood? And what determines the 
individual differences in food induced mood improvements and brain 
activity? Regardless of these questions, the results of this study show 
that food increasing plasma Trp/LNAA ratios improves mood and alters 
associated brain function. In conclusion, we provide a mechanistic 
account for food in controlling mood by affecting brain function via a 
serotonergic mechanism. These results provide support to reducing 
disease risks, improving stress resilience, and optimizing physical and 
mental well-being through specialized diets.
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Interlude B.
In Chapter 2, 3, and 4 we have provided results that indicate that PTSD 
and depression are accompanied by specific structural and functional 
alterations of the neural network that supports emotions and memory. 
In Chapter 5 we have shown that food targeted at raising Trp/LNAA 
levels can improve mood and affect neural processing in neurocircuits 
implicated in mood regulation. Although food or pharmacological 
treatment can improve mood and relieve symptoms of anxiety disorders 
it does not affect the root cause of such disorders. Considering that 
memory for emotional experiences contribute to the aetiology and 
persistence of memory one strategy would be to alter memory for such 
emotional experiences. In order to do so we need to understand under 
which situations memories are sensitive to alterations. In Chapter 6 we 
will explore the dynamic neural systems that enable flexible and adaptive 
memories. Insight into these dynamic systems will provide us with target 
mechanisms to alter memory for emotional experiences 
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6 DyNAMIC NEURAL SySTEMS ENABLE 
ADAPTIVE,  FLEXIBLE MEMORIES.
6.1 Published as:
Kroes MCW and Fernández G (2012). Dynamic neural systems enable adaptive, flex-
ible memories. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews. 36, 1646-1666.
6.2 Abstract
Almost all studies on memory formation have implicitly put forward a rather 
static view on memory. However, memories are not stable but sensitive to 
changes over time. Here we argue that memory alterations arise from the 
inherent predictive function of memory. Within this framework, we draw an 
analogy between the lateral temporal - lateral prefrontal system that supports 
prediction based on simple stimulus-response associations and propose that 
a similar system centring on the hippocampus and medial prefrontal cortex 
(mPFC) exists for complex episodic memories. We consider the hippocampus 
to be elementary for regularity detection and the mPFC for regularity storage 
together with response options, which form the basis of abstract knowledge. 
As such, abstract knowledge can come to guide behaviour in novel situations 
that only share partial overlap with episodic experiences that have given rise 
to the formation of abstract knowledge. Furthermore, we suggest that systems 
consolidation and sleep contribute to the formation of abstract knowledge, and 
that abstract knowledge can function as pre-existing schemas to the encoding of 
novel memories. Finally, we discuss that reconsolidation supports the updating of 
memories to optimize prediction. We accentuate that memory formation requires 
dynamic interactions between brain regions, and that rapid formation of detailed 
memories depends on synaptic weight changes, whereas rather stable abstract 
knowledge is supported by cortico-cortical rewiring. Together, we attempt 
explaining that apparent memory alterations and distortions are adaptive.
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6.3 Introduction
We are able to maintain memories over long periods of time. These 
memories may even originate in childhood, and often involve great 
detail. Thinking about such detailed childhood memories the first author 
of this review can remember a very specific occurrence involving a 
theme-park, knights, and his grandfather (see Figure 6.1A). This ability 
to retain information over extended amounts of time has fascinated 
scholars for centuries. The investigation of the biological substrates of 
memory ('the search for the engram') has lead to amazing discoveries 
on how information is encoded, stabilized, and becomes integrated 
in the architecture of the nervous system over time. Over the last 60 
years, the search for the engram has zoomed in on the neurobiological 
basis of memory on an ever decreasing spatial scale. Starting from the 
scale of the whole brain (206), down to a focus on the hippocampus 
(207), and individual cells in the hippocampus (208), to the scale of 
synapses (209, 210), single proteins (211, 212), and methyl groups (213). 
Additionally, research has shown that memories are initially labile 
and sensitive to disruption but become stabilized over time, a process 
known as consolidation (30). This body of neuroscientific work implicitly 
suggests that stable engrams are stored in the brain enabling memories 
to persist for prolonged periods of time. yet, it has long been recognized 
that memories are not accurate representations of past experiences and 
are sensitive to changes over time. In this review we will take memory 
alterations as an example, as we think it reveals important characteristics 
of the dynamic nature of memory, and the neural systems that support 
memory formation.
In trying to reconstruct the before mentioned episode from his life, the 
first author asked his brother to describe the event as he remembered 
it (Figure 6.1B). His brother's description of the episode is largely similar 
in that he describes the same people, location, and objects. yet, he 
remembers aspects that the first author has forgotten, such as them 
having practiced the show. Even more striking is the fact that there are 
various discrepancies. For example, the brother remembers himself as 
103
6. Dynamic neural systems enable aDaptive, flexible memories
the blue knight, whereas the first author thought he was the red knight. 
In trying to resolve the differences between their memories, the first 
author went looking for a photo taken during that day he remembered 
being in a family photo album. Although he did find the photo he 
remembered, it was not taken on the day of 'the incident', and featured a 
neighbour as well (Figure 6.1C). Many of the details both his brother and 
the first author remember are present in this photo; the wooden swords, 
the back yard, a grown-up watching the show, etc. This example clearly 
shows that memories are not veridical representations of experience, 
and may become distorted over time, for example through integration of 
information from other sources and experiences.
similarities omissions discrepancies
As children, my brother and I had been to a medieval theme-park and had seen a 
knight’s tournament which had included the ‘evil’ black-caped knight, who, 
importantly for the story here, had repeatedly spit on the ground from his horse. In the 
following weeks, we had re-enacted this tournament in our back yard. This is what I 
remember from ‘the incident’:
“We had been to the ‘Land van ooit’ (‘the land of once’). My brother and I were displaying 
the knight ght between the ‘red’ and ‘black’ knight to our grandfather, aunt, uncle, mom 
and dad. They were sitting in the backyard in white plastic garden chairs... The area in the 
backyard runs slightly uphill… I must have been the black knight and must therefore have 
been wearing the black cape. We were sword ghting… so we must have been carrying 
wooden swords. ... I don’t actually remember the spitting incident itself, but I must have 
paraded by as if on a horse… and while passing the audience spat grandpa in the face. I’m 
not quite sure what happened next, but it probably caused some turmoil…”
“Marijn is the black knight. I am the blue knight. Aunt, uncle, grandpa, mom, and dad are 
sitting in folding chairs in front of a sitting area. The gras is very green. We had practiced 
the ‘show’. I was going to win (at least that was the deal), because the black knight was the 
bad guy. I did not see the ‘spit incident’ because I was in the back of the yard. All of a sudden 
everybody was mad at you, and I knew the show was going to be cancelled. It was a 
summer day, we had wooden swords which dad had made.” 
“We had been to ‘the land of once’ and hereafter you played ‘knights’ and we had made 
swords. On a afternoon when your aunt and grandpa were around, the show had to be 
repeated. You and your brother rode around on imaginary horses across the grass in the 
yard. Grandpa was seated at the high end, your aunt, uncle, mom and I stood at his side. 
When you came galloping by you spit and this landed on grandpa’s face. Your aunt acted 
upset but soon hereafter your grandpa started laughing” 
A
B
C
D
Figure 6.1: Memory of 'The incident'
A: The first author 's memory for a specific episodic experience. B: The first author 's brother 's memory for 
this episodic experience. C: A photograph from the first author 's family album that relates to his memory 
for this episodic experience. D: Memory for this episodic experience of the first author 's father. Similari-
ties (green), omissions (yellow), and discrepancies (red) detected between the first authors memory and 
that of his brother and father. 
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Such memory inaccuracies are well known in psychological literature. 
Generally, although we are often quite confident about the correctness 
of our memories, these may be highly inaccurate at the same time or 
even false (214, 215). Hence, our memory is not a very reliable source 
for accurate reconstruction of past episodes. As an unreliable memory 
system may have serious consequences (216, 217) this raises the question 
what could possibly be the use of an inaccurate memory system? A 
hint at why memory is not an exact reproduction of experiences comes 
from a description of a man named Solomon Shereshevsky who had an 
incredible ability to accurately reproduce experiences from memory, yet 
experienced great difficulty detecting continuity in the world,  abstracting 
knowledge across experiences, and predicting future events (218, 219). 
The ability of absolute memory seems to come at the cost of abstraction, 
which is necessary to form knowledge that is no longer specific to a 
given experience, but can be applied to novel situations. From this we 
can infer that the function of memory is not to reproduce accurately 
past experiences, but to abstract knowledge from experiences to predict 
the outcome of future events given the current situation. The need for 
abstraction from episodic experiences is twofold. First, an overly specific 
memory system may hinder generalization across experiences, as is 
the case for Shereshevsky. Second, a memory system that stores every 
experience as a veridical memory trace may run into a capacity problem 
(220). yet, abstraction from episodic experiences and retention of 
specificity may not be mutually exclusive, for example details of a highly 
salient experience may be preferentially retained.
An intuitively appealing assumption thus is that memory serves the 
function of predicting the future (221). Taking this one step further, it 
has been suggested that an organism has to use sensory input to plan 
a future motor output, and this sensori-motor predictive function may 
be the sole reason for the existence of a nervous system (222). More 
specifically, prediction has been proposed to be an elementary function 
that occurs at each level of the neural computational hierarchy. Within 
the neural hierarchy 'higher' areas are thought to form predictions 
over incoming information from 'lower' areas. The difference between 
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predictions and incoming information (prediction error) is thought to be 
minimized through recurrent interactions within the system (223-227). 
Perception arises when the neural activity settles into a stable state in 
which the prediction error throughout the system is minimal. Similarly, 
actions are executed to match predictions, and again the difference 
between perceptual predictions and action outcomes are continuously 
tried to be minimized in a dynamic iterative cycle (224). Such a system 
requires a current state to be compared to a previous state, which 
has to be maintained online or stored in memory. The basic function 
of memory to serve prediction may thus be elementary, and complex 
episodic memory may have arisen from this function in phylogeny. 
Although this view is in need of further scientific support, we consider 
that viewing memory as having a predictive function can provide insight 
into the neural mechanism that support memory formation. Throughout 
this review we will highlight studies in which behaviour is guided by 
predictions that arise from memory for episodic experiences.
We adopt the premises that memory serves a predictive function, and 
that memory arises within a neural sensori-motor hierarchy. By taking 
autobiographical memory as an example we extend a previous proposal 
on predictive coding and episodic memory (228). This 'predictive 
interactive multiple memory systems' (PIMMS) model is a more in depth 
description of episodic memory as a predictive system, and shares with 
our view that multiple interactive memory systems exist in the brain. The 
PIMMS model focuses on differences between familiarity and recollective 
experiences, and on interactions between the hippocampus, entorhinal 
cortex, and the ventral visual system. Importantly, the formation of 
abstract knowledge in the PIMMS model is limited to predictive memory 
for item categories. We focus on more conceptual, abstract knowledge 
formation from episodic experiences and envision a critical role for the 
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) in this process. Although the mPFC has 
often been implicated in memory formation few theories on its role in 
memory exist. As such we provide a novel theory on the role of the mPFC 
in memory. The second section of this review focuses on the extraction of 
regularities across episodic experiences that are critical for a predictive 
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memory system, and we propose that the hippocampus is particularly 
suited to perform this function. In the third section we discuss how 
extracted regularities may be integrated with behavioural output. We 
will draw an analogy with simple stimulus-response learning that is 
supported by the lateral prefrontal cortex (lPFC) suggesting that the 
mPFC plays a critical role in linking regularities extracted across complex 
episodic experiences to behavioural output, and in doing so forms the 
basis of abstract knowledge in interaction with the hippocampus. In 
section four and five studies on systems consolidation and sleep are 
discussed, the interactions between the hippocampus and mPFC further 
explored, and we propose that systems consolidation and sleep aid the 
formation of abstract knowledge and the optimization of prediction 
from episodic memory. In section six we discuss relatively recent studies 
on schema memory and indicate that abstract knowledge comes to 
guide the integration of novel information again through interactions 
between the hippocampus and mPFC. In the final section we discuss 
studies on reconsolidation and suggest that memory alterations following 
memory reactivation functions to update predictions. Throughout 
this review we suggest that rapid memory formation and memory for 
details depend on synaptic weight changes, but that abstract knowledge 
formation is accompanied by changes in neural wiring. Additionally, we 
will highlight that memory formation requires recurrent and dynamic 
interactions between brain regions. Taken together this review provides 
insight into the neural mechanisms that might give rise to memory 
alterations, emphasizes the dynamic nature of memory, and proposes 
a neuroscientific and neuroanatomical model for an adaptive flexible 
episodic memory system.
Critically, a memory system serving prediction requires the integration of 
information across distinct experiences and the extraction of regularities. 
In the following section of this review we will propose that the 
hippocampus is particularly suited to extract regularities across episodic 
experiences.
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6.4 Extraction of regularities
In the movie 'Groundhog Day' Bill Murray gets stuck in time, endlessly 
repeating the same day.  As he is confronted with the exact same 
situation over and over again, he is able to adjust his behaviour based 
on previous experiences of the exact same situation. In reality veridical 
re-representation of the exact same situation never occurs, details of the 
experience are always different. In order to deal with this variability we 
need to base our predictions of the outcome of a situation on similarities 
between the current situation and previous experiences. Thus, a 
predictive memory system requires the rapid storage of experiences, the 
detection of regularities across experiences that are independent of the 
variance amongst experience, and the storage of extracted regularities 
forming the basis of abstract knowledge allowing predictions that can 
come to guide behaviour even when specific details of the current 
experience differ. Many studies have focussed on predictive coding for 
simple stimulus-response associations and have shown that interactions 
between the lateral temporal and lateral PFC critically support this 
function. Only recently have studies started to indicate that the ability of 
predictive coding for complex episodic memories arise through dynamic 
interactions between the hippocampus and neocortex, with a specific role 
for the mPFC in integrating abstract representations across modalities 
with behavioural output. In drawing an analogy between the lateral 
temporal-lateral PFC system that supports simple stimulus-response 
associations, and a hippocampus-mPFC centred network that supports 
complex episodic memory we aim to put forward a role for the mPFC 
in memory formation and extend predictive coding to apply to episodic 
and autobiographical memory. Considering this framework, it might 
be that the distortions observed for the memory of 'the incident' have 
arisen from the inherent sensori-motor predictive function of memory. 
Here we will first describe the neural systems that support the detection 
of regularities and the formation of abstract knowledge from episodic 
experience where we envision a critical role for the hippocampus.
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Half a century of neuropsychological research has lead to the consensus 
that multiple memory systems exist that are supported by distinct neural 
structures. Furthermore, memory functions are present in all processing 
hierarchies of the brain, and can operate both independently and in 
interaction (207, 228-233). A specific role for the hippocampus at the 
centre of an episodic memory system (memory for specific experiences) is 
envisioned, whereas the neocortex is implicated in the storage of memory 
for facts and general knowledge (semantic memory). The acquisition of 
factual knowledge may arise from the detection of regularities across 
episodic experiences. This implicates that the hippocampus is also 
important for the acquisition of factual knowledge. However, the role of 
the hippocampus in semantic memory is highly debated (234). Although 
amnesic patients with hippocampal damage are unable to acquire new 
episodic memory, several scholars have reported that these patients 
can acquire semantic knowledge during development (235), or over 
many learning sessions (235-239). Additionally, their memories are 
extremely rigid and not easily applied to novel settings (237, 240, 241). 
The role of the hippocampus in semantic memory remains a topic of 
debate. Nevertheless, it appears that the hippocampal episodic memory 
capabilities give rise to formation of new abstract knowledge, which in 
turn can become stored within the neocortex and retrieved relatively 
independent of the hippocampus (231, 238, 239). This raises the question 
with which specific characteristics the hippocampus is endowed that 
bestows upon it such a central role in episodic memory and the formation 
of abstract memory representations.
We consider several characteristics of the hippocampus to make it 
an ideal candidate structure to detect and extract regularities across 
episodic experiences and, hence, support the formation of abstract 
knowledge. These are the external connectivity of the hippocampus 
with the rest of the brain, the internal connectivity of the hippocampus, 
and a high degree of associative plasticity. Before describing these 
characteristics we wish to clarify several assumptions. First, a 
consequence of the predictive coding framework is that memory encoding 
and retrieval can no longer be conceived of as separate processes, but 
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occur through recurrent interactions (228, 242). This implicates that brain 
areas or neural functions (e.g. pattern completion and pattern separation) 
that have classically been associated with either memory retrieval or 
memory encoding now interact to support both functions. Second, 
we suggest that the hippocampus is able to detect regularities across 
episodic experiences and is able to orthogonalize these regularities from 
details of an experience. The hippocampus may then drive the neocortex 
to store these regularities more permanently. Critically, the formation 
of abstract knowledge then arises through interactions between these 
regions. We will return to this issue in the next sections, particularly when 
discussing studies on systems consolidation and sleep.
The first important characteristic of the hippocampus to the detection 
and extraction of regularities from episodic experiences is its extrinsic 
connectivity. Information entering the brain is transmitted through a 
hierarchy of unimodal and polymodal cortical areas, integrating and 
associating different features into increasingly more complex, yet unitary, 
representations (243, 244). Although memory functions exist at each 
stage of this processing hierarchy (244), such memory is specific to the 
modality of processing (245). The complexity of episodic memory requires 
the integration and association of information from different processing 
modalities and is considered to exist within a widespread distributed 
cortical processing network (245-248). However, within the neocortex only 
a small portion of all possible connections between neurons physically 
exist and physical connections between distant cortical regions is limited 
(249, 250). Therefore, cortical connectivity might be too sparse to allow 
associations between all elements of information linked to one episode 
and processed in distributed neocortical areas (251). In contrast, the 
hippocampus can be conceived of as a supramodal processing area as it 
receives convergent input from all polymodal areas and many subcortical 
regions, and projects back to most regions from which it receives 
input (243, 252). The connectivity pattern of the hippocampus thus 
allows integration of information from distributed neo- and subcortical 
regions that is critical for the detection of regularities across episodic 
experiences.
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A second important characteristic of the hippocampus is its intrinsic 
connectivity that forms a random network allowing arbitrary associations 
between details processed in distributed cortical areas (252-254). 
Additionally, the intrinsic architecture gives rise to the information 
processing functions - pattern completion and pattern separation 
(248, 251, 255, 256) - enabling the creation of distinguishable memory 
representations, the completion of memory representations from partial 
input, and comparison of different memory representations to each 
other, detecting differences and commonalities between them (248, 
251, 257, 258). As mentioned above, we propose that pattern separation 
and pattern completion occur in reiterative cycles whereby incoming 
information can be rapidly stored, compared to retrieved memories, 
regularities between these representations can be detected, and novel 
memory representations for regularities can be formed.
The extrinsic and intrinsic connectivity of the hippocampus enable the 
detection of regularities. Electrophysiological studies support such a 
role for the hippocampus. So called 'place cells' exhibit high firing rates 
at specific locations in the environment forming an allocentric spatial 
map of the environment (208),  and have been proposed to be the neural 
basis for cognitive maps allowing the distinction between and storage of 
memories (259). However, as place fields of hippocampal place cells prove 
not to be as stable as initially thought, but remap relative to sensory cues, 
and show differential responses dependent on task demands, rewards, 
delays, and behavioural sequences, it has alternatively been suggested 
that place cells do not code for specific locations, but for relational 
representations or conjunctions between stimuli and behavioural options 
that will vary with the position of an animal in space, effectively forming 
a 'memory space' (260). The hippocampal system is then able to identify 
common elements across episodes, and these commonalties are thought 
to link episodes, composing a network of memories that allows one to 
bridge between experiences. The construction of multi-level networks of 
memories can be viewed as the emergence of a 'semantic space' forming 
abstract knowledge from many overlapping episodic representations 
(260-262). These functions can arise though attractor dynamics in the 
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neural processing hierarchy (263, 264). In neural networks, attractor 
states are conceived to be relatively stable activity patterns supported by 
previous plasticity changes towards which new similar activity patterns 
will converge. Additionally, sequences of attractor states can form 
temporal episodes (265). Hippocampal conjunction or regularity cells 
can form attractor states or 'nodes' that bring together information from 
distributed neocortical areas and across experiences (266). Additionally, 
the existence of attractor states in other brain regions would support 
dynamic interactions between them. In line with this suggestion, attractor 
dynamics in the hippocampus (267, 268), neocortex (269, 270), and other 
brain areas (271) have been reported. The existence of attractor dynamics 
highlight that episodic memory is supported by bidirectional dynamic 
interactions between brain regions. The idea that other interactions 
between brain regions also follow attractor dynamics is appealing. Given 
the scope of this review, we will, however, only discuss attractor dynamics 
when studies have explicitly investigated this issue. In conclusion, 
electrophysiological studies appear to support a role for hippocampal 
cells in the detection and storage of regularities that gives rise to abstract 
knowledge, possibly by forming attractor states to incoming information.
A third important characteristic of the hippocampus in the detection 
of regularities is its high degree of associative plasticity. Many episodic 
experiences only occur once, but their significance may only become 
apparent afterwards. Therefore, it is important to store episodic 
experiences as they occur, i.e. in real time. Such 'automatic recording 
of experience' is thought to be supported by the plasticity of the 
hippocampal NMDA dependent long-term potentiation system (272), 
enabling rapid weight changes through the strengthening of existing 
synapses (249). The rapid storage of novel experience enables the 
detection of regularities between a current environmental situation and 
existing memory representations.
However, an automatic recording system places high demands on the 
storage capacity of the hippocampus (251), and would rapidly run out 
of storage space for new experiences (272-274). Therefore, memory 
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selection procedures are envisioned. For instance, familiar information 
may not reach the hippocampus (242) or hippocampal memory 
traces may decay rapidly and only a proportion of traces are thus 
permanently selected for stabilization (272, 275). It would be beneficial if 
environmental regularities detected amongst hippocampal associations 
were eventually stored within a system less sensitive to interference 
and decay. Computational modelling studies have shown that a memory 
system storing environmental regularities should have a slow learning 
rate as to prevent over-writing of memories (276) and requires gradual, 
interleaved and repeated exposure to previously stored information and 
novel information (261, 262, 276). This has lead to the proposal that the 
hippocampus rapidly forms memory representations and subsequently 
replays these to the neocortex, enabling repeated exposure to, and 
integration of, previously stored and novel memory representations 
initiating a gradual development of connectivity between cortical modules 
(272, 276).  As mentioned, cortical connectivity is sparse. Therefore, the 
formation of inter-cortical memory networks might require the creation 
of novel connections, not the strengthening of existing connections. Such 
re-wiring is more resistant to interference than weight changes (249) and 
thus provides a more robust memory representation. However, rewiring 
is resource costly and therefore only worthwhile if the induced changes 
represent regularities across experience that should, and do not, rapidly 
change over time. Through such a process, environmental regularities 
eventually become stored within inter-cortical connectivity, possibly 
independent of the hippocampus, and form the substrates of abstract 
knowledge. We will return to this matter in section four when discussing 
studies on systems consolidation. Given the sparseness of cortico-cortical 
connectivity it is unlikely that cortical memory representations are able 
to link all arbitrary details of a given experience, and might thus be 
fairly rigid and come at a loss of specific details. However, we consider 
that neocortical regularity representations interact with hippocampal 
processing, allowing the flexible application of regularity representations
In summary, specific neural systems support the detection of regularities 
and the formation of abstract knowledge. Neuropsychological literature 
113
6. Dynamic neural systems enable aDaptive, flexible memories
distinguishes between hippocampus dependent episodic memory and 
semantic memory that is supported by the neocortex. We have argued 
that episodic memory gives rise to abstract knowledge (that is akin 
to semantic memory). Specific characteristics of the hippocampus 
are considered to support the detection of regularities. Hippocampal 
connectivity allows the integration, separation, and comparison of 
information from distributed brain regions and across experiences. In 
line with this idea, hippocampal cells appear to encode conjunctions and 
regularities, which can bring together associated information within and 
between episodic experiences. Further, the hippocampus allows the rapid 
encoding of information through weight changes supporting the detection 
of regularities between memories and new experiences. Finally, regularity 
representations are proposed to become stored in the neocortex through 
re-wiring, forming a stable substrate of knowledge yet losing detail and 
flexibility. We thus propose that the hippocampus detects regularities 
and drives the formation of abstract knowledge in the neocortex. 
Alternatively, the hippocampus may support the formation of multiple 
episodic memory traces within the neocortex upon which the neocortex 
performs abstraction across representations. This matter remains 
unresolved to date. However, we favour the former explanation and will 
highlight studies in support of this hypothesis throughout this review.
We have taken the point of view that memory serves a predictive function, 
and arises within a neural sensori-motor hierarchy, as we think this can 
provide insight into the neural mechanisms that supports formation of 
flexible memories. Within this framework an open question that remains 
is how extracted regularities are integrated with behavioural output to 
support sensori-motor prediction. As the hippocampus does not directly 
connect to the motor cortex, interactions with other areas are necessary 
to link extracted regularities from episodic experiences to motor outputs. 
In the next section we will draw an analogy between the lateral prefrontal 
cortex (lPFC) and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) to suggest that the 
mPFC is a critical region for the dynamic nature of memory. Further 
we will propose that the mPFC interacts with the hippocampus to form 
abstract knowledge and support sensori-motor prediction.
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6.5 From regularities to response
In order to understand how to map from episodic memories to 
behavioural output we will draw an analogy with the neural systems 
that support rule learning for simple stimulus-response mapping. Rules 
are arbitrary associations between disparate but behaviourally related 
information (277), where a particular stimulus instructs a fixed response. 
Importantly, rule learning has been shown to occur through dynamic 
interactions in a neural hierarchy of brain regions that process stimulus 
information, and regions that process motor outputs. The lPFC shows 
a high degree of connectivity with the lateral temporal, enthorhinal, 
and parahippocampal cortices (278), areas that process and support 
recognition memory for item and category information (279, 280), but 
notably not the hippocampus (281). Single cell recordings have revealed 
that neurons in the lPFC form integrated representations of cues, 
categories, rewards, task demands, and behavioural responses, and 
increase activity with increasing rule familiarity (282, 283). Additionally, 
a graded hierarchy exists with regard to the integration of stimulus, 
response, and rule representations. Neurons in the inferior and lateral 
temporal cortices show the strongest representations of stimuli, neurons 
in the lPFC integrate stimuli and motor output options, and neurons in the 
premotor cortex exhibit the strongest representation of rules and motor 
output options (282, 284, 285). Finally, a fast rule learning system has 
been observed in the basal ganglia, whereas the lPFC reflects a slower 
learning system (284, 286). Human imaging studies have revealed similar 
hierarchical interactions between the lPFC, lateral-, and inferior temporal 
cortices, and basal ganglia (287, 288), where increasingly higher order 
interactions between stimulus-response mapping require increasingly 
more anterior prefrontal areas (289, 290). Furthermore, the dependency 
of simple rule learning on cortical areas increases with experience and 
time through dynamic interactions between brain regions (291, 292).
The animal and human findings on rule learning mimic suggestions from 
computational modelling that have shown that within a neural hierarchy 
the higher levels are important for maintaining contextual information, 
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communicating contextual information to lower processing levels, and in 
doing so guide neural processing at lower levels relative to behavioural 
response options (293-295). Thus, the PFC is considered to hold online 
behavioural options and dynamically form attractor networks towards 
which processing at lower levels settle. In line with this suggestion it 
has been shown that activity in the medial premotor cortex that reflects 
choice options, can be maintained by few neurons over a delay period, 
and these neurons can support the recovery of the other neurons within 
the same attractor network at the time when a behavioural response is 
required (270).
Together these findings indicate that the lPFC plays a cardinal role in 
simple rule learning. The lPFC interacts with regions that represent 
single item and category information, e.g. the lateral/inferior temporal 
cortex, and regions representing motor outputs, e.g. PMC, and appear 
to dynamically form attractor states within a graded hierarchy. Although 
simple stimulus-response rules can be applied to novel stimuli (296), 
such rules are generally rigid and do not efficiently generalize to 
novel situations when feature overlap is limited (297, 298). Thus, for 
predictions based on regularities detected amongst complex multi-
feature configurations of episodic experiences a different system appears 
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Figure 6.2: Analogy between two memory systems supporting prediction
A: The lateral temporal-lateral prefrontal system supports simple rule learning. B: An analogous hippocam-
pal-mPFC system hypothesized to support a predictive memory system for abstract rules based on complex 
episodic experiences. A graded hierarchy is proposed to exist for both systems through which stimuli, 
rules, and behavioural output are dynamically integrated.
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necessary. As the neural system that supports simple rule learning 
complies with the neural hierarchy of sensori-motor prediction, we 
reason that a similar hierarchy may give rise to a system that supports 
prediction based on complex episodic experiences. We propose that 
such a system arises through interactions between the hippocampus 
and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) analogous to the lateral temporal 
- lPFC interactions described for simple rule learning (Figure 6.2). As 
discussed, predictions from episodic experiences require responses based 
on detected regularities that are invariant of specific stimuli. Considering 
that we do not wish to introduce new terminology to the field, we will 
refer to response prediction learning from complex episodic experiences 
as abstract rule learning.
Together with the hippocampus, the mPFC has often been implicated in 
episodic memory in both humans and animals (299-301). Importantly, in 
monkeys abstract rule learning that is independent of particular stimuli 
depends on the mPFC (302), where the principle sulcus was found to 
support working memory maintenance, the orbitofrontal cortex was 
implicated in the updating of rules based on rewards, and the anterior 
cingulate cortex played a role in representing highly integrated and 
context dependent abstract rule representations. In rodents, neurons 
in the infralimbic and prelimbic cortices, regions thought to be the 
homologue of the primate ventromedial prefrontal cortex and anterior 
cingulate cortex (303, 304), change responses when switching between 
behavioural strategies (305) that depend on either the hippocampus 
or basal ganglia (306), but not when a consistent strategy is followed 
and the behavioural output is different (305), indicating that infralimbic 
neurons initiate strategy switches whereas prelimbic neurons enforce 
execution of current strategies. Abstract rule representations of episodic 
experiences in the mPFC thus appear to interact with other brain regions, 
including the hippocampus and basal ganglia, to drive optimal. Two recent 
studies provide further inside into the dynamic interactions between the 
hippocampus and mPFC that give rise to prediction based on abstract 
rules detected across episodic experiences.
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In a human fMRI study, subjects had to predict 'the weather' based on 
visual stimuli (297). Subjects could learn direct stimulus configurations 
to response mappings, which was associated with increased activation 
of the vMPFC, posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), parahippocampal cortex, 
ventral striatum, and amygdala. Subjects could also learn higher-order 
conceptual knowledge through the detection of regularities across 
experiences, which was reflected in activation of the hippocampus, 
vMPFC, and PCC, as well as greater functional coupling between the 
hippocampus and vMPFC (297). Interestingly, the parahippocampus was 
not found to reflect higher-order conceptual knowledge, which indicates 
that this area may be more concerned with specific associative stimulus 
pairings. Furthermore, when confronted with novel stimuli but similar 
underlying task rules, hippocampus, vMPFC, and PCC activity correlated 
with correct performance. Importantly, hippocampal activity during 
learning of the task rules with the original stimuli was correlated with 
performance when faced with these novel stimulus configurations (297). 
These findings clearly indicate that interactions between the hippocampus 
and mPFC contribute to the formation of abstract knowledge, and 
that this process is already initiated during learning. Interestingly, 
this suggests that the role of the hippocampus in abstract knowledge 
formation may not be a 'teacher' replaying individual memories to the 
neocortex so that the latter can extract regularities (276), but indicates 
that the hippocampus contributes to the formation of abstract knowledge 
by detecting regularities across episodic experiences (260). Further 
insight into the dynamic interactions between the hippocampus and 
mPFC during abstract rule learning comes from multi-unit recordings. 
Hippocampal and mPFC activity has been found to phase synchronize 
at theta frequencies, and this theta coupling has been associated with 
learning and memory performance (307). Neural oscillations are thought 
to coordinate interactions between information represented within the 
hippocampus and mPFC, possibly through the formation and dissipation 
of functional networks in the form of synchronized cell assemblies 
(246, 265, 308). When rats learn to shift flexibly between two rules in a 
spatial memory task (reflecting episodic memory, not simple stimulus-
response learning), theta coherence between the hippocampus and mPFC 
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varies with learning and is accompanied by the formation of neural cell 
assemblies that are associated with memory (309). Specifically, theta 
frequency coherence between the hippocampus and mPFC increased at 
the choice point of a maze, i.e. the location at which the animal had to 
apply a learned abstract rule in order to predict in which direction to 
travel to obtain a reward, and was greatest once the animal had learned 
the correct rule. Additionally, this increase in theta coherence was 
accompanied by an increase in co-activation amongst mPFC cells that 
were modulated by hippocampal theta, which formed reliable subgroups 
of neurons, hence cell assemblies (309). The hippocampus appears to 
drive the completion of mPFC cell assemblies as during periods of high 
theta coherence, certain mPFC neurons would phase shift to the trough 
of theta, bringing together the neurons of mPFC assemblies in time. 
In turn mPFC assemblies may come to form attractor states to neural 
processing at other levels of the hierarchy. In line with this suggestion, 
only a subpopulation of mPFC cells is entrained by hippocampal-mPFC 
theta coupling. Entrained cells encode current relevant behaviours, 
whereas non-entrained cells become most active during errors and 
reward omissions, triggering a theta phase reset, which may signify a 
switch in the neural assemblies forming the current attractor state (310). 
The two studies discussed here (297, 309) critically indicate that episodic 
memory serves a predictive function that necessitates the detection 
of regularities across episodic experiences, and the formation and 
application of abstract knowledge. Furthermore, both studies indicate 
that it is the hippocampus that drives the mPFC and the formation of 
abstract knowledge.
In conclusion, we have drawn an analogy with the inferior temporal 
- lateral prefrontal neural system that supports simple rule learning 
to propose that prediction based on complex episodic experiences 
critically relies on interactions between the hippocampus and mPFC 
(Figure 6.2). We have proposed that during the formation of abstract rule 
representations the hippocampus detects regularities across episodic 
experiences and through neural coherence drives the mPFC to form 
cell assemblies representing integrations of detected regularities with 
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behavioural options and value associations. Furthermore, the flexible 
application of abstract rules to novel situations is considered to again 
require the hippocampus (297, 311, 312), a disability generally observed 
in hippocampal lesion patients (237, 240, 241). Finally, we conceive of a 
process whereby mPFC cell assemblies  come to guide or bias memory 
processing akin to top-down retrieval or attention functions (309, 313, 
314). Together, this dynamic system supports the formation of abstract 
knowledge that can nevertheless be applied flexibly. Hence the novelty 
of our thesis is that we extend the view of the predictive function of 
memory to episodic memory including autobiographical memory. Further, 
in assuming that hippocampal-mPFC interactions are part of a neural 
hierarchy that supports sensori-motor predictions, we put forward 
specific roles for both regions in the formation of abstract knowledge. 
This idea will be further explored in the next chapters where we will 
highlight the interactions between the hippocampus and mPFC.
Although the first authors', his brother's, and father's (Figure 6.1D) 
recollection of the incident may differ in details, their memories and 
the photograph share many features. A memory system that functions 
to extract regularities and foster prediction, for example between the 
first author's own episodic experience of 'the incident', his father's 
telling of the story (a favourite party feature), and subsequent viewing 
of the photograph, may have contributed to alterations in the first 
author's mnemonic representation of 'the incident'. Novel memories 
may be formed based on regularities across episodic experiences that 
do not reflect veridical representation of experiences, and have led to 
some of the memory distortions observed. The distortions in the first 
author's memory of the incident thus fit with the suggestion that the 
autobiographical memory system also serves a predictive function 
that extract regularities and forms abstract knowledge across episodic 
experiences. As such, memory alterations reflect the flexibility of an 
adaptive memory system. Although this proposal can explain why the 
different memories of the incident agree in general, it leaves the striking 
differences in details unexplained. One possibility that may explain these 
differences in details is that with the formation of abstract knowledge, 
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memory representations change and different details may be lost. In the 
next section we will focus on such changes in memory representations 
that may occur during so called systems consolidation.
6.6 Systems consolidation supports formation of abstract 
knowledge
The extraction of regularities across experiences could thus have 
contributed to the commonalities observed between the first authors, 
his brother's, and father's memory of 'the incident'. yet, their memories 
markedly differ on specific details. It is well known that over time our 
ability to retrieve detailed aspects of an autobiographical experience 
diminishes, whereas abstract knowledge of experience is retained, and 
memory alterations become apparent (214, 215, 315). One process that 
may contribute to memory alterations over time is systems consolidation. 
Here we will discuss the neural basis of systems consolidation and 
emphasize an overlap with the neural systems that support the 
formation of abstract knowledge, highlighting interactions between the 
hippocampus and mPFC.
Systems consolidation refers to a process in which the hippocampus 
initially stores experiences by linking together neocortical 
representations, and subsequently reinstates experience dependent 
patterns of neural activity in neocortical circuits causing strengthening 
of cortico-cortical connections. This is thought to be an iterative process 
resulting in memories to become stored in a neocortical trace that can be 
retrieved independent of the hippocampus (248, 316, 317). An extension 
of systems consolidation theory holds that for certain memories the 
mPFC can take over the indexing function of the hippocampus (318). 
An alternative theory to standard systems consolidation proposes that 
the reactivation of memory representations automatically results in 
the novel encoding of the reactivated representations incorporating 
current contextual information resulting in multiple traces of a memory 
(319). The formation of such related memories facilitates the extraction 
of regularities across episodic experiences that is thought to become 
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stored neocortically, yet the details of memory representations are 
considered to remain hippocampally dependent (319, 320). The question 
whether episodic memories may ever become fully independent of the 
hippocampus has sparked intense debate, and a wealth of patient and 
imaging studies have been put forward in support of either side of the 
argument (for reviews see (316, 317, 319-322)). However, lesion studies in 
animals have yielded results that conflict with both theories (323). To us it 
appears that both recent and remote memory performance for complex 
episodic experiences at least benefits from hippocampal involvement 
that may be determined by task demands (323, 324). Note that the 
systems consolidation debate mirrors the discussion on neural systems 
supporting episodic and semantic memory from which we derived our 
hypothesis that the hippocampus rapidly stores episodic experiences, 
detects regularities and drives the formation of abstract knowledge in the 
neocortex. Furthermore, the system consolidation discussion also reflects 
the idea that abstract knowledge may become stored in the neocortex but 
that the flexible application of knowledge to specific details relies on the 
hippocampus, again in line with our proposal. 
Both standard system consolidation theory and multiple trace theory 
assume that the differences observed between recent and remote 
memories are due to changes of the memory trace that have occurred 
over time. An alternative to the differences observed between recent 
and remote memory is that these are not caused by the passage of time 
per se, but are attributable to a memory system that functions to extract 
regularities and fosters sensori-motor prediction. According to this view, 
systems consolidation effects do not reflect differences in the memory 
trace retrieved as a result of a retrieval cue, but differences in abstract 
knowledge that interacts with the retrieval cue (325). Differences in 
abstract knowledge at the time of recent and remote memory retrieval 
would affect the formation of novel episodic memory traces, the detection 
of regularities and the development of abstract knowledge.  This is 
conceived to occur through the reinstatement of experience dependent 
activations consistent with the hippocampal-mPFC interactions we have 
described for regularity to response mapping for episodic experiences. 
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In this section we will discuss studies on systems consolidation, further 
explore the interactions between the mPFC and hippocampus, and the 
role of the mPFC in memory. Where relevant we will highlight evidence in 
favour or against the three hypotheses on systems consolidation.
Studies on systems consolidation have revealed that remote memory 
formation requires interactions between the hippocampus and neocortex 
in the post-encoding consolidation period that drive plasticity changes 
in the neural network. Both lesion and inactivation studies have shown 
a double dissociation where recent memory depends on hippocampus 
but over time remote memory is supported by the mPFC (326-329). 
At the same time as memory comes to depend on the mPFC, neurons 
within the mPFC develop differential firing rates for specific memory 
representations, also in the absence of further training indicating 
that synaptic connections within the mPFC or between the mPFC and 
other brain areas change due to intrinsic activity, possibly through the 
reinstatement of experience dependent activation in the delay interval 
(326). According to the systems consolidation hypothesis, reinstatement, 
or replay, would lead to a strengthening of cortico-cortical connections 
rendering the hippocampal memory index no longer necessary. As 
such, systems level consolidation should develop through an interaction 
between the hippocampus and neocortical areas, and the mPFC in 
particular, requiring synaptic modifications between these connections 
(318). Although NMDA receptor blockade does not impair memory 
retrieval (330), genetic reversible inactivation of NMDA receptor in 
CA1 in the week after learning, but not at later times after learning 
impaired remote memory (331). In contrast, AMPA receptor activity 
within the hippocampus is necessary both in the first and second week 
after learning for remote memory formation (332), which suggests that 
for remote memory formation basal neural activity is necessary within 
the hippocampus, but neural plasticity is only necessary in the output 
region of the hippocampus (333). Furthermore, reversible NMDA receptor 
blockade in the mPFC during the two weeks following learning, but not 
during later weeks, impairs remote memory (326). Interestingly, the direct 
projections from CA1 to the mPFC display NMDA receptor-dependent 
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LTP (334), and the impairment of remote memory by mPFC NMDA 
receptor blockade in the two-week post learning period is accompanied 
by a deficiency in the ability to induce LTP in vivo within the CA1-mPFC 
pathway that is attributable to post-synaptic plasticity mechanisms, 
not presynaptic basal synaptic transmission alterations (329). Hence, in 
line with our proposal hippocampal activity appears to drive synaptic 
plasticity in the mPFC. In addition to the mPFC, the posterior parietal 
cortex, and retrosplenial cortex show an increase in immediate early 
gene (IEG) expression over time, as memory becomes to depend less 
on the hippocampus (327, 328). Within the posterior cingulate cortex, 
IEG expression shows a shift from deep cortical layers to superficial 
layers over time, consistent with a shift towards greater cortico-cortical 
connectivity (335). Furthermore, genetically modified mice that have 
relatively normal CaMKII levels in the hippocampus but not the neocortex 
(CaMKII+/- mice), exhibit normal recent but impaired remote memory, 
and this is accompanied by a decrease in IEG expression in the mPFC. 
In these animals LTP can normally be induced in the hippocampus, but 
although LTP can be induced in the neocortex, this rapidly decays back 
to baseline (336). These findings indicate that in the immediate post 
encoding consolidation period, interactions between the hippocampus 
and mPFC are necessary to instate changes in the mPFC which may come 
to support remote memory. Additionally, the shift of memory dependency 
from the hippocampus to the mPFC is not a simple information transfer, 
but is initiated in parallel and develops through concurrent hippocampal-
mPFC interactions (328, 337). These findings provide support for theories 
that assume a transformation of memory with systems consolidation
As we have described, the formation of abstract knowledge, given the 
sparseness of cortico-cortical connectivity, requires the integration of 
memory in cortical networks not just through weight changes of existing 
synapses but via rewiring through the formation of novel synapses (249). 
It has been proposed that connections between neocortical neurons 
are formed in a two-step procedure in which first a random growth of 
neocortical synapses occurs that can become potentiated in a second 
step if subsequently exited by the reinstatement of experience dependent 
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activity (338). Although the mPFC damage immediately after learning 
does not impair recent memory (326-328), temporary inactivation of the 
mPFC during encoding does impair remote memory (328) This suggests 
that during encoding synapses in the mPFC are 'tagged' for future 
enhancement through subsequent hippocampal-mPFC interactions (275, 
328). Continuing this line of reasoning Lesburgueres and colleagues (2011) 
go on to show that preventing 'tag' setting through mPFC inactivation 
during the formation of one mnemonic association but not another, does 
not affect recent memory but impairs remote memory for the non-
tagged experience, possibly by preventing histone modifications that 
serve as tag. Temporary inactivation of the mPFC during encoding also 
prevented subsequent morphological changes in the mPFC (328), and 
expression within the mPFC of a growth protein associated with novel 
synapse formation increases with the formation of remote memory 
(327). Additionally, the genetically modified CaMKII+/- mice exhibit 
reduced synaptogenesis in the mPFC (339). Similarly, transgenic mice in 
which PAK, a regulator of actin and therefore of synaptic remodelling, 
is inhibited in the postnatal forebrain show altered spine morphology 
in the neocortex but not the hippocampus and impaired remote but 
not recent memory (340). Interestingly, PAK activity depends on NMDA 
receptor activation and plasticity within cortical layers IV and II/III is 
retarded in PAK transgenic mice (340), suggestive of impaired cortico-
cortical rewiring. Finally, disrupting spinogenesis in the mPFC impairs 
remote memory formation (341). Thus, the formation of remote memory 
is accompanied by the same type of cortical rewiring changes that 
support the formation and storage of abstract knowledge from episodic 
experiences. Although the studies discussed above fit with the thesis that 
systems consolidation supports the formation of abstract knowledge, it 
does not exclude standard systems consolidation theory or multiple trace 
theory, although it appears to favour theories that assume transformation 
of memory with systems consolidation.
As we have discussed, with the formation of abstract knowledge, through 
hippocampal-mPFC interactions, the mPFC can come to guide neural 
processing in other brain regions. With regard to systems consolidation 
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similar mechanisms appear to exist. First, the interaction between the 
hippocampus and mPFC are dynamic in that over time the hippocampus 
drives plasticity changes in the mPFC, which are at the same time 
accompanied by adjustments within the output of the hippocampus (331). 
The change in hippocampal output may be an activate inhibition initiated 
by the mPFC to prevent the encoding of already stored information, 
preventing redundancy in the system (342). Second, the formation 
abstract knowledge within the mPFC through hippocampal-prefrontal 
interactions can subsequently become important to the exchange of 
information that directs neocortical reorganization. In resonance with 
this idea, mPFC synchrony increases with learning and drives entorhinal 
to perirhinal communication supporting information exchange between 
the hippocampus and neocortex (343).  The mPFC is thus considered to 
provide a binding function as it actively appears to optimize interactions 
between disparate brain regions to support the formation of flexible 
memories.
Neuroimaging studies have revealed that systems level reorganization 
also occurs for human episodic memory. Tracking memory for complex 
pictures over a three month period showed that retrieval of memory is 
associated with increased mPFC activity over time, whilst a decrease in 
hippocampal activity was observed (344). A similar increase in mPFC 
involvement in memory was observed when object-location associations 
were learned spaced over repeated episodes compared to massed 
learning (345), consistent with the suggestion that mPFC involvement 
increases over multiple reinstatements of experience dependent activity. 
Interestingly, this increase in mPFC involvement for stabilized memories is 
accompanied by a decrease in gamma activity at early visual areas, whilst 
stabilized memories are retrieved faster (346), suggesting that following 
systems level consolidation a reduction of detailed memory processing 
takes place. A study  conducted over several days examining the effect of 
multiple retrievals of autobiographical episodic and semantic memories, 
revealed that although the hippocampus and mPFC show repetition 
suppression with increasing retrieval attempts, both regions exhibit 
greater activity for autobiographical than semantic memory at the first 
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retrieval attempt and after eight retrieval attempts (347). Additionally, 
the results appear to indicate that the differentiation in neural activation 
between autobiographical and semantic memory retrieval in the 
hippocampus does reduce over time, whereas this differentiation in the 
parahippocampus increases.  Again these studies indicate that memories 
transform during systems consolidation, but also indicate that the 
Figure 6.3: A dynamic neural model supporting a flexible and adaptive episodic memory system
A dynamic neural system is hypothesized to give rise to flexible and adaptive memories. A: Detailed 
representations (orange circles) of episodic experiences are processed in distributed regions of the brain. 
Existing neocortical connections (orange lines) are too sparse to allow the integration of all details of 
an episodic experience. The hippocampus is considered to be able to connect many details of an episodic 
experience (grey lines) through rapid synaptic weight changes that comes to form an episodic memory 
representation. Also, synapses in the mPFC that will come to support abstract knowledge are already 
tagged during initial learning (grey circles). B: The hippocampus detects regularities between episodic 
experiences and interactions with the mPFC to initiate the formation of abstract knowledge. Upon the 
detection of regularities the hippocampus drives (blue lines) neocortical rewiring (red lines) between 
the mPFC and detailed representation that are common across episodic experiences. The mPFC integrates 
motor output options, and together the neocortical wiring is hypothesized to form the basis of abstract 
knowledge (red circles and red lines). Abstract knowledge can in turn provide a structure that nests more 
detailed representations of an episodic memory (orange circles and orange lines), and the mPFC is consid-
ered to provide a binding function across neocortical associative modules. C: Due to decay, interference, 
and synaptic-downscaling during sleep, connections supported by low synaptic weights may disappear 
(grey - dashed connections), leading to the loss of memory details (grey circle). With the development of a 
neocortical knowledge network and the loss of details that depend on connections that are not part of this 
network, memory representations may come to depend more on this neocortical network and less on the 
hippocampus. Details that are not part of the abstract knowledge network could remain dependent on the 
hippocampus (orange circle and grey line). Similarly, flexible application of abstract knowledge to such de-
tails is considered to depend on the hippocampus. Furthermore, novel detail representations (dark-orange 
circle) can be rapidly integrated into the neocortical network if congruent with the existing knowledge 
network that provides a schema to new learning, and only briefly require hippocampal involvement (blue 
line).  Finally, details that are dependent on the hippocampus (orange circle and grey line) are considered 
to be sensitive to updating during reconsolidation, but the neocortical knowledge network (red circles 
and red lines) is proposed to be less sensitive to alteration due to reconsolidation. Together this dynamic 
system supports flexible and adaptive memory.
128
hippocampus remains involved when detailed episodic memories are 
retrieved.
In summary, the mechanisms underlying systems consolidation 
resemble those we have described for abstract knowledge formation 
from episodic experiences. The loss of details and retention of abstract 
knowledge over time is paralleled by a shift of memory dependency 
from the hippocampus to the neocortex, and specifically the mPFC. 
The hippocampus is thought to reinstate experience dependent 
neural activation in the neocortex in the post encoding consolidation 
period driving plasticity changes in the neocortex and between the 
hippocampus and neocortex. Interestingly, neocortical synapses that 
come to support memory over time are already tagged during learning 
for future strengthening. This suggests parallel memory formation in 
the hippocampus and neocortex, akin to the development of abstract 
knowledge during learning. Furthermore, the shift in memory dependency 
is considered to occur through a two-step procedure where in the 
neocortex random synaptic growth occurs that can become stabilized 
if this coincides with the reinstatement of neural activity supporting 
the stabilization of cortico-cortical connections. Over time regularity 
representation within the mPFC may take over the binding function of 
the hippocampus and come to guide neural processing in other regions. 
However, as the cortico-cortical connectivity remains sparse, this might 
come at a loss of the complexity of episodic memory. When details of 
episodic experiences are retrieved the hippocampus does appear to be 
involved, also in the retrieval of remote memories, possibly guided by 
abstract knowledge that is supported by a neocortical network centred on 
the mPFC (Figure 6.3).
In conclusion, studies on systems consolidation reveal that memory 
formation is a dynamic process. In line with our hypothesis systems level 
consolidation appears to support the formation of abstract knowledge 
through interactions between the hippocampus and mPFC proposed 
to be part of a sensori-motor predictive neural hierarchy. However, 
these studies do not provide definitive evidence that the formation of 
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abstract knowledge occurs with systems consolidation nor does it exclude 
standard systems or multiple trace theory and is therefore an important 
topic for future studies. Nevertheless, due to systems consolidation the 
memory of 'the incident' might thus have changed, whereby regularities 
between different experiences have become integrated and specific 
details lost. The loss of specific details and persistence of abstract 
knowledge indicates that a flexible memory system is adaptive, as 
specifics are lost but abstract knowledge that can be applied to multiple 
situations independent of particular details is retained. An open question 
that remains is when and how memory representations are transformed 
during a post-consolidation period. Sleep has been a long-suggested 
candidate for such memory transformation. In the next section studies on 
sleep will be discussed that provide further insight into the interactions 
between the hippocampus and mPFC that support the formation of 
abstract knowledge and emphasizes the dynamic nature of memory. 
Critically, these studies reveal that during sleep abstract knowledge is 
formed that supports a predictive function.
6.7 Sleep supports formation abstract knowledge
During sleep the hippocampus is considered to repeatedly reinstate 
experience dependent activations in the neocortex that drive changes in 
cortico-cortical connectivity and give rise to memory transformations. 
Importantly, sleep provides an optimal opportunity to reprocess 
memories, detect regularities, and map regularities to responses as 
during sleep memories are not subject to possible interference by 
incoming sensory information. We hypothesize that sleep contributes to 
the formation of abstract knowledge from episodic experiences and that 
studies on sleep and memory provide insight into the mechanisms of a 
dynamic memory system.
Supporting the idea that sleep plays a role in memory consolidation, 
sleep has been found to improve memory, more than a wake period of 
comparable length (for a review see (348). Recently, the re-exposure 
during sleep to smells or sounds associated with object-location learning 
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was found to enhance subsequent memory (349, 350). Although these 
latter studies provide causal evidence that specific memories can be 
reactivated and reprocessed during sleep and subsequently strengthened, 
they imply a rather passive function of sleep in memory consolidation, 
where sleep simply strengthens veridical memory representations. 
However, if sleep actively updates and reprocess memories serving the 
extraction of invariant regularities across experiences, sleep should 
result in qualitative changes in memory representations and the active 
consolidation of new memories (276, 348, 349, 351)). Confirming this 
suggestion, subjects who had not discovered a hidden rule during a 
rule learning task were more likely to display knowledge of the hidden 
rule after a sleep period compared to subjects who had stayed awake 
(352). Thus, subjects demonstrated novel insight for information learned 
prior to sleep. Critically, this indicates that during sleep memories are 
reconfigured and regularities across episodic experiences can be detected 
to form new memories and the basis of abstract knowledge that supports 
a predictive function. However, the extraction of regularities during 
sleep may also lead to false memories. In a Deese-Roediger/McDermott 
paradigm subjects learn lists of words (e.g. door, glass, pane, shade, 
house, and curtain) which are semantically related to a critical word that 
is never shown (e.g. window).  Subsequent testing on all words including 
the critical word leads to false memories (i.e. subjects indicate having 
studied 'window'). Interestingly, sleep preferentially preserved memory 
for critical words (353). The mechanisms by which memories may be 
reprocessed and abstract knowledge is formed during sleep are starting 
to be uncovered. In the next paragraphs we will present studies that 
reveal interactions between the hippocampus and mPFC during sleep that 
we suggests gives rise to the formation of abstract knowledge.
Memory processing during sleep has been associated with specific 
electrophysiological mechanisms (253, 354). Importantly, neural 
oscillations are thought to provide a spatio-temporal structure for 
coordinated communication between neural cell assemblies within and 
across brain areas (354). During sleep interactions between cortical slow 
oscillations, thalamocortical spindles and hippocampal sharp wave ripple 
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events provide a mechanism to coordinate the output of reactivated 
hippocampal cell assemblies with ongoing neocortical activity and guide 
the hippocampal output to the neocortical circuits that gave rise to input 
to the hippocampus during the experience (354-356). In concordance, 
slow oscillations, spindles and sharp waves occurring during sleep have 
been found to correlate with memory performance, and interference with 
these mechanisms affects memory in animals and humans (357-364). As 
hippocampal sharp wave ripple events can become nested in the troughs 
of spindles (355), when the depolarized neocortical state is most sensitive 
to plasticity changes, this would be an optimal timing for memory 
interactions between the hippocampus and the neocortex. In line with this 
idea, sleep spindles have been detected in neocortical areas that were 
also involved in learning of a task (365) and their occurrence increases 
with the amount of difficulty of a task (360). Interactions between 
the hippocampus and neocortex during sleep may thus be critical to 
memory consolidation and the formation of abstract knowledge through 
reactivation of memories.
Electrophysiological studies have provided evidence for the reactivation 
of memories during sleep. During explorations, when learning of a 
route occurs, place cells fire in sequential order compressed in theta 
oscillations with a certain degree of overlap and as such allow for 
the representation of overlapping past, present, and future locations 
into single episodes (366-368). Seminal to the idea that memories are 
reprocessed during sleep has been the discovery that place cells within 
the hippocampus reactivate in the same spatio-temporal sequences 
during sleep as they had during a prior learning episode (369, 370) albeit 
at a faster time scale (371). Importantly, the forward nature of memory 
replay (370) implies a predictive memory function, instead of a mere 
recap of events. 
In line with the suggestion that memory reactivation during sleep 
supports the formation of abstract knowledge in the neocortex, 
interactions between the hippocampus and visual cortex for replay 
of sequences have been found (356), as well as replay of cells in the 
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mPFC (372), striatum (373), several forebrain regions (374), and the 
locus coeruleus (357). Additionally, following learning of a unilateral 
motor task, sleep spindles also increase in the contralateral hemisphere 
(358), suggesting a generalization of experience dependent learning. 
Furthermore, replay of place cell sequences decreases over several 
post-learning sleep periods (370). These findings confirm to the idea 
that during sleep the hippocampus replays information acquired during 
the wake period to the neocortex, allowing for multiple interleaved 
exposures either suited to train a slow neocortical rule learning system 
that extracts regularities (276, 348, 375), or store regularities detected by 
the hippocampus. Hence, memory reactivations and interactions between 
the hippocampus and neocortex during sleep appear to be an ideal 
mechanism to the formation of abstract knowledge that might come to 
provide predictions and guide behaviour. yet only recently has support for 
this suggestion been presented.
In section 3 we have described that during abstract rule learning from 
episodic experiences, neural cell assemblies are formed within the 
mPFC through interactions with the hippocampus that reflect abstract 
rules (309). Critically, such memories related to abstract rule learning 
have been found to reactivate during sleep through mPFC-hippocampal 
interactions (376). The reactivation of abstract rule related neural 
assemblies could be detected based on the similarity of the principle 
components between activity during learning and sleep. Interestingly, 
different components reactivate at different times during sleep, reflecting 
a possible interleaved learning schedule optimal to the formation 
of abstracts knowledge (276). The replay of these cell assemblies 
occurs in concert with hippocampal sharp-wave ripple events, and the 
hippocampal activity appears to precede mPFC activation, indicating that 
the hippocampus drives the mPFC activity in line with the suggestion 
that following the detection of regularities, the hippocampus drives 
the formation of abstract knowledge in the neocortex. Importantly, the 
neural assemblies that activate during sharp-wave ripple events reflect 
assemblies that were active at the choice point of the maze, and the 
reactivation of these assemblies occurs more often when an animal 
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has learned the abstract rule (376). These results indicate that abstract 
knowledge can be formed during sleep through hippocampal-mPFC 
interactions, and may come to support sensori-motor prediction.
Human neuroimaging studies have also revealed memory related 
reactivation during sleep of the hippocampus and neocortical regions 
implicated in task learning (349, 377-380), and this reactivation activity 
correlates with subsequent memory performance (379). Additionally, 
functional hippocampal-mPFC connectivity increases following a night 
of sleep and is related to memory performance (377, 378). Importantly, 
subjects who gain insight into a hidden rule following a night of sleep 
exhibit greater hippocampal-neocortical connectivity during learning 
and an increase in mPFC activity following sleep (381). In contrast, 
subjects who do not gain this abstract knowledge show no increase in 
mPFC activity following subsequent sleep (381). Thus, the hippocampus 
and mPFC might interact during sleep to detect regularities across 
reactivations and form abstract knowledge. Interestingly, the formation 
of false memories during sleep (353) has also been associated with 
the hippocampal-mPFC network (381). Hence, interaction between the 
hippocampus and the mPFC appear to give rise to abstract knowledge 
that can come to support prediction, but this process can also give rise to 
memory alterations and distortions.
With the formation of abstract knowledge, sleep may initiate the systems 
consolidation shift of memory dependency from the hippocampus to the 
neocortex. The decrease of memory related hippocampal activity over 
time has been reported to correlate with the slow-wave sleep period after 
learning, and is accompanied by an increase of mPFC activity over time 
with regard to memory performance (344). During sleep, the mPFC may 
support a binding function by bringing together distributed neocortical 
memory processes. In a study where subjects had to learn face-location 
associations, activity in the fusiform cortex (an area implicated in face 
processing) was found to correlate with early visual and posterior 
parietal areas (an area implicated in location processing) during sleep 
stage 1. During sleep stage 2 the fusiform cortex switches towards 
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functional connectivity with the mPFC and middle temporal cortex, and 
this network overlapped with the neural networks that would come to 
support subsequent memory retrieval (382). Sleep appears to initiate 
changes in functional cortico-cortical connectivity that is associated with 
abstract knowledge formation and could take over a pointer function 
of the hippocampus (318). As such, the formation of a neural network 
supporting abstract knowledge appears to provide a structure that nests 
detailed memory representations.
The reduction of hippocampal involvement in memory has been 
proposed to be attributable to synaptic down-scaling during sleep (348, 
383). Synapses that have been potentiated during a wake period are 
again weakened during sleep (384, 385). Synapses that are sensitive to 
regularities between experiences would have been strengthened more 
during learning and are more likely to survive synaptic downscaling 
than synapses potentiated by single experience that reflect details (375). 
Additionally, synaptic down-scaling affects weight but not wiring changes. 
Together this suggests that regularities are preferentially stored during 
sleep, but details of memory may be lost.
In summary, one function of sleep is considered to be the detection 
of regularities across experiences through the interleaved replay of 
episodic experiences thereby creating abstract knowledge that comes 
to guide future behaviour. Studies on memory and sleep critically reveal 
that the formation of memory is dynamic and that sleep can contribute 
to the optimization of prediction from episodic memory through the 
formation of abstract knowledge. In line with our thesis, the formation 
of abstract knowledge during sleep occurs through hippocampal-
mPFC interactions and is associated with changes in cortico-cortical 
connectivity. Additionally, with the formation of abstract knowledge the 
mPFC brings together distributed cortical memory processes and takes 
over the binding function from the hippocampus. As such a hardwired 
neural network centred on the mPFC and reflecting abstract knowledge 
can provide structure to nested memory representations. Additionally, 
hippocampal involvement and details of a memory may be lost due to 
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synaptic down-scaling during sleep (Figure 6.3C). As such, the memory 
for 'the incident' might have become reconfigured during sleep, losing the 
specific details of the episode but maintaining or even creating memory 
for regularities between 'the incident' experience and other experiences
Synaptic down-scaling is considered to free up capacity to allow new 
learning. In resonance with this idea, sleep facilitates new learning 
following sleep (382, 384-386), which is correlated with hippocampal 
connectivity during sleep (382).  Hence, the integration of new memory 
within existing knowledge could also have contributed to the distortions 
of the first author's own memory. In the next section we will discuss how 
abstract knowledge comes to guide the integration of new information 
into memory and more specifically that a hardwired neocortical network 
centred on the mPFC can provide elaborate information and as such 
affect hippocampal processing and new learning.
6.8 Abstract knowledge comes to guide integration new 
information
So far we have discussed how the regularities can be detected amongst 
episodic experiences, and how detected regularities form abstract 
knowledge over time, possibly during sleep, and come to guide 
behaviour. Additionally, the formation of abstract knowledge within 
the neocortex can develop to guide future memory encoding, possibly 
providing elaborate information to hippocampal processing. This allows 
the integration of current incoming sensory information with abstract 
knowledge, current goals, and task demands, as well as the formation 
of novel memory representations that are non-overlapping with existing 
representations (272, 299). The importance of existing knowledge in the 
formation of novel memories has long been recognized (272, 387, 388). 
Relevant to a learning situation, existing knowledge is considered to 
provide a prior state related to which incoming information is encoded. 
The prior state is thought to form dynamically and has been termed a 
'schema' (387, 388), though Bartlett favoured the term 'organised setting'. 
Only recently have neuroscientist begun to investigate schemas in the 
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acquisition of novel information and have come to define a schema as a 
pre-existing network of interconnected neocortical representations (325), 
where we would like to add that schemas reflect abstract knowledge  
based on previously detected regularities and related to the current 
learning situation.
Initial suggestions that prior experience could alter novel learning came 
from studies showing that rats reared in a 'village', thereby providing 
extensive experience to a complex environment, could still learn 
routes within this environment following hippocampal lesions (389). 
More recent studies have shown that the speed with which memories 
become independent of the hippocampus and integrated within the 
neocortex depends on the presence of a corresponding schema (390). 
This implicates that the existence of prior information allows for a 
rapid integration of novel information and that the learning rate of the 
neocortex can be fast if information is congruent with a schema. These 
findings are suggestive that initial learning requires a slow neuronal 
growth process such as rewiring, but if wiring is in place and forming 
a schema with which novel incoming information is congruent, than 
novel information can be rapidly integrated through a fast learning 
process possibly reflecting weight changes. Furthermore, flexibility to 
adjust abstract knowledge requires new learning and is hippocampus 
dependent. As a consequence of these observations it has been suggested 
that systems consolidation might not so much be about time but about 
the need for specific changes, i.e. cortico-cortical rewiring or synaptic 
modification (391). In support of this idea learning of information in the 
presence of a schema is accompanied by up-regulation of immediate 
early genes (IEG) in the mPFC (337). Specifically, this up-regulation is 
greatest when new information is learned in the presence of a strong 
schema, but IEG up-regulation is greatest in the hippocampus when a 
completely new schema has to be learned, i.e. when the learning situation 
comprises most novelty. Furthermore, both suppression of activity (by 
blocking basic AMPA transmission with CNQX) and obstructing plasticity 
(with the NMDA receptor antagonist AP5) within the mPFC impairs 
learning of new information within the presence of a schema, yet only 
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suppression of activity not plasticity impairs the retrieval of these new 
memories (337). The existence of prior knowledge regarding a specific 
learning situation thus appears to boost the speed with which novel 
memories become hippocampus independent and integrated within the 
neocortex with a specific dependence on the mPFC. yet to date it remains 
unclear whether there is no need for rewiring for new learning in the 
presence of a schema, and whether in this case memory formation would 
be insensitive to interference with spinogenesis. As before, these studies 
critically indicate that memory formation is dynamic, as it depends on the 
existence of prior knowledge. Additionally, these studies also highlight 
that the existence of abstract knowledge may aid the integration of new 
information to optimize predictions and guide behaviour. Similar to the 
discussion in the previous section of abstract rule learning, systems 
consolidation, and memory reactivations during sleep, schema memory 
critically involves interactions between the hippocampus and mPFC
Human studies on schema consolidation have mirrored animal findings. 
An early positron emission tomography (PET) study has shown that the 
presentation of pictures relevant to interpreting a subsequent story 
aids understanding of an otherwise confusing text and is associated 
with increased activation of the mPFC and precuneus (392). More 
recent studies have investigated the dynamic interaction between the 
hippocampus and neocortex with regard to schema consolidation. Van 
Kesteren and colleagues (2010) effectively modulated prior knowledge, 
or schemas, by presenting subjects with a movie either in normal order 
(schema group) or in an order in which the scenes of the movie had 
been scrambled (no-schema group). When subjects viewed the last part 
of the movie in non-scrambled order on the next day, the schema group 
showed reduced functional connectivity between the hippocampus 
and mPFC. Interestingly, the subjects that exhibited better memory for 
schema related questions within the non-schema group showed also 
less hippocampal-mPFC interactions (393). These effects persisted in a 
post-learning encoding period, reflecting a change in schema-dependent 
consolidation. In a follow-up study, subjects learned associations between 
visual motifs, fabric textures, and words that were either incongruent 
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(acrylic-sock) or congruent (fleece-sweater) with common knowledge 
(394). When cued with the visual motifs, subjects were better at 
remembering congruent associates, which was accompanied by greater 
activity in the mPFC and task-specific somatosensory cortex during 
recall as well as stronger interactions between these regions. Thus, 
reduced hippocampal-mPFC connectivity during encoding is paralleled 
by increased mPFC-sensory cortex interactions at retrieval. This finding 
also indicates that the mPFC may take over a binding function from the 
hippocampus, as do other studies previously discussed in this review 
(343, 382). Novel memories appear to become rapidly integrated within 
existing neocortical networks through hippocampal-mPFC interactions 
if an overlap exists between novel incoming information and episodic 
regularities that we suggest to involve the mPFC. The mPFC may thus 
effectively form prior predictions over incoming information, and increase 
interactions amongst distributed neural regions that form a preexisting 
network. In line with this idea mnemonic congruency effects on 
perceptual processing have been detected at very early stages (100 ms) 
in the occipital cortex (395), have been associated with increased theta 
activity (396, 397), and greater theta phase locking between occipital 
regions, parahippocampus, retrosplenial cortex, and mPFC (398), where 
the mPFC is thought to exert prior expectations on visual processing 
(223). Similar to the formation of neural assemblies thought to form 
attractor states during abstract rules learning (309, 310).
Ultimately, the pre-existent network of interconnected neocortical 
representations based on regularities across episodic experiences should 
provide organizing principles guiding learning and behaviour. In section 
3 we have described a study on the formation of abstract knowledge 
through hippocampal-mPFC interactions (297). In this study the authors 
also tested the application of acquired knowledge to novel situations. 
In a transfer test subjects were confronted with a choice paradigm with 
the same underlying rules as learned previously but with new stimulus-
pairs. Thus, abstract knowledge based on regularities of prior experience 
served as a schema in a perceptually novel session effectively testing the 
application of detected regularities across episodic experience invariant 
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of the specific perceptual details. In this new learning session subjects 
showed superior performance that was correlated with the amount of 
prior abstract knowledge. The probability of correct responding in this 
transfer task was associated with increased activity in the hippocampus, 
mPFC, and precuneus, yet only the hippocampus showed a greater degree 
of activity with regard to correct performance on the transfer test than 
during initial learning (297). One can infer from this that regularities 
are detected by the hippocampus and become represented by the mPFC 
through dynamic hippocampal-mPFC interactions. In turn the regularity 
representations that dependent on the mPFC might provide prior 
expectation signals to the hippocampus which is critical for the flexible 
application of abstract task rules to novel situations. This finding reflects 
the idea that abstract knowledge depends on the neocortex and mPFC in 
particular, but that the retrieval of details and application of knowledge 
to new situations also requires the hippocampus.
The existence of schemas provides prior expectations that guide decision 
making and support the integration of novel memories into neocortical 
networks. However, schemas could also be responsible for the formation 
of false memories. Probing prior knowledge of people before presenting 
suggestive information increases the chances that suggestive information 
becomes incorporated into autobiographical memory creating false 
memories (214, 387). This is especially true for the integration of false 
details into a memory representation. It might thus be that the repeated 
exposures to retellings of 'the incident' and seeing the related picture 
have caused extraction of regularities across these experiences. Abstract 
knowledge of 'the incident' may have come to form a schema to guide 
novel memory formation during subsequent experiences related to 'the 
incident' and have led to integration of incorrect details into the memory 
for the event. Once more, the anecdote provides an example of a flexible 
memory system that supports prediction, but may result in inaccurate 
memories.
In conclusion, studies on schema consolidation indicate that prior 
knowledge guides new learning that optimizes subsequent behaviour. 
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Again schema consolidation studies emphasize that memory is a 
dynamic process. Mirroring the discussion on abstracts knowledge, 
systems consolidation, and sleep, schema consolidation occurs through 
interactions between the hippocampus and mPFC, and implicates an 
important role for the mPFC in abstract knowledge. We speculate that 
the interactions between abstract knowledge and the formation of 
new memories occur through dynamic interactions between the mPFC, 
hippocampus and possibly other brain regions (Figure 6.3C). However, to 
date little is known about the electrophysiology of schema consolidation 
that can corroborate this claim. Furthermore, the rapid integration of 
novel information into memory in the presence of a schema suggests 
that this relies on weight changes of existing neocortical synapses, and 
does not require neocortical rewiring. Again, future studies will have to 
verify this hypothesis. Finally, the presence of abstract knowledge could 
have caused a rapid integration of new experiences into the first author's 
memory of 'the incident', and as such, contributed to the observed 
memory distortions. The alterations in the first author's memory for the 
incident thus indicates that autobiographical memory is flexible, and 
that abstract knowledge may have optimized the integration of novel 
information to form adaptive memory representations. A final possibility 
we will discuss that could have contributed to these distortions, is the 
possibility that certain aspects of the memory were erased or updated 
when reactivated.
6.9 Memory reactivation and updating of predictions
Standard consolidation theory suggests that  memories are initially labile 
and sensitive to disruption but become stabilized over time and are 
subsequently relatively insensitive to disruption (30). A dynamic memory 
system would, however, benefit if memories remain sensitive to changes 
if the outcome of a situation relative to a retrieved memory is different 
from what was predicted, allowing for the optimization of prediction from 
memory. In light with our hypothesis here, details of memories should 
be more sensitive to updating than abstract knowledge, and updating of 
episodic memories should again involve the hippocampus.
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In the late 60's and early 70's of the last century, several studies showed 
that interfering with brain function immediately following retrieval of a 
memory caused subsequent amnesia of the memory (47, 48, 399). These 
findings regained interest when Nader and colleagues found that blocking 
protein synthesis in the amygdala following memory retrieval impaired 
memory a day later (50). Critically, this impairment was not observed if 
memory was not retrieved prior to protein synthesis blockade, nor was it 
observed immediately following the application of the protein synthesis 
inhibitor (50). These findings indicate that when a memory is recalled 
it is reactivated and becomes instable requiring a time dependent re-
stabilization process that has been termed reconsolidation (48, 49, 400). 
Subsequent animal studies have indicated that complex hippocampal 
dependent memories also undergo a reconsolidation process when 
reactivated (401-403). In humans impairments of simple emotional 
associative memory upon reactivation have been reported (404-406) 
as well as disruptions of episodic memory following reactivation (407-
412). However, several of the human studies do not meet the criteria to 
demonstrate a reconsolidation process, as they lack immediate memory 
tests or have given an amnesic agent prior to memory reactivation and 
are therefore unable to show a time-dependent process and may have 
interfered with the retrieval process or new learning (for a review see 
(413)). Nevertheless, reconsolidation does appear to occur for episodic 
memories, which could explain some of the alterations observed for the 
memory of 'the incident'. yet, the observed memory alterations are for 
specific details, but the first author has not lost memory for the episode 
completely. Our thesis predicts that his knowledge of the incident has 
come to depend on wiring changes whereas details of the memory have 
remained sensitive to synaptic weight changes and thus to alterations 
through reconsolidation.
In concordance with the weight versus wiring suggestion, several 
studies have reported that older memories and stronger memories are 
less sensitive to reconsolidation disruption, or can recover following 
disruption (414-417). In addition, reconsolidation is impaired by 
blocking molecular substrates that have been associated with synaptic 
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plasticity (for review see (400)), and is associated with changes in 
memory-related glutamate receptor expression (418, 419). Indeed, 
disrupting reconsolidation can result in a reduction of synaptic long 
term potentiation (420). Furthermore, upon reactivation memory 
destabilization depends on protein degradation from the synapse (421, 
422). Thus, reconsolidation seems to be associated with changes in 
synaptic weight changes. In contrast, interfering with processes that are 
important to synapse formation and neural growth, such as BDNF or actin 
rearrangement, impairs new learning but not reconsolidation (421, 423). 
These findings mimic the results from studies on systems consolidation, 
sleep, and schema learning presented in the previous sections. To 
elaborate, studies within all these fields of memory research show that 
the formation of abstract knowledge is supported by neocortical rewiring, 
but that details of memories may be sustained by synaptic weight changes 
that are most sensitive to updating. Abstract knowledge that is supported 
by cortico-cortical connectivity should thus be less sensitive to disruption 
through reconsolidation. Nevertheless, disruption of reconsolidation for 
old memories have also been reported (401, 424), even for memories that 
are thought to have undergone systems consolidation at that time (401). 
Therefore, it remains an open question whether neocortical memories 
can be disrupted during reconsolidation, possibly via an impairment of 
critical nodes in the memory network, and which aspects of the memory 
network remain intact following disruptions. Amnesia following disruption 
of reconsolidation indicates that memory is dynamic but may not appear 
immediately useful.
Findings that memories could be strengthened upon reactivation 
implicated that the function of reconsolidation might be the updating of 
memory representations (425-428), thereby allowing for the optimization 
of behavioural prediction from memory. In support of this notion, 
reactivating memory in a setting that requires new learning renders 
a memory sensitive to disruption of reconsolidation, but not if the 
reactivation trial does not require new learning (403). A more recent 
study used a cellular approach to investigate the updating hypothesis 
by exploiting a dissociations between the dependency of new learning, 
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destabilization of memory, and re-stabilization on specific cellular 
mechanisms (421). Additionally, a specific learning paradigm was 
employed in which an animal's memory of a context was updated with 
the incorporation of a shock association at reactivation. Interestingly, 
preventing the destabilization of synapses at reactivation, prevented the 
updating of the memory, but left the original memory for the context 
intact. In contrast, inhibiting the re-stabilization of synapses not only 
prevented the updating of the memory, but also impaired memory for the 
original context (421). Hence, under reconsolidation conditions memories 
can be updated to optimize the predictive function of memory.
Considering that amnesic agents used in animals to disrupt 
reconsolidation cannot be readily applied as experimental treatments in 
human subjects, most studies on reconsolidation in humans have used 
interference paradigms and have also indicated a role for reconsolidation 
in memory updating (413). Typically, in these studies subjects have to 
learn a set of items. In the following session memory is reactivated by 
reminding subjects of the learning set from the first session. After the 
reminder a new stimulus set is learned that is thought to interfere with 
the reactivated memory from session one. Using this procedure it has 
been shown that memory for the first set is impaired by learning of the 
new set when memory is reactivated 24 hours after learning, but not 
if memory is not reactivated (407, 408, 412) or if tested immediately 
after learning of the second set which reveals a time-dependent 
reconsolidation effect and excludes the possibility that the effect is 
attributable to secondary encoding (407, 408). Critically, subjects do not 
recall less items from the first set, but erroneously report items from 
the second set, thus indicating an integration of the two lists in memory 
(407). Additionally, instructing subjects after the reminder to actively 
update their memory causes subjects to remember items from the first 
set correctly in addition to the new information (412). In summary, both 
animal and human studies thus suggest that reconsolidation allows for 
the updating of memory for a known situation to a new outcome and, 
hence, supports memories predictive function. Throughout this review 
we have indicated that formation of flexible memories involves dynamic 
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interactions between brain regions. Recently studies have also revealed 
interactions between brain regions during reconsolidation.
Reconsolidation may also allow for interactions between brain regions 
to update memory. As we have discussed, the updating of a context 
memory with a fear association can occur through reconsolidation (421). 
Interestingly, fear conditioning critically depends on the amygdala, 
and the discussed updating impairment occurred through injections 
in the hippocampus (421), this indicates that interactions between the 
hippocampus and other brain regions occur during reconsolidation. 
Additionally, this finding concurs with our hypothesis that retrieval and 
updating of details of a memory involves the hippocampus. Furthermore, 
Kuhl and colleagues (2010) measured brain activity while subjects 
learned pairs of items (A-B). The presentation of AB pairs was preceded 
by cues indicating a high or low monetary reward for correct recall on a 
subsequent memory test. In a following study phase subjects memorized 
the same cues (A) but with new associate items (C). AC learning puts 
memory for AB pairs at risk of being forgotten. When assessing brain 
activity during AC learning that predicts AB memory on a final memory 
test following AC learning the investigators found hippocampal activation 
to be predictive for AB memory survival. Critically, greater activation 
in regions associated with reward processing at the time of AC learning 
predicted better memory for AB pairs on the final test. This indicates that 
hippocampal dependent memories can be reactivated together with brain 
regions that process their associated context, i.e. the reward (429) in line 
with animal findings (373). Thus, during memory reactivation interaction 
between brain regions also appear to occur and allow the updating of 
memories during reconsolidation (430).
The interactions between a stored memory representation and incoming 
information of the current situation, as well as the interactions between 
brain regions during reconsolidation may follow attractor dynamics. 
This implicates that reconsolidation only occurs when neural activation 
evoked by a reactivation session settles to an attractor state that 
represent the original memory. Two findings speak to this proposal. 
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First, reconsolidation only occurs if memory is reactivated in the original 
learning context (408, 431), thus the overlap between learning and re-
exposure needs to be high enough to evoke memory reactivation. Second, 
under re-exposure regimes that do not evoke memory reactivation but 
new learning (e.g. extinction) reconsolidation of the original memory 
is not observed (402, 432). A recent modelling study exploited these 
findings to investigate attractor dynamics in reconsolidation (433). The 
authors created a neural network model that formed attractor states for 
specific memories following training. The network could be tested by 
presenting a partial cue and testing the overlap between the evoked state 
in the network and the specific memory attractor states. Importantly, 
synaptic weights in the network were adjusted following normal Hebbian 
plasticity rules, but importantly synapse destabilization was also 
modelled and caused by the difference between the retrieved attractor 
state and retrieval cue. Using this approach the authors were able to 
show that if a mismatch exists between the attractor state in which the 
network settles and the re-exposure cue, neuronal synapses that code 
for the mismatch will destabilize and require restabilization (433). Note 
that destabilization occurs as a consequence of mismatch detection; a 
process predicted to occur at each level of the neural hierarchy according 
to the sensori-motor predictive framework and could be seen as an 
extension of the PIMMS model (228). Interestingly, the authors used an 
auto-associative neural network and the results indicate that mismatch 
detection is critical to reconsolidation, as both have been suggested to 
be properties of the hippocampus, this structure may be critical to the 
reconsolidation process.
In summary, memories can become instable during reconsolidation and 
require restabilization upon reactivation. Studies on reconsolidation 
critically emphasize the dynamic nature of memory in that memories 
can be adjusted to optimize prediction from memory. We have 
presented studies that indicate that during reconsolidation synapses 
destabilize putting memories that depend on synaptic weight changes 
at risk of disruption. Memories that have been integrated through 
re-wiring changes in the cortico-cortical connectivity might be less 
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sensitive to reconsolidation disruption (Figure 6.3C). Furthermore, 
reconsolidation appears to serve the function of updating existing 
memory representations to changes in environmental contingencies, and 
this contributes to an optimized prediction from memory. Reconsolidation 
thus provide memory with the flexibility to adapt to new situations 
and could explain why details of the first author's memory for 'the 
incident' have been lost or changed while his abstract knowledge of 'the 
incident' has remained relatively intact. Additionally, this could explain 
the differences observed between reconsolidation studies on simple 
associative memory and complex episodic memory (413). The former 
can be supported by plasticity of a limited number of local synapses 
and disruption of these could lead to complete memory loss, whereas 
remote episodic memory relies on distributed hardwired neocortical 
representations that would be less sensitive to full disruption. Future 
studies will have to reveal whether causal interference with neocortical 
brain function can disrupt distributed episodic memories, to which 
degree wiring changes are essential for restabilization of memory, and 
what degree of the cortical memory network remains intact following 
possible episodic memory disruption. Finally, we have discussed that 
memory reactivation can be accompanied by interactions between 
brain regions and that these may follow attractor dynamics. Specifically, 
mismatch between a retrieved memory attractor state and incoming 
information might open up the reconsolidation window, and the detection 
of this mismatch could be a principle function of the hippocampus 
in reconsolidation. To date the role of the mPFC in reconsolidation is 
unknown. According to our thesis abstract knowledge dependent on the 
mPFC would provide prior predictions over incoming information about 
a current situation, supporting mismatch detection by the hippocampus 
and initiation of reconsolidation. This suggestion is in need of empirical 
support. In conclusion, reconsolidation could have contributed to 
alteration of the 'incident' memory, and specifically have resulted in 
changes in details, highlighting that dynamic neural systems enable 
adaptive and flexible memories.
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6.10 Discussion
In this review we have taken memory alterations as an example to 
reveal important characteristics of the dynamic nature of memory 
and the neural systems that support memory formation. We have 
tried to explain that memory distortions occur, because memories are 
not veridical representation of experience, but serve the function of 
predicting the future. Taking the point of view that memory serves a 
predictive function and arises in a neural hierarchy that supports sensori-
motor prediction, we have tried to put forward a view on the dynamic 
neural systems that support the formation of flexible memories, and 
particularly propose specific functions for the hippocampus and mPFC 
in this process. Critically, prediction from episodic experiences requires 
integration of information from distinct experiences, the detections of 
regularities across experiences, and the formation of abstract knowledge 
that is invariant of specific features (Figure 6.3). In section two we have 
considered several characteristics of the hippocampus that support 
detection of regularities across experiences. Additionally, we discussed 
that the hippocampus allows rapid encoding of information through 
weight changes enabling the detection of regularities between memories 
and novel experiences. Following detection, regularities are thought 
to become stored in the neocortex through rewiring forming a relative 
stable substrate of abstract knowledge (Figure 6.3B). The formation 
of abstract knowledge implies a dynamic memory system as abstract 
knowledge no longer reflects a veridical memory representation. Abstract 
knowledge may come to support the predictive function of memory. 
However, behaviour based on predictions from episodic memory requires 
the integration between regularity representations and motor outputs. 
In section three we have drawn an analogy with the lateral temporal-
lateral prefrontal system that supports simple rule learning to suggest 
that an analogous hippocampal-mPFC system supports a predictive 
memory system for abstract rules based on complex episodic experiences 
(Figure 6.2). Notably both these systems comply with the view of the 
brain as a sensory-motor predictive neural hierarchy. Specifically, our 
novel proposal is that the mPFC plays a critical role in the formation of 
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abstract knowledge by integrating regularities detected across episodic 
experiences with motor output to form abstract rules (Figure 6.3B). 
In the formation of abstract rule representations the hippocampus is 
considered to detect regularities and through dynamic interactions drive 
the mPFC to form cell assemblies representing integration of regularities 
and behavioural output options. In turn, the flexible application of 
abstract knowledge again requires interactions between the mPFC 
and hippocampus (Figure 6.3C). It is of interest to note that the neural 
network that we propose to support a predictive function for complex 
episodic experiences shows overlap with the neural networks implicated 
in prospective memory and imagination (434, 435). In section four and 
five we have emphasized an overlap between the neural systems that 
support the formation of abstract knowledge and those implicated in 
memory processing during systems consolidation and sleep, which 
provide further insight into the interactions between the hippocampus 
and mPFC and have lead us to suggest that systems consolidation and 
sleep contribute to the formation of abstract knowledge. During sleep 
the hippocampus is considered to reinstate experience dependent neural 
activations in the neocortex that enable the detection of regularities 
across experiences and initiate a shift in memory dependency from the 
hippocampus to the neocortex. This shift occurs with the formation of 
cortico-cortical connectivity through a two step procedure where random 
synaptic growth in the neocortex is stabilized if it coincides with the 
reinstatement of neural activity. Accompanying the formation of abstract 
knowledge, the mPFC may take over the memory binding function of the 
hippocampus, and come to guide neural processing in other brain regions 
(Figure 6.3B). Finally, during sleep synaptic down-scaling reduced the 
weights of synapses. This would results in a loss of weak synapses but the 
survival of strong synapses and rewired connections, and therefore a loss 
of memory details but retention of abstract knowledge (Figure 6.3C). In 
section six, we presented studies to suggest that the existence of abstract 
knowledge and a pre-existing network of interconnected neocortical 
representations can come to guide new learning. The presence of abstract 
knowledge is proposed to form a schema and cause a rapid integration 
of matching new experiences into the neocortex, possibly because this 
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rapid integration only requires weight changes (Figure 6.3C). Finally in 
section seven, we discussed that memory reactivation allows memories 
to be updated. This may be specific to details of memories that are only 
associated with synaptic weight changes (Figure 6.3C). Additionally, we 
have discussed that updating at reactivation might rely on interactions 
between the hippocampus and other brain areas that possibly follow 
attractor dynamics. Together these mechanisms contribute to the 
formation of abstract knowledge and support the extension of the 
predictive function of memory to episodic and autobiographical memory.
Our thesis makes specific predictions and raises specific questions to 
future studies. We propose that the hippocampus detects regularities 
and subsequently drives the neocortex and in particular the mPFC to 
form abstract knowledge. This suggests that detected regularities are 
immediately represented in the hippocampus but only at a later time in 
the mPFC. Both neuroimaging and electrophysiological studies employing 
decoding methods should thus be able to find regularity representations 
in the hippocampus before being able to detect these in the mPFC. 
Additionally, methods to study connectivity dynamics might reveal that 
the ability to detect regularity representations in the mPFC arises through 
hippocampal input. Similar study methods may be able to provide insight 
into the question whether the mPFC takes over a binding function from 
the hippocampus with systems consolidation, a consideration we support 
in this thesis. If so connectivity studies should be able to show that the 
mPFC affects effective connectivity between disparate brain regions, 
accompanied by an increase in abstract knowledge. An additional 
promising approach in our view is the study of network properties 
using graph theoretical approaches. A prediction based on our thesis 
is that the mPFC should exhibit greater characteristics of a hub with 
the development of abstract knowledge. Such an approach could also 
be beneficial when assessing which elements of the neural network 
dynamically change to support adaptive memory alterations, and which 
elements remain intact. With an increase in abstract knowledge we 
predict increases in effective connectivity between neocortical regions, 
and particularly with the mPFC, an increase in hubs in the network and 
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an overall decrease of path length. Additionally, we suggest that large 
parts of the network supporting episodic memory would remain intact 
following reconsolidation disruption, but details may be altered, or critical 
nodes or hubs might be lost resulting in 'catastrophic interference'. We 
have proposed that system consolidation contributes to the formation of 
abstract knowledge. As such we predict that over time memories become 
more abstract, more dependent on the neocortex and mPFC in particular. 
Additionally, over time memories lose details. However, if details of 
remote memories are recalled this generally involves the hippocampus. 
These suggestions are congruent with predictions from multiple trace 
theory, but conflict with standard systems consolidation theory. One 
possible consequence of our theory is that the application of abstract 
knowledge to novel situation increases as abstract knowledge loses its 
relation to specific details, to our knowledge this remains uninvestigated 
to date. We would however predict that abstract knowledge provides 
guidance to neural processing in these novel situations, reflected in 
effective connectivity from the mPFC to the hippocampus. Similarly, 
in schema learning studies the mPFC should exert effective control 
over the hippocampus when investigating the influence of abstract 
knowledge on the integration of novel information into memory. In our 
view the involvement of the hippocampus in memory is determined by 
the required information processing functions. If memories are retrieved 
that have become stored in a coherent neocortical network, these can 
be retrieved independent of the hippocampus. If, however, integration 
between memory representations that are not part of a single coherent 
neocortical network, or integration with novel incoming information is 
required, we predict that hippocampal involvement is critical. In our view 
neocortical memory representations are not 'semantic' in a classical 
way, as neocortical network can in principle also integrate details, but 
represent regularity structures. The involvement of the hippocampus in 
remote memory retrieval then does not reflect the 'episodic-ness' of a 
memory or vividness of a memory, but the interaction between abstract 
knowledge and mnemonic representations that are not part of the same 
neocortical representation. This view and these predictions conflict with 
predictions based on the multiple trace theory.
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An important and unresolved issue is whether the hippocampus is 
necessary for the detection of regularities or is simply more optimized 
to do so. Studies on developmental amnesia suggest that such patients 
can acquire semantic knowledge (235), and thus that the hippocampus 
may not be essential for abstract knowledge formation. An interesting 
question is whether in these patients changes in neocortical function 
may allow the formation of abstract knowledge, for example through 
alterations in the degree of associative plasticity, and whether such 
changes persist in adulthood. Temporary inactivation of the hippocampus 
in animals by reversible genetic approaches or optogenetic methods 
may provide insight into this matter, as well as plasticity investigations in 
patients using transcranial magnetic stimulation.
As we have drawn an analogy between the lateral temporal-lateral 
PFC system and the hippocampal-mPFC system observations on the 
lPFC may also apply to the mPFC. One of these may be that within the 
mPFC a hierarchy exists where abstract rule representations show 
greater integration with motor option in more dorsal regions, and 
more anterior mPFC involvement is found with increasing complexity of 
abstract rules. The differentiation between the two systems that we have 
proposed is based on the type of information configurations processed. 
The lateral system can support mapping between unitary mnemonic 
representations and motor outputs, whereas mapping between complex, 
multimodal memory representations to motor outputs would require 
the hippocampus and mPFC. The involvement of the mPFC in memory 
tasks should thus follow the differentiation of tasks thought to be 
'hippocampally-dependent'. We would like to emphasize that we do not 
consider the distinction between the two systems to be a dichotomy, but 
envision extensive interactions between the two systems, and possibly 
even the existence of a gradient in the localization of information 
representations within the prefrontal cortex.
An issue we have repeatedly returned to throughout this review is a 
differentiation between synaptic weight changes and changes in neural 
rewiring. We have proposed that the weight changes support the rapid 
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storage of memories and details of memories. In contrast, we suggest 
that abstract knowledge formation relies more heavily on rewiring. This 
topic is scarcely investigated. However, several predictions can be made 
based on our proposal. First, abstract knowledge formation should 
suffer more from methods that impair rewiring, while leaving detailed 
memory formation relatively intact. Further, synaptic downscaling 
during sleep has been suggested to affect weight changes, and should 
thus reduce memory for details, but could be beneficial for abstract 
knowledge. Similarly, studies on wiring versus weight changes with 
regard to schema learning may answer the important question whether 
more rapid hippocampal independence of memory in the presence of a 
schema reflects a faster learning rate due to the presence of a schema, 
or simply 'less learning' as less neural rewiring has to be achieved to 
integrate a memory. Furthermore, with regard to reconsolidation, we 
suggest that memories that depend on weight changes are more likely to 
undergo reconsolidation. This means that abstract knowledge would be 
less sensitive to reconsolidation disruption than memory for details. Of 
importance here is that this entails that episodic memories that depend 
on a large distributed neural network are less likely to be fully altered 
during reconsolidation. 
With regard to reconsolidation, very little is known about interactions 
between brain regions during reconsolidation, and to our knowledge 
no research has been conducted towards the involvement of the mPFC 
in reconsolidation. Reconsolidation may be initiated by mismatch 
detection and could be initiated by interaction between the mPFC 
and hippocampus. For reconsolidation of episodic memories abstract 
knowledge that depends on the mPFC may provide a prior probability 
over incoming information of a current episodic experience that is 
rapidly stored and subsequently compared by the hippocampus. As such 
interactions between the mPFC and the hippocampus may be critical for 
reconsolidation of episodic experience.
The proposal on hippocampus-mPFC interactions presented here 
arose from the intuitive assumption that episodic memory serves a 
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predictive function. However, few studies have provided evidence for this 
assumption, and we would welcome future attempts to investigate this 
matter.
In order to support prediction, we have suggested that memory is an 
adaptive dynamic system, and its flexibility may also be responsible for 
the distortions observed in the first author's memory of 'the incident'. In 
a final attempt to reconstruct this experience he also asked his aunt and 
uncle for a description of the event as both he, his brother, and father 
indicated them being present during that particular episode. This is their 
response:
"I've just consulted with your uncle, who we believe has a memory like an 
elephant, yet neither of us remember any of this."
Much to the first author's surprise this either means that two people have 
completely lost their memories for the incident, or three people have 
a memory for an event that never happened.  Whether true of false, at 
least the dynamic neural system that underlies adaptive, flexible episodic 
memory now allows the first author to predict one thing: Do not spit old 
people in the face.
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Interlude C.
In Chapter 2, 3, and 4 we have provided results that indicate that PTSD 
and depression are accompanied by specific structural and functional 
alterations of the neural network that supports emotions and memory. 
In Chapter 5 we have shown that food targeted at raising Trp/LNAA 
levels can improve mood and affect neural processing in neurocircuits 
implicated in mood regulation. Although food or pharmacological 
treatment can improve mood and relieve symptoms of anxiety disorders 
it does not affect the root cause of such disorders. Considering that 
memory for emotional experiences contribute to the aetiology and 
persistence of memory one strategy would be to alter memory for such 
emotional experiences. In Chapter 6 we have explored the dynamic neural 
systems that enable flexible and adaptive memories. Insight into these 
dynamic systems provides us with target mechanisms to alter memory 
for emotional experiences. In Chapter 7-12 we will explore the possibility 
to alter memory for emotional experiences that may contribute to the 
aetiology or persistence of affective disorders.
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7 EMOTION CAUSES TARGETED FORGETTING OF 
ESTABLISHED MEMORIES.
7.1 Published as:
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7.2 Abstract
Reconsolidation postulates that reactivation of a memory trace renders it 
susceptible to disruption by treatments similar to those that impair initial 
memory consolidation. Despite evidence that implicit, or non-declarative, human 
memories can be disrupted at retrieval, a convincing demonstration of selective 
impairment in retrieval of target episodic memories following reactivation is 
lacking. In human subjects, we demonstrate that if reactivation of a verbal 
memory, through successful retrieval, is immediately followed by an emotionally 
aversive stimulus, a significant impairment is evident in its later recall. This 
effect is time-dependent and persists for at least six days. Thus, in line with 
a reconsolidation hypothesis, established human episodic memories can be 
selectively impaired following their retrieval.
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7.3 Introduction
Following memory acquisition, there is a period during which memory 
traces undergo consolidation into long-term memory, a process involving 
synaptic protein synthesis and changes in gene expression (30).  Until 
recently, a prevailing view was that once memory is consolidated, it 
is immune to manipulations that, prior to consolidation, impair its 
subsequent retrieval (30, 316). However, an early study (47) cast doubt 
on this account by demonstrating that electroconvulsive shock (ECS), 
known to impair consolidation (436), impairs expression of a previously 
consolidated memory if applied immediately after retrieval of that 
memory. This finding has been replicated and extended in animal models, 
leading to an hypothesis that retrieved memories must be reconsolidated 
in order to persist (49, 50, 437).
Convincing support for this phenomenon in humans is limited, primarily 
because amnesic agents such as protein synthesis inhibitors and 
ECS cannot be applied to healthy human subjects as experimental 
treatments (399). The existing studies supporting modulation of human 
memory following reactivation demonstrate impaired non-declarative 
forms of memory, namely fear conditioning  (Schiller et al., 2010), fear 
potentiated startle (405, 406) or motor sequence learning (438). By 
contrast, reconsolidation impairment for specific declarative memories, 
in particular long-term memories for episodes that are accessible to 
conscious recollection (i.e. episodic memory), has not been demonstrated. 
Reconsolidation effects for human episodic memory are limited to 
decreased memory for a word list implied by a surrogate index of 
memory (439), or the integration of new list items into a previously learnt 
list following a reminder (407). Thus, these studies do not show selective 
impairment of a specific target episodic memory.
Recently, we described an emotion-induced retrograde amnesia 
(440), a manipulation that provides a potential technique for studying 
reconsolidation of specific human episodic memories. In brief, stimuli that 
precede an emotional event during encoding suffer a relative amnesia 
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in subsequent free or cued recall (440, 441). That is, whereas emotional 
(E) items show a well-described episodic memory enhancement (29), 
the preceding (E-1) items show a relative amnesia. Consequently, this 
manipulation (an emotional event) shares with interventions like ECS 
(436) and protein-synthesis inhibition (442) a fundamental ability to 
evoke retrograde disruption of memory.
Here, we modified the paradigm associated with emotion-induced 
retrograde memory disruption at encoding to demonstrate effects 
consistent with a reconsolidation interpretation. In two pilot studies, 
Experiments (Exp) 1 and 2, we established that the manipulation used in 
our reconsolidation experiments (Exp 3-5) could evoke emotion-induced 
retrograde disruption of verbal memory, as indexed by cued recall. In 
our previous studies, we employed aversive words as emotional stimuli. 
However, emotion-induced memory disruption is critically dependent on 
the amygdala (440) and  the human amygdala shows strongest responses 
to affective facial expressions (443). On this basis, we elected to present 
fearful faces as the emotional stimuli in the current series of experiments. 
The critical finding from Exp 1 and 2 is that retrograde amnesia is 
evident 24 h after encoding, but not if recall is cued immediately after 
the study phase, indicating an effect on consolidation. Given the overlap 
in treatments that disrupt consolidation and reconsolidation (444), this 
paradigm provides a framework for selective impairment of a target 
episodic memory.
The proposal that retrieved memories become labile and must undergo 
reconsolidation, as expressed in the reconsolidation hypothesis, is highly 
controversial. Several studies have not replicated a post-retrieval memory 
impairment effect, while others have suggested alternative explanations 
for findings labelled as reconsolidation, particularly following 
observations of complete memory recovery within days (445-447). Animal 
experiments have led to specific criteria  in order for memory disruption 
to be referred to as a reconsolidation impairment (44). Memory must 
be disrupted following reactivation, as indexed in a subsequent memory 
test (49). The impairment should not be attributable to retrieval failure 
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or a reactivation-locked, temporary inability to access memory traces 
that dissipates over time (448). Impairment should, however, be time-
dependent and not expressed in tests of immediate memory (50). Finally, 
the memory impairment must not be due to impaired novel encoding of 
any attribute of reactivated memories (449). We satisfy these criteria 
for disruption of reconsolidation within a series of human experiments 
(Exp 3-5) where we demonstrate emotion-induced disruption of memory 
following successful reactivation.
7.4 Methods and Materials
7.4.1 Participants
A total of 89 native English-speaking subjects completed Exp 1-5. 
All subjects gave informed consent and were free of neurological or 
psychiatric history. The study had full ethics approval. Twenty (10 males, 
10 females, age-range: 19-37, mean: 25.6) and 14 (7 males, 7 females, age-
range: 20-31, mean: 25.6) subjects completed Exp 1 and 2, respectively. 
Twenty, 15 and 20 subjects completed Exp 3, 4 and 5, respectively. We 
have previously shown that in subjects not familiar with the neutral nouns 
presented in these studies, the chance of correctly completing an item 
in the employed stimulus set is approximately 11% (411). On this basis, a 
performance criterion was set for our reconsolidation studies of recall hit 
rate minus false alarm rate greater than 10% for control nouns on Day 2. 
Thus, data from 16 subjects (8 males, 8 females, age-range: 21-35, mean: 
27.2) were included in Exp 3, 11 subjects (5 males, 6 females, age-range: 
22-30, mean: 25.6) in Exp 4 and 14 subjects (5 males, 1 left-handed, 9 
females, age-range: 20-28, mean: 22.6) in Exp 5.
7.4.2 Stimuli
Verbal stimuli comprised a set of 400 nouns which were 'stem-unique' 
in that the first 3 letters were different for each of the nouns. Faces 
were selected from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces set (450), 
converted to gray scale and framed to exclude non-facial features. 
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An equal number of female and male faces were presented in each 
experiment.
7.4.3 Behavioural tasks and procedures
7.4.3.1 Exp 1
Encoding and cued recall sessions were conducted in the same 
environment, 24 h apart. On Day 1, subjects viewed 240 nouns, taken from 
the set of 400, and made a push-button response to indicate whether the 
noun described a living or nonliving entity. A face was presented after 
a random number of words (between 3 and 5; mean = 4) upon which 
Figure 7.1: Emotion-induced retrograde disruption of consolidation (Exp 1 and 2). 
(A) Design of Exp 1 and 2. E, emotional face; N, neutral face; -1, +1, position of word relative to face. (B) 
Cued recall on Day 2 (% Hits) minus control for Exp 1. (C) Cued recall on Day 1 for Exp 2. Error bars, here 
and in subsequent figures, indicate s.e.m.
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subjects were instructed to press a third button. Nouns and faces were 
each presented for 1 s, with a stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) of 4 s. 
A total of 60 faces were presented, 30 neutral (N) and 30 fearful (E). 
Nouns were conditionalised according to their position relative to face 
presentation and labelled emotional (E) or neutral (N) ± 1, i.e. a noun 
that immediately preceded an emotional face is referred to as E-1. Nouns 
without positional assignment served as controls (C), with the constraint 
that these controls were more than 2 nouns before, and more than 1 noun 
after, a given face (Figure 7.1A). On Day 2, word stems were presented 
every 4 s (stimulus duration, 1 s) and subjects instructed to complete the 
stems to make a word from Day 1. In all experiments, nouns and word 
stems were presented in uppercase in random order.
7.4.3.2 Exp 2
This was identical to Exp 1, except that the encoding session was followed 
immediately by the cued recall task.
7.4.3.3 Exp 3
This experiment was conducted in the same environment, at the same 
time of day, across 4 separate days. On Day 1, subjects viewed 400 nouns 
at a rate of one every 4 s (stimulus duration, 1 s), and made a push-button 
response to indicate whether the noun described a living or nonliving 
entity. To promote retrieval success across the ensuing cued recall tests, 
the encoding task was repeated a total of 3 times. On Day 2, word stems 
were presented (stimulus duration 1 s, SOA 4 s) and subjects instructed to 
complete the stems out loud to make a word from Day 1, while avoiding 
guessing. A face was presented after a random number of word stems 
(between 3 and 5; mean = 4) upon which subjects were instructed to make 
a button press. A total of 80 faces were presented, 40 neutral (N) and 
Figure 7.2: Reconsolidation experimental design. 
(A) Design of Exp 3. E, emotional face; N, neutral face; -2, -1, +1, position of word stem relative to face. (B) 
Time-line of Exp 3 and 4.
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40 fearful (E). Day 3 and Week 2 (test day one week after Day 1) followed 
the same procedure as Day 2 except that no faces were presented (Figure 
7.2A).
Word stems were conditionalised according to their position relative to 
face presentation on Day 2 and labelled emotional (E) or neutral (N) ± 
1, i.e. a stem that immediately preceded an emotional face is referred 
to as E-1. We also examined memory for E-2 and N-2 stems. Word stems 
without positional assignment served as controls (C), with the constraint 
that these controls were more than 2 word stems before, and more than 
1 word stem after, a given face. Performance on Day 3 and Week 2 is 
expressed as the proportion of remembered Day 3 / Week 2 words that 
were remembered on Day 2.
7.4.3.4 Exp 4
This was identical to Exp 3 except that the experiment was conducted 
over 3 days, with Day 2 consisting of 2 cued recall sessions (Test 1 and 
Test 2) with Test 3 on Day 3 (Figure 7.2B).
7.4.3.5 Exp 5
This was identical to Exp 3 except that only 100 nouns, taken from the set 
of 400, were presented on Day 1. Furthermore, on Day 2 only 20 faces 
were presented, 10 neutral and 10 emotional, with each face presented 
above a neutral or emotional noun, respectively (Figure 7.6A). The neutral 
nouns presented with neutral faces were taken from the stimulus set 
of 400 nouns. The emotionally aversive nouns presented together with 
fearful faces were selected from a set used in our previous studies (33). 
The first 3 letters of these emotional nouns were different from the 
100 nouns presented on Day 1. Given the lower number of critical items 
(E-1, N-1) in this experiment (only 10 emotional and neutral faces were 
presented on Day 2), we applied a further performance criteria for Exp 3. 
In view of the conditionality of Day 3 performance on Day 2, if only one 
E-1 or N-1 stem was recalled on Day 2 (i.e. 10% hit rate) the corresponding 
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conditional performance on Day 3 was excluded from our analyses. Thus 1 
subject's hit rate for E-1 stems, and 2 further subjects for N-1 stems, were 
excluded (E-1 effects remained significant if this E-1 hit rate was included).
7.4.4 Statistical analyses
In view of our strong a priori prediction that cued recall of E-1 nouns 
would differ relative to control and N-1 nouns, statistical analyses were 
constrained to planned comparisons. Thus, for all experiments we report 
separate paired t-tests comparing E-1 vs. control and N-1 cued recall. 
One-tailed significance is reported on the basis of the prediction that 
memory for E-1 nouns would be impaired. To test for persistence of 
reconsolidation effects over 1 week (Exp 3 and 5) we report separate word 
type x day (Day 3, Week 2) 2 x 2 ANOVAs for E-1 vs. control and N-1 nouns. 
For Exp 3-5 we did not predict any effect of face presentation on the first 
test of cued recall (Day 2). To demonstrate that this was indeed the case, 
we report, for Exp 3-5, emotion (E, N) x position (-2, -1, +1) 2 x 3 repeated 
measures ANOVAs for % Hits relative to controls on Day 2. Although our 
predictions pertain to E-1 cued recall, we include memory performance 
for E-2, N-2, E+1 and N+1 nouns in our plots of reconsolidation effects for 
descriptive purposes.
7.5 Results
7.5.1 Emotion-induced retrograde disruption of consolidation
In our previous studies of emotion-induced retrograde memory 
impairment at encoding (440), 14-word lists were presented with a 
stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) of 3 s, the emotional (E) stimulus 
was an emotionally aversive noun and memory was assessed using 
free recall after a 30 s filled delay which followed each list. The nature 
of the reconsolidation task (Exp 3-5) required a longer SOA because 
presentation of the E stimulus occurred during cued recall, instead of 
verbal encoding. Thus, we employed an SOA of 4 s in the recall task to 
allow completion of cued recall before presentation of the E stimulus (a 
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fearful face). Because of the differences between this and our previous 
paradigm (440), we conducted a pilot study (Exp 1) to first establish that 
fearful faces, presented 4 s after the verbal stimulus, evoke emotion-
induced retrograde amnesia of verbal encoding, as indexed by cued 
recall. Given that our main reconsolidation experiments were to be 
conducted on successive days, the interval between encoding and cued 
recall in this pilot study was 24 h. 
On Day 1, healthy human subjects performed a semantic encoding task 
on visually presented 'stem-unique' nouns. The critical manipulation 
was that some of these nouns were followed by the visual presentation 
of a face. Faces could be either emotional (fearful) or neutral. Neutral 
(N) faces controlled for non-specific effects of face presentation during 
encoding. On Day 2, word stems, the first 3 letters of previously encoded 
words, were presented and subjects instructed to complete the stems out 
loud to make a word from Day 1 (Figure 7.1A). Figure 7.1B demonstrates 
a significant emotion-induced retrograde amnesia (i.e. E-1 effect) when 
cued recall is tested after a 24 h delay. Planned comparisons demonstrate 
a relative decrement of cued recall for E-1 cues (relative to control cues 
paired t-test t(19) = -3.181; p = 0.003 one-tailed; relative to N-1 cues paired 
t-test t(19) = -2.582; p = 0.009 one-tailed). Mean control noun recall was 
23.3 % (s.e.m. 1.5).
Successful demonstrations of memory reconsolidation (50, 427, 446) 
use learning paradigms in which both consolidation and reconsolidation 
processes could be conclusively affected. To test whether emotion-
induced amnesia induced at encoding with the experimental parameters 
used in Exp 1 reflects an effect consistent with impaired consolidation, we 
conducted a further pilot experiment. Consolidation impairment is time-
dependent, and not expressed in tests of immediate memory retrieval 
(30). Thus, Exp 2 was identical to Exp 1 except that cued recall was tested 
immediately after encoding. Figure 7.1 C demonstrates that E-1 memory 
disruption is not present in immediate tests of cued recall. Planned 
comparisons confirm no significant effect of cued recall for E-1 cues 
relative to control cues (paired t-test t(13) = 0.545; p = 0.298 one-tailed) 
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or relative to N-1 nouns (paired t-test t(13) = 0.000; p = 0.500 one-tailed). 
Mean control noun recall was 28.5 % (s.e.m. 2.1).
Thus, E-1 effects when tested by cued recall were only observed 
following a 24 h delay, and not on a test of immediate memory, an 
observation consistent with an emotion-induced retrograde disruption 
of consolidation. This finding is in contrast to our previously reported 
emotion-induced amnesia observed under free recall following a 30 s 
delay (440). This indicates that the emotional stimulus, in addition to 
disrupting consolidation, evokes an immediate interference with an 
additional process required for successful free recall. It is noteworthy in 
this context that in our original study (440)¬, nouns were presented in 
semantically-related lists, suggesting that the immediate effects at free 
recall may reflect an emotion-induced disruption of a category-cued 
retrieval strategy for the E-1 noun.
7.5.2 Memory disruption following reactivation
Figure 7.2A illustrates the experimental protocol for Exp 3. On Day 1, 
healthy human subjects performed a semantic encoding task on visually 
presented verbal stimuli. On Day 2, subjects returned to perform a cued 
recall task. They were presented with stems of previously encoded nouns 
and instructed to complete the stems out loud. The critical manipulation 
was that some of these stems were followed by the visual presentation of 
either an emotional (fearful) or neutral face. Our working hypothesis was 
that emotional (E) faces would disrupt reconsolidation of the preceding 
retrieved word (E-1 words), indexed in a selective retrieval impairment 
on subsequent tests of cued recall. Neutral (N) faces controlled for non-
specific effects of face presentation during the cued recall task. In view 
of the novel approach to studying reconsolidation in this paradigm, and 
unknown temporal profile of any potential effect, we also include cued 
recall performance for E-2 and N-2 word stems in the plots we present.
We did not expect an effect of face presentation on cued recall on Day 2, 
and Figure 7.3A demonstrates that this prediction was confirmed. A word 
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type (E, N) x position (-2, -1, +1) 2 x 3 repeated measures ANOVA (for % 
Hits relative to controls) revealed no significant main effect or interaction. 
The small decrement for E-1 relative to control is non significant (paired 
t-test t(15) = -1.297; p = 0.214 two-tailed), ensuring equal memory 
performance for the different word types immediately prior to the 
reconsolidation disrupting manipulation. To test whether emotional 
face presentation on Day 2 disrupted the memory trace of E-1 words, we 
repeated the cued recall task on Day 3. The memory task was identical to 
Day 2 except that faces were not presented.
Consistent with a reconsolidation hypothesis, a significant percentage 
of target nouns, i.e. those that preceded emotional faces (E-1 nouns), 
that were correctly recalled on Day 2 were no longer recalled on Day 3. 
Thus, on Day 3 there is a selective impairment of cued recall for E-1 cues, 
Figure 7.3: Words recalled immediately before presentation of an emotional, but not neutral, face show 
impaired retrieval on subsequent testing (Exp 3). 
(A) Cued recall on Day 2 (% Hits). (B) Cued recall (% Hits) on Day 3 for those word stems correctly recalled 
on Day 2. E-1 (red •),  N-1 (blue ∆) and control nouns (black ☐).  (C) Reconsolidation impairment is specific 
for E-1 stimuli. Performance is plotted as % Hits relative to that for control nouns.
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relative to control noun cues (Figure 7.3B and C). Critically, this deficit is 
not observed for N-1 nouns, i.e. cues that on Day 2 were followed by a 
neutral face, indicating that it is the fearful emotional facial expression, 
and not the presentation of a face per se, that leads to impaired E-1 
reconsolidation. Planned comparisons confirm the predicted relative 
decrement of cued recall for E-1 cues (relative to control cues paired 
t-test t(15) = -2.157; p = 0.024 one-tailed; relative to N-1 cues paired 
t-test t(15) = -1.880; p = 0.040 one-tailed). Thus, recall probability of 
an item previously correctly recalled can be specifically attenuated if, 
during memory re-activation, it is immediately followed by an emotional 
stimulus.
7.5.3 Veridical memory retrieval is required for emotion-induced 
subsequent memory impairment
To investigate the specificity of reconsolidation, we next tested whether 
a retrieval attempt alone immediately prior to an emotional stimulus is 
sufficient to produce impairment in subsequent memory testing. A small 
subset of words forgotten on first testing (Day 2) show spontaneous cued 
recall on second testing (Day 3). If a mere retrieval attempt on Day 2 
for E-1 cues leads to impaired reconsolidation then it follows that recall 
of these words should be impaired on Day 3. Miss rates on Day 2 for E-1 
and control cues were both 57.0% (SE 4.2 and 4.0, respectively). The 
proportion of these Day 2 misses that were correctly recalled on Day 3 
was (mean, s.e.m.) 10.1% (1.9) and 8.5% (1.4) for E-1 and control nouns, 
respectively. A paired t-test confirmed no significant difference (t(15) = 
0.864; p = 0.40 two-tailed). Thus, veridical memory reactivation, and not 
retrieval attempt, is required for emotion-induced retrograde impairment 
of reconsolidation.
7.5.4 Post-reactivation memory impairment persists over time.
Animal studies report inconsistent findings as to the durability 
of reconsolidation impairment with some reporting sustained 
reconsolidation impairment while others demonstrate spontaneous 
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recovery or reinstatement (448, 451). In terms of the neurobiology 
of reconsolidation, reversibility favours a retrieval or performance 
interpretation, whereas lack of reversal would support a storage deficit 
(446, 449, 452). We therefore repeated the test of cued recall one week 
after the initial encoding session (Week 2). Consistent with this effect 
reflecting a persistent long-lasting deficit in reconsolidation, target words, 
whose cues were followed by an emotional face on Day 2, show impaired 
recall at Week 2 (Figure 7.4). A word type (E-1, Control) x day (Day 3, Week 
2) ANOVA for % Hits demonstrates a significant effect of day F
1,14
 = 7.848, 
p = 0.014, an effect of word type at trend F
1,14
 = 3.983, p = 0.066, and, 
critically, no word type x day interaction. Similarly, a word type (E-1, N-1) 
x day (Day 3, Week 2) ANOVA for % Hits relative to control noun recall 
demonstrates an effect of word type at trend F
1,14
 = 3.396, p = 0.087, and 
no word type x day interaction. Thus, the effect we observe endures for at 
Figure 7.4: Memory impairment for E-1 cues persists for at least one week (Exp 3). 
Cued recall (% Hits) on Day 3 and Week 2 for those word stems correctly recalled on Day 2. E-1 (red •), 
control nouns (black ☐).
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Figure 7.5: Reconsolidation is time-dependent (Exp 3 and 4). 
Cued recall (%) for Exp 4 (dashed lines) on Test 2 (Day 2) and Test 3 (Day 3) for those word stems correctly 
recalled on Test 1 (Day 2). Critically, there is no emotion-induced impairment of reconsolidation if tested 
immediately after induction. Performance from Exp 3 (solid lines) is plotted for comparison. E-1 (red •) and 
control (black ☐).  The day during which Tests 1-3 were performed in Exp 3 and 4 is indicated below.
least 6 days and does not represent transient memory impairment for E-1 
stimuli, arguing against a retrieval or performance deficit.
7.5.5 Memory impairment following reactivation is time-dependent
As stated above, for post-reactivation memory disruption to be judged as 
reconsolidation, the effect must not be due to impaired novel encoding of 
reactivated memories (449). Thus, it might be argued that the observed 
impairment simply reflects recalled E-1 words not benefiting from a 
second 'encoding' when retrieved on Day 2. Indeed, a counter argument 
to the reconsolidation hypothesis states that the reactivation of memory 
causes a second distinct memory trace to be formed (321, 449). To control 
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for this possibility we conducted a further experiment (Exp 4), identical 
in design to our previous experiment, except that on Day 2 subjects 
performed a second cued recall session immediately after the first, i.e. 
the initial cued recall session (Test 1) on Day 2, during which emotional 
and neutral faces were presented, was immediately followed by the cued 
recall session (Test 2) that, in Exp 3, occurred on Day3 (Figure 7.2B). Cued 
recall on Test 1 was, as in Exp 3, not affected by face presentation. A word 
type (E, N) x position (-2, -1, +1) 2 x 3 repeated measures ANOVA for % 
Hits relative to controls in Test 1 revealed no significant main effect or 
interaction.
Encoding is defined as the rapid acquisition of a memory trace, a 
process occurring prior to completion of consolidation (30, 316). Thus, 
if the impaired recall of E-1 stems observed on Day 3 in Exp 3 is simply 
attributable to lack of secondary encoding, the same effect should be 
present in the second test (Test 2) of cued recall in Exp 4. Figure 7.5 
demonstrates that this was not the case. There is no decrement for E-1 
stems on Test 2 if this comes immediately after Test 1 (E-1 relative to 
control noun stems paired t-test t(10) = -0.167; p = 0.436 one-tailed; 
relative to N-1 recall paired t-test t(10) = -0.333; p = 0.373 one-tailed). 
Thus, impaired recall of E-1 words is present 24 h after the emotional 
manipulation, supporting a claim that this reflects an emotion-induced 
impairment of reconsolidation and not a non-specific effect consequent 
upon impaired re-encoding.
7.5.6 Replication of initial findings 
To demonstrate the robustness of E-1 reconsolidation impairment, we 
conducted a further experiment (Exp 5), identical to Exp 3 except that 
we now present fearful faces paired with an emotionally aversive noun 
(Figure 7.6A). Reliable emotion-induced amnesic effects are evoked 
by aversive nouns (440) and picture-noun pairings (453). We also 
decreased the number of words encoded on Day 1 to increase cued recall 
performance on Day 2, thereby increasing our sensitivity to memory 
performance on subsequent testing.
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Figure 7.6: Enhancing reconsolidation impairment (Exp 5). 
(A) Experimental time-line and design of Exp 5. (B) Cued recall on Day 2 (% Hits).  (C) Reconsolidation 
impairment is specific for E-1 stimuli. Cued recall on Day 3 for those word stems correctly recalled on Day 
2, is plotted as % Hits relative to that for control nouns. (D) Cued recall (% Hits) on Day 3 and Week 2 for 
those word stems correctly recalled on Day 2 plotted as per Figure 7.4.
As in Exp 3, there was no significant effect of facial emotional expression 
or position on Day 2 performance (Figure 7.6B). An emotion (E, N) x 
position (-2, -1, +1) 2 x 3 repeated measures ANOVA (for % Hits relative 
to controls) on Day 2 revealed no significant main effect or interaction. 
As shown in Figure 7.6C, the pattern of emotion-induced reconsolidation 
impairment on Day 3 is identical to that observed in Exp 1 except that 
we now observe a deficit approximately two-times that seen in Exp 1. 
Planned comparisons confirm the predicted relative decrement of cued 
recall for E-1 cues (relative to control cues paired t-test t(12) = -2.147; p = 
0.026 one-tailed).
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Figure 7.6D provides further evidence that the reconsolidation impairment 
we observe persists over time. A word type (E-1, Control) x day (Day 3, 
Week 2) ANOVA for % Hits demonstrates a significant effect of word type 
F
1,12
 = 9.470, p = 0.010, and no significant main effect of day or word type 
x day interaction. A further word type x day ANOVA comparing E-1 and N-1 
% Hits also demonstrates a significant effect of word type F
1,10
 = 5.795, p = 
0.037 [N-1 % Hits (s.e.m.) for those word stems correctly recalled on Day 
2 were 93.5 (4.3) for Day 3 and 83.1 (6.7) for Week 2]. Thus, the effect is 
not attributable to the presentation of a face-word pair per se as neutral 
pairings did not affect memory on Day 3 or Week 2.
7.5.7 Effect size
Whereas the effect size [Cohen's d = (MeanControl - MeanE-1) / pooled 
standard deviation] for E-1 memory impairment relative to control stems 
on Day 3 in Exp 3 is equal to 0.52, indicating a moderate effect, the 
corresponding effect size for Exp 5 is 0.87, demonstrating that this is a 
large effect. Corresponding effect sizes relative to N-1 cues are 0.61 and 
0.82 for Exp 3 and 5, respectively.
7.5.8 False alarms
The false alarm rates for Exp 3-5 are given in Tables 1 - 3. Employing the 
Hit - False alarm rate as the dependent variable in our statistical analyses 
yielded similar results as described for Hit rate alone. For Exp 3, a word 
type (E-1, Control) x day (Day 3, Week 2) ANOVA for % Hits minus False 
alarms demonstrates a significant effect of day F
1,14
 = 10.065, p = 0.007, 
an effect of word type at trend F
1,14
 = 3.655, p = 0.077, and no word type x 
day interaction. The same test in Exp 5 reveals a significant effect of word 
type F
1,13
 = 6.800, p = 0.023.
7.5.9 Antrograde effects of emotional stimuli
In our original report of impaired E-1 noun free recall (440), emotional 
stimuli were aversive words presented in a neutral word list with a SOA 
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of 3 s. In this study (440), we observed no difference in recall of E+1 
nouns relative to neutral controls. A further study employing the same 
experimental paradigm (441) also reported no E+1 memory impairment. 
However, a similar study, employing a SOA of 5 s, reported significantly 
impaired recall of stimuli presented immediately after aversive picture-
noun pairings (453). The current experiments testing for the effects of 
emotional stimuli at encoding (Exp 1 and 2) employed a SOA of 4 s, i.e. 
intermediate between the SOAs used in previous studies. It is therefore 
interesting that recall performance for E+1 cues is numerically less than 
that for control nouns at both a delayed test (Exp 1, Figure 7.1B) and 
immediate test (Exp 2, Figure 7.1C) of cued recall. Although this apparent 
cued recall decrement does not reach significance in either Exp 1 (E+1 
relative to control cues paired t-test t(19) = -1.328; p = 0.200 two-tailed) 
or Exp 2 (E+1 relative to control cues paired t-test t(13) = -1.120; p = 0.283 
two-tailed), this observation suggests that SOAs longer than 3 s are more 
likely to lead to E+1 memory impairment if the emotional stimulus is 
presented at encoding. By contrast, Figures 6.3C and 6.6C demonstrate 
that if the emotional stimulus is presented immediately before successful 
retrieval of E+1 nouns, there is essentially no decrement of E+1 noun recall 
on subsequent testing (i.e., no reconsolidation impairment for E+1 nouns). 
This may, therefore, indicate greater resistance of established memories 
to anterograde disruption of reconsolidation evoked by an emotional 
stimulus, relative to anterograde disruption evoked at encoding.
7.6 Discussion
We demonstrate selective impairment in reconsolidation of target 
episodic memories following successful reactivation. In a series of 
experiments, we systematically address the criteria generated by animal 
models for memory disruption to reflect reconsolidation impairment. 
We show that impaired reconsolidation occurs if an emotionally aversive 
stimulus is presented immediately after successful reactivation of a 
memory. Successful memory reactivation is critical, in that retrieval 
attempt is insufficient to impair subsequent cued recall. This retrograde 
effect is long-lasting, enduring at least one week, arguing against a 
176
retrieval or performance deficit. Critically, the reconsolidation impairment 
we report is time-dependent in that it is observed after a 24 h delay, 
but not in immediate tests of cued recall. Our data therefore provide 
evidence that is consistent with reconsolidation of episodic memory, and 
its disruption, in humans.
Reconsolidation is postulated to be an adaptive update mechanism by 
which new information is incorporated into old memories (48, 403, 407, 
422, 444, 447, 454); but see (455). Indeed, reactivation of an established 
episodic memory has been shown to modify its content (407, 456). We 
suggest that the reconsolidation effects reported here reflect a process 
whereby disrupting the integration of retrieved nouns by the presentation 
of an emotional face corrupts a pre-existent memory trace (403, 447). 
This is not simply disrupted re-encoding of recalled items because the 
reported reconsolidation impairment is time-dependent, being detectable 
only 24 h after it is induced, and not immediately following induction.
The exact mechanism by which a fearful face corrupts a pre-existing 
verbal memory remains to be determined. Our previous studies on 
emotional memory encoding demonstrate that impaired memory for E-1 
items is coupled to enhanced memory for the emotional stimuli (440). 
These  effects are critically dependent on both amygdala and central 
adrenergic activation, suggesting that while memory is enhanced if 
adrenergic activation occurs at the time of encoding, it may be impaired 
if occurring 3-6 s after the initial encoding event (440). If an analogous 
mechanism mediates the reconsolidation impairment observed in the 
current studies, this would predict enhanced memory for the fearful 
faces themselves. We tested this hypothesis in a further experiment 
(Supplementary Exp 1, see supplemental information) which followed a 
similar experimental protocol to Exp 5, with the addition of a surprise 
recognition memory test on faces presented on Day 2. Consistent with 
our hypothesis, reconsolidation impairment of E-1 word stems was 
associated with enhanced recollection of fearful, but not neutral, faces 
(see supplemental information).
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We therefore suggest that the reconsolidation impairment we observe 
is mediated by an amydgala-dependent adrenergic release, evoked by 
fearful face presentation, which boosts face memory while corrupting 
a pre-existent memory trace reactivated sometime in the preceding 4 
s. Validation of this proposed mechanism will require a demonstration 
that pharmacological blockade of the adrenergic system blocks 
reconsolidation impairment and enhanced memory for fearful faces. It 
is unlikely that reconsolidation impairment reflects physiological arousal 
evoked by fearful faces. Emotion-induced memory enhancements do not 
require peripheral adrenergic engagement (457). Furthermore, previous 
data demonstrate that although fearful faces elicit robust amygdala 
responses (443, 458), they do not elicit reliable increases in physiological 
measures of arousal relative to neutral faces (459). We suggest instead 
that the impaired reconsolidation effects we observe are likely to be 
mediated by rapid central adrenergic release within the amygdala.
An interesting additional observation from Exp 4 (Figure 7.5) is that 
normal retrieval of E-1 cues during Test 2 immediately after our 
reconsolidation disrupting manipulation (Test 1), prevents the emergence 
of impaired reconsolidation 24 h later (Test 3). There are two potential 
explanations for this finding. Firstly, correct retrieval at Test 2 may re-
stabilise the memory trace before emotion-induced retrograde disruption 
of reconsolidation is complete. Alternatively, performance for E-1 cues on 
Test 3 might be supported by secondary encoding, the process whereby 
during every retrieval episode, retrieved mnemonic information, together 
with incoming sensory information, is stored as a novel memory trace 
(319). This latter explanation suggests that, although reconsolidation of 
the original verbal memory is disrupted, normal levels of retrieval at Test 
3 reflect cued recall of the novel memory trace formed at Test 2.
A recent study reports a manipulation which completely impairs human 
fear conditioned memory following reactivation, while leaving declarative 
memory for the acquired contingency between the conditioned and 
unconditioned stimulus intact (405). This suggests that declarative 
memories are more resistant to reconsolidation disruption relative to 
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non-declarative forms. Whereas conditioned fear could reflect a discrete 
neural representation localised to the amygdala, declarative memories 
are thought to comprise a distributed cortical representation (316). This 
distributed representation may explain why our manipulation partially 
impairs reconsolidation, as opposed to the complete impairment following 
reactivation observed in human fear conditioning studies (405, 406), 
even though reactivation of distributed memory traces has been reported 
(429). However, despite the relative resistance of declarative memory to 
reconsolidation impairment, our manipulation achieves approximately 
20% reduced retrieval probability of a target episodic memory by the 
second week of testing (Figure 7.6D). A similar effect magnitude was 
observed in a recent report suggesting reconsolidation of recalled 
autobiographical memory (410). In this study, new learning of Bartlett's 
"War of the Ghosts" narrative after the reactivation of a personal, 
autobiographical neutral experience impaired subsequent memory for 
that experience. Interestingly, the "War of the Ghosts" narrative has been 
shown to be mildly emotionally arousing (460), which may, in view of the 
effects we report, have contributed to the reconsolidation impairment 
reported by (410).
A further factor contributing to the smaller magnitude of reconsolidation 
impairment described here, relative to that observed in tests of non-
declarative memory (405, 406), is inter-subject variability. Averaging 
over subjects we observe significant reconsolidation impairment in both 
Exp 3 and 5. However, of the 16 subjects included in our analyses of Exp 
3, 10 showed reconsolidation impairment (mean 12.9% decrease relative 
to control noun recall on Day 3), 1 subject showed no differential E-1 
memory and 5 showed a slight E-1 memory enhancement. Similarly, of 
the 14 subjects included in Exp 5, 9 showed reconsolidation impairment 
(mean 27.8% decrease relative to control noun recall on Day 3) whereas 
2 subjects showed no differential E-1 memory and 3 showed E-1 memory 
enhancement. This variability mirrors the discrepancies between studies 
reporting an impairing retrograde effect of emotion on memory encoding 
(440, 441, 453) and those demonstrating a retrograde enhancement 
(461, 462). With respect to E-1 effects at encoding, it has been shown that 
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the magnitude of memory impairment depends on subjects' genotype 
(463), level of anxiety trait (441), and gender, with females showing 
greater impairment than males (440). Whether these factors also 
influence emotion-induced retrograde reconsolidation impairment is yet 
to be determined. Both males and females were included in the current 
experiments, (and both showed reconsolidation impairment) although 
sample sizes were insufficient to make inferences on gender effects. As 
described above, the time interval between neutral and emotional stimuli, 
i.e. SOA, may influence the magnitude of reconsolidation impairment, 
which could in turn interact with other variables such as genotype, 
temperament and gender. Furthermore, future studies which measure 
the degree of arousal elicited by specific emotional stimuli, and how this 
varies between subjects, will also contribute to our understanding of 
inter-subject variability in E-1 reconsolidation impairment.  It is unlikely 
in the current study that individuals' general memory ability contributed 
to inter-individual differences in E-1 effects. The correlations between 
control noun cued recall on first testing (Day 2) and E-1 memory relative 
to control nouns on Day 3 were not significant in Exp 3 (Pearson's r = 
0.02; p = 0.930 ) or Exp 5 (Pearson's r = -0.02 ; p = 0. 948 ).
Reconsolidation is proposed to provide a principled basis for therapeutic 
interventions in conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD), where the aim is to selectively decrease the strength of aversive 
memories for traumatic events (44, 404, 464, 465). Although we address 
reconsolidation of neutral as opposed to aversive memory, the critical 
observation here is that reconsolidation of specific human episodic 
memories can be selectively impaired. Moreover, this can be achieved via 
a non-invasive psychological manipulation. Future studies might usefully 
extend these observations to the context of human emotional episodic 
memory, with testing intervals longer than 1 week necessary to determine 
the clinical potential of these effects. In conclusion, we demonstrate a 
targeted, selective reduction in established episodic memory, a finding 
that provides a potential framework for treatments aimed at reducing 
unwanted human memories. 
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8 EVIDENCE FOR RECONSOLIDATION OF 
EMOTIONAL EPISODIC MEMORy IN HUMANS.
8.1 Under review as:
Kroes MCW, Tendolkar I, van Wingen GA, van Waarde JA , Strange BA, Fernández 
G (under rev.). An electroconvulsive therapy procedure impairs reconsolidation of 
emotional episodic memories in humans.
8.2 Abstract
Despite accumulating evidence for a reconsolidation process in animals, support 
in humans, especially for episodic memory is limited. Here we show in a within 
subjects-design that a single application of electroconvulsive therapy following 
memory reactivation in patients with unipolar depression disrupts reactivated, 
but not non-reactivated, memories for an emotional episode in a time-
dependent manner. Our results satisfy critical criteria to provide evidence for 
reconsolidation of emotional episodic memories in humans.
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8.3 Introduction
The reconsolidation hypothesis postulates that upon reactivation, 
memory traces return to a labile state and are once again susceptible 
to disruption by treatments similar to those that impair initial memory 
consolidation. The criteria to provide compelling evidence for the 
reconsolidation phenomena generated from non-human animal studies 
comprise 1) consolidated memory must be reactivated by a reminder cue, 
2) the manipulation aimed at altering reconsolidation must be provided 
post-reactivation not prior, and 3) reconsolidation is a time-dependent 
process and therefore, memory should not be affected immediately 
but after a time window allowing reconsolidation to take place - 
usually tested after 24 h (50, 446, 449). Non-human animal studies on 
reconsolidation have generally employed invasive techniques to disrupt 
memory traces, consequently only lesser invasive methods have been 
translated to humans. Due to the use of slow-acting pharmacological 
compounds, or psychological manipulations such as interference learning, 
human reconsolidation studies often do not meet criteria 2 and 3 leaving 
them susceptible to alternative explanations, such as secondary encoding 
or source confusion (409, 411, 413, 466). The use of electroconvulsive 
therapy (ECT) to study reconsolidation in humans would circumvent 
these concerns. ECT has historically provided considerable insight into 
the nature of memory consolidation (467) and pioneering rodent studies 
have indicated that reactivated memory traces may be disrupted by 
electroconvulsive shock (47).
We therefore tested for an ECT-evoked disruption of episodic emotional 
memory reconsolidation in 42 patients with unipolar depression 
undergoing ECT. Patients were randomly assigned to one of three groups 
(Figure 8.1., Supplementary Table 8.1). One week after learning two 
emotionally aversive slide-show stories (Supplementary Figure 8.1.), 
memory for one of the two stories was reactivated. Immediately following 
memory reactivation, patients in groups A and B were anaesthetized 
and received ECT, whereas patients in group C did not. We hypothesized 
that ECT would disrupt memory of the reactivated relative to the non-
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reactivated story in group A when tested one day after reactivation and 
ECT, but not in group B when tested ~90min after reactivation and ECT. 
8.4 Methods and Materials
8.4.1 Participants
Over 3.5 years we investigated forty-two patients diagnosed with unipolar 
depression classified according to the DSM-IV-TR (468), who were 
undergoing ECT treatment and either at the end of an acute treatment 
cycle or receiving maintenance ECT (age-range: 34-84 yr, mean: 57.16 
yr, s.e.m.: 3.96 yr). The study was approved by the institutional ethics 
committee (CMO Regio Arnhem-Nijmegen) and all patients provided 
written informed consent. Patients were pseudo-randomly assigned to 
one of three groups, equated for demographic, cognitive and clinical 
parameters (Figure 8.1, Supplementary Table 8.1). Patients were either 
medication free or under stable treatment throughout this study, had 
normal- or corrected-to-normal vision and hearing. Patients were free 
Session 1 Session 2 Session 3 Session 4
7days 24hours 6days
Arm A. Encoding Reactivation ECT Retrieval 1 Retrieval 2
+/-4min
Arm B. Encoding Reactivation ECT Retrieval 1
29-133min
Arm C. Encoding Reactivation Retrieval 1
Figure 8.1: Study design 
Patients were assigned to one of three groups (A, B, C). During a first study session all groups were 
shown two emotional slide-show stories. During a second session memory for one of the two stories was 
reactivated. Immediately after memory reactivation patient in groups A and B received ECT. In patients of 
group B memory was tested immediately upon recovery from ECT (Test, blue). In patients of groups A and C 
memory was tested one day after reactivation (Test, red and green respectively).
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of current or past relevant somatic or neurological disorders, and were 
free of a diagnosis of bipolar depression, schizophrenia or substance 
dependence disorders, and had a global assessment functioning score 
(GAF) >40. Patients were recruited from the Radboud University Nijmegen 
Medical Centre, and the Rijnstate Hospital in Arnhem, the Netherlands. 
8.4.2 Stories
During an initial learning session, patients were shown two slide-shows 
depicting emotionally aversive stories. The to be memorized material 
consisted of slide shows accompanied by an auditory narrative forming 
an episode. To maximize memorability and ecological validity for clinical 
1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11
“A mother and her son 
leave their house in the 
morning”
“When they cross the road, 
the boy is hit by an out of 
control car, which mortally 
injures him”
1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11
“Two sisters leave from 
the apartment around 
midnight”
“When they pass an alley, 
the youngest sister is taken 
hostage by an escaped 
convict, who seriously 
physically molests her”
“Cahill Story”
“New Story”
Figure 8.2: Stimulus material 
Patients were presented with two slide shows that form arousing episodic stories of negative valence. Top: 
the original "Cahill  Story", bottom: the newly developed story. Both stories consist of 11 slides and each 
slide is accompanied by an auditory narrative.
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settings, we selected high-arousing stories with negative valence. One 
story was identical to the one of Cahill and colleagues (469), adapted 
to the Dutch language (457, 469) and consisted of 11 slides. Of note, 
although a neutral version exists also, we only used the negative arousing 
version of the "Cahill Story". A second slide-show story was developed 
identical in structure, in valance and arousal ratings of the critical 
emotional slide, and matched in details (presence of human beings, 
objects/buildings, background, positions, etc.). Additionally, the narrative 
is identical in structure, grammar, arousing/neutral words, similar in 
word and syllable count, and voice emphasis (Figure 8.2). To reduce 
interference caused by learning two stories shortly after each other, 
and to allow specific reactivation of one story, we ensured that the two 
stories were clearly distinct. The new story consists of modern digital 
photographs, and the narrative is spoken by a female voice (the "Cahill 
Story" uses images from a more remote time and a male voice). Whereas 
the main characters in the "Cahill Story" are a mother and her son, the 
new story involves two twenty-something sisters. Presentation duration of 
the slide shows is 5 min each.
8.4.3 Memory reactivation
Following previous human reconsolidation studies, subjects received a 
brief memory reactivation to initiate reconsolidation (405, 406, 470-
472). One week after the initial study session, memory for one of the 
two stories was reactivated by presenting the first slide of this story. To 
reactivate memory and initiate a reconsolidation process for one of the 
two stories, patients were presented with the first slide of one of the two 
stories. Parts of this slide, however, were masked by black-and-white 
checkerboard patterns. Patients were asked three questions on what 
was visible behind the mask. Upon answering a question, the related 
part of the mask was removed, until the entire slide was visible after 
three questions were answered. Answers were provided by free recall. If 
the patient was unable to answer freely, a two-alternative forced choice 
question was posed. Reactivation score was calculated as follows: number 
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of questions answered correctly by free recall * 2 + number of correctly 
answered questions by multiple choice. 
8.4.4 Electroconvulsive stimulation
Immediately following memory reactivation, patients in groups A and 
B were anaesthetized and received ECT, whereas patients in group C 
did not. Electroconvulsive stimulation was administered right unilateral 
or bifrontotemporal with a brief pulse (0.25-0.5 ms), constant current 
(0.9 Ampere) apparatus with a maximum stimulus output of 1008 
milliCoulombs, i.e. 200% (Thymatron System IV, Somatics Inc., IL, USA). 
The stimulus dosage was set at 2.5 times the initial seizure threshold (i.e., 
the stimulus dosage that elicited a motor seizure of at least 20 seconds 
established during the first ECT session) in bifrontotemporal and at 6 
times the initial seizure threshold in right unilateral ECT. Anaesthesia 
was achieved with intravenous administration of etomidate (0.2-0.3 mg/
kg) followed by succinylcholine (1.0 mg/kg) and positive pressure oxygen 
(100%) was provided until the return of spontaneous respiration.
8.4.5 Digit Symbol substitution Test (DSST)
To test for possible group differences in general cognitive functioning 
at the time of story memorization and memory testing, a digit symbol 
substitution test was administered. The DSST consists of nine digit-
symbol pairs and a list of 115 symbols (473). The task is to write down 
the associated digits underneath the 115 symbols as fast and with as few 
errors as possible. The DSST was administered prior to the initial study 
session and prior to memory testing. 
8.4.6 Multiple choice memory test
Following the order of the 11 presented slides, 3-5 multiple-choice 
questions per slide with 4 answer options were posed (2). To reduce 
the burden on patients, the number of questions was reduced from the 
original 78 to 40 questions per story. An example of one of the questions 
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is: "Who is depicted on slide 2? a) Mother, b) Son, c) Mother and son, 
d) Mother and son, and another person in the background." Questions 
were selected based on presence of variability, and absence of ceiling or 
floor effects in pilot studies. Scores are expressed as decimal portions 
correct out of all questions. Testing memory for both stories required 
approximately one hour.
8.4.7 Procedures
Upon signing informed consent patients were pseudo-randomly assigned 
to one of three groups (A,B,C; Figure 8.1). The randomization of subjects 
was done in such a way that the order of study of the stories, the to be 
reactivated story, and the order of story testing was balanced across 
groups.
8.4.7.1 Encoding
Patients completed the DSST. Next, the two slide shows were presented on 
a computer screen. Patients were explicitly instructed that their memory 
for the stories would subsequently be tested, but were blind to specifics 
of the study in terms or reconsolidation or memory reactivation. Order of 
presentation of the two stories was pseudo-randomized so that ordering 
was similar across groups.
8.4.7.2 Reactivation and ECT
One week after encoding, memory for one of the two stories was 
reactivated. For groups A and B this occurred in the operating room once 
all ECT preparations had been made. For group C reactivation took place 
within the same hospital office as where memorization had taken place. 
Immediately after memory reactivation patients in group A and B were 
anesthetized and received ECT. The delay between reactivation and start 
of ECT procedures did not differ between groups A and B (t(24) = 0.75, P 
= 0.461, group A mean: 4.46 min, s.e.m.: 0.46; group B mean: 4.00 min, 
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s.e.m.: 0.41). The reactivated story was pseudo-randomized so that the 
reactivated story was balanced across groups.
8.4.7.3 Memory Test Session
For group A and C memory was tested one day after memory reactivation 
and ECT, for group B this was done immediately after reactivation and 
recovery from ECT (mean: 103.77 min, s.e.m.: 7.84; range: 29-133 min). 
First patients completed the DSST, next the memory test was conducted. 
Multiple-choice questions were asked verbally by the experimenter and 
tests were completed for one story then for the next. The order of tested 
stories was pseudo-randomized so that this was balanced across groups.
8.5 Results
8.5.1 Subjects
Thirteen patients per group completed the study. Three patients dropped 
out because ECT treatment was stopped (N=2) or because the patient 
relapsed in psychosis (N=1). There were no group differences in terms 
of gender, age, number of prior administered ECT sessions, duration of 
the depressive episode, modified cumulative illness rating scores (CIRS 
(474)), global assessment of functioning scores (GAF (468)), or depression 
ratings (MADRS (475)) (Supplementary Table 8.1). Thus, the observed 
between-group differences in reactivated memories are not due to 
differences in cognitive or clinical status.
8.5.2 ECT procedure
ECT induced a satisfactory generalized seizure in all patients. 
Groups A and B did not differ in terms of motor seizure duration, 
electroencephalogram (EEG) seizure duration, applied current, electrode 
placement (right unilateral, bifrontotemporal), amount of administered 
etomidate or succinylcholine, and initial seizure threshold as was 
established at the first ECT session (Supplementary Table 8.2). Hence, the 
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observed between-group differences in reactivated memories are not due 
to differences in ECT parameters or anesthetic dose. 
8.5.3 Memory reactivation does not differ between groups
All groups showed evidence of memory reactivation, i.e., memory 
performance at reactivation was above chance level as indexed by the 
memory reactivation score (one-sample t-test across all groups, (t(36) = 
7.53, P < 0.001), and groups did not differ in memory reactivation scores 
(Kruskal-Wallis for group (A,B,C), H(2) = 1.77, P = 0.412; group A mean: 
3.08, s.e.m.: 0.35; group B: mean: 2.62, s.e.m.: 0.96; group C mean: 3.23; 
s.e.m.: 1.24). Therefore, the observed between-group differences in 
reactivated memories are not due to differences in strength of memory 
reactivation, and adequate memory reactivation principally allows the 
initiation of a reconsolidation process.
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Figure 8.3: ECT disrupts reconsolidation 
Memory scores expressed in percentage correct. One day after reactivation and ECT, memory for the 
reactivated story (solid-bars) was not different from chance (group A red) and impaired compared to the 
non-reactivated story (open-bars). Critically, in line with reconsolidation being a time-dependent process, 
testing memory immediately after ECT reveals no difference in recognition scores for the reactivated 
story compared to the non-reactivated story (group B blue). Further, in the absence of ECT (group C green) 
memory for the reactivated story is enhanced relative to the non-reactivated story. Dashed line indicates 
chance level (25%), error bars depict s.e.m.
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8.5.4 
No difference in general cognitive functioning between groups 
as assessed by the DSST
A group (A, B, C) x time point (study, test) repeated measures ANOVA on 
DSST scores revealed no main effect of time point (F
1, 31
 = 0.03, P = 0.864), 
group (F
1, 31
 = 0.52, P = 0.600) or group x time point interaction (F
1, 31
 = 
1.39, P = 0.265). Hence, group differences in memory performance are 
unlikely to be due to group differences in general cognitive functioning.
Table 8.1: Statistics 
Statistical test results. 1Group  x Reactivation (reactivated story, non-reactivated story) repeated measures 
ANOVA; 2One-way ANOVA; 3Post-hoc pair-wise comparisons; 4Paired t-tests; 5One-sample t-test.
Test: Group Reactivation Reactivation 
x Group
1Group = A, B, and C F
2, 36
 = 6.50
P = 0.004
F
1, 36
 = 0.01
P = 0.926
F
2, 36
 = 11.18
P < 0.001
1Group = A and B only F
1, 24
 = 1.28
P = 0.270
F
1, 24 
= 4.24
P = 0.050
F
1, 24
 = 4.29
P = 0.049
Test: Group 3A vs B 3B vs C 3A vs C
2Non-reactivated story F
2, 38 
= 1.08
P = 0.350
P > 0.5 P > 0.5 P > 0.5
2Reactivated story F
2, 38
=13.94
P < 0.001
P < 0.05 P < 0.05 P < 0.05
Test: Group A Group B Group C
4Reactivated story vs 
non-reactivated story
t(12) = -2.96
P = 0.012
t(12) = 0.01
P = 0.994
t(12) = 4.41
P = 0.001
5Reactivated story com-
pared to chance
t(12) = 0.23
P = 0.825
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8.5.5 ECT disrupts reactivated memory
As predicted, we observed ECT-evoked disruption of memory for the 
reactivated story when tested one day after reactivation in group A 
(Figure 8.3 red), but critically not on immediate memory testing in 
group B (Figure 8.3 blue). Specifically, memory for slides pertaining to 
the reactivated story in group A is not different from chance level, and 
impaired relative to that for the non-reactivated story (Table 8.1 in main 
text). By contrast, in group B, memory performance is not different 
between the two stories, and at a level equivalent to the non-reactivated 
story in group A. Taken together, the results from groups A and B accord 
with a view that reactivated emotional episodic memories are impaired 
by a single ECT session in a time-dependent fashion. Interestingly, our 
control group C (Figure 8.3 green), which followed the same protocol 
as group A except for not receiving anesthetics and ECT, showed better 
memory for the reactivated vs. non-reactivated story. Thus, reactivation is 
beneficial for memory in the absence of subsequent ECT.
To further examine the interaction effect of group x reactivation, present 
in the ANOVA comparing all three groups, we specifically tested whether 
this effect is driven by memory for reactivated or non-reactivated stories. 
Critically, there are no significant between-group differences in memory 
for non-reactivated stories, but an effect for reactivated stories (Table 
8.1). Thus, memory performance for the non-reactivated story was not 
significantly modulated by ECT or the time interval between ECT and 
test. That group C showed better memory for reactivated material in the 
absence of ECT supports similar findings in animals (476).
8.5.6 No emotion by reactivation interactions
Emotional narratives accompanied both slide-stories learnt by patients. 
Each story can be separated into three phases of which the middle 
is considered most emotional and results in enhanced memory when 
compared to the same images accompanied by a neutral narrative (2). 
Testing for a reactivation (reactivated story, non-reactivated story) x 
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phase (1,2,3) effect within group A revealed a main effect of reactivation 
(F
1, 12
 = 8.75 P = 0.012), but no main effect of phase (F
2, 24
 = 0.48, P = 
0.0624), or reactivation x phase interaction (F
2, 24
 = 2.40, P = 0.112). Thus 
we observe no interaction between relative emotionality of the studies 
material and the disturbance of reactivated memory.
8.5.7 Memory performance is associated with illness and ECT 
parameters
Next we assessed whether screening scores or elements of ECT treatment 
were related to memory performance. Cumulative illness rating scale 
scores (CIRS) correlated with memory performance over all groups 
(Pearson r = -0.32, N = 38, P = 0.047), thus the lower the comorbid 
physical problems or illnesses the better memory performance. Limiting 
the analyses to group A and group B, we tested whether ECT treatment 
parameters were related to memory performance. An independent t-test 
showed that memory impairment was greater for bifrontotemporal 
electrode placement compared to right unilateral stimulation (t(24) = 
2.28, P = 0.032, right unilateral mean: 0.36, s.e.m: 0.02; bifrontotemporal 
mean: 0.29, s.e.m.: 0.02), in line with previous reports(467, 477, 478). 
Given that bilateral stimulation leads to more memory impairment, 
we specifically tested for a modulation of reconsolidation by electrode 
placement in group A. No effect was observed (P > 0.05), but this null 
finding may reflect the size of our sample (unilateral N=4, bilateral N=9). 
That bifrontotemporal electrode placement is associated with greater 
memory impairments than right unilateral electrode placement replicates 
previous findings (467, 477, 478). The reconsolidation impairment 
observed in group A was still evident when controlling for electrode 
placement. The relation between electrode placement and memory 
performance suggests that the observed memory impairments are a 
result of the electrical stimulation and/or the convulsion itself and not 
other elements of the ECT treatment such as the anaesthesia. 
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8.6 Discussion
In summary, we show in unipolar-depressed patients that a single ECT 
application following memory reactivation disrupts reactivated, but 
not non-reactivated, memory for an emotional episode. Additionally, 
we show that this effect is time-dependent, expressed only after a 
24h period. In the absence of ECT, reactivation of memory actually 
benefits memory performance 24h later. The effects we report are 
therefore not due to an unspecific effect of time or reactivation. Our 
data provide evidence for a disruption of reactivated emotional episodic 
memories by invasive interference with normal neural activity. The novel 
findings are: 1) Our results satisfy critical criteria for demonstrating 
reconsolidation in humans, that have been difficult to meet by other 
methods, 2) the memory impairment/enhancement following reactivation 
cannot be due to new learning and thus be confounded by possible 
interference at the time of retrieval, 3) shows the loss of emotional 
episodic memory following reactivation extending findings on simple 
associative fear memories (413, 466). Episodic memory can contribute 
to the persistence of emotional responses (479), therefore the ability to 
disturb reconsolidation of emotional episodic memory is of great clinical 
importance. By circumventing the difficulties previously facing human 
reconsolidation studies, our results bridge a cross-species gap between 
human and non-human research, and provide critical support to previous 
human studies on reconsolidation (413, 466).
Our findings are in line with early studies on non-human animals and 
psychiatric patients that show a disruption of reactivated memory or 
clinical symptoms when followed by electroconvulsive stimulation, 
respectively (47, 399). Our data show that an extensive and ecologically 
valid emotional episodic memory task is sufficiently sensitive to detect 
reconsolidation impairment. By contrast, an early human study that 
showed no effects of ECT on reactivated memory also showed limited 
effects on the consolidation of item recognition and paired associative 
memory (480), which could reflect that these tests lacked the sensitivity 
to reveal reconsolidation effects.
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Reconsolidation has received much interest due to its potential 
for permanently altering or erasing memories that contribute to 
the persistence of psychiatric disorders (481, 482). A translational 
significance of the present findings is the potential therapeutic advantage 
of evoking depressive ideations prior to ECT, in order to disrupt 
reconsolidation and therewith induce amnesia for these symptoms 
(399, 480). However, despite observing a relationship between memory 
performance and electrode placement but not with anesthetic dose, 
we cannot distinguish whether the applied electrical current or the 
anesthesia cause the impairment of reactivated memory. Regardless, 
our data emphasizes the dynamic nature of memory by demonstrating 
that the alteration of episodic memory for emotional experiences during 
reconsolidation is possible. 
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9 β-ADRENERGIC BLOCKADE DURING 
MEMORy RETRIEVAL IN HUMANS EVOKES A 
SUSTAINED REDUCTION OF DECLARATIVE 
EMOTIONAL MEMORy ENHANCEMENT.
9.1 Published as:
Kroes MCW, Strange BA, and Dolan RJ (2010). β-adrenergic blockade during memory 
retrieval in humans evokes a sustained reduction of declarative emotional memory 
enhancement. The Journal of Neuroscience, 30(11), 3959-3963.
9.2 Abstract
Memory enhancement for emotional events is dependent on amygdala activation 
and noradrenergic modulation during learning. A potential role for noradrenaline 
(NE) during retrieval of emotional memory is less well understood. Here we 
report that administration of the β-adrenergic receptor antagonist propranolol 
at retrieval abolishes a declarative memory enhancement for emotional items. 
Critically, this effect persists at a subsequent 24 hours memory test, in the 
absence of propranolol. Thus, these findings extend our current understanding 
of the role of NE in emotional memory to encompass effects at retrieval, and 
provide face validity to clinical interventions using β-adrenergic antagonists in 
conjunction with reactivation of unwanted memories in anxiety-related disorders.
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9.3 Introduction
Enhanced episodic memory for emotional events (1, 483) is dependent 
on the amygdala (5). During initial acquisition or consolidation of an 
emotional memory, the amygdala is thought to upregulate neuronal 
processing in the hippocampus (37, 38) through a β-adrenergic 
mechanism (29, 33, 39). β-adrenergic blockade with the β1β2-antagonist 
propranolol selectively impairs long-term human episodic memory for 
emotionally arousing material without affecting memory for neutral 
material when administered prior to learning (440, 469). This widely 
accepted model of noradrenergic influences on human emotional 
memory, by focusing on encoding and consolidation (29), implicitly 
suggests that the role of noradrenaline does not extend to retrieval of 
emotional memories. Providing evidence for a role of NE in retrieval 
would therefore add considerably to a broader understanding of the 
nature of emotional influences on memory.
Although adaptive to survival, emotional memory enhancement may 
also have pathological consequences, as in anxiety-related disorders 
such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (3). Once consolidated, 
memories are thought to be relatively insensitive to disruption or further 
modulation (30), rendering pharmacological treatments long after 
the traumatic event therapeutically ineffective. On the other hand, if 
neuromodulatory effects on emotional memory following consolidation 
were evident then this would provide a potential therapeutic approach for 
attenuating the retrieval of unwanted, established, emotional memories. 
As such, the application of NE antagonists might, for example, reduce the 
occurrence of intrusive memories such as flashbacks in PTSD. Identifying 
a role for NE during emotional memory retrieval would therefore be of 
considerable clinical significance.
Currently, the role of NE at retrieval is unclear. Human brain imaging 
during emotional memory retrieval demonstrates activation of the locus 
coeruleus (LC) (484), the origin of noradrenergic forebrain projections 
(485, 486). Other studies demonstrate amygdala engagement during 
201
9. β-adrenergic blockade during memory retrieval in humans evokes a sustained reduction of declarative 
emotional memory enhancement
similar emotional memory retrieval tasks (487-489). However, human 
psychopharmacological data fail to demonstrate blockade of enhanced 
emotional retrieval by propranolol given at recall (490, 491). This 
contrasts with observations in rodents that propranolol, given prior to 
retrieval of contextual conditioned fear, attenuates the fear response 
(492). One possible explanation for this discrepancy is that the memory 
paradigm employed in previous human studies (490, 491) did not evoke a 
robust emotional memory enhancement. Thus, the absence of consistent 
and robust emotional memory enhancements in these studies indicates a 
relatively marginal contribution of the adrenergic system in these tasks, 
Figure 9.1: Experimental design
a. Depiction of the encoding task (left panel) and cued recall task (right panel). During encoding stem-
unique nouns are presented with occasional emotional nouns (E) and perceptually distinct nouns (P). 
During the cued recall task three letter stems of the nouns encoded on the first day are presented. The 
stems of the perceptual nouns are not presented in a distinct font. b. Schematic of the study design over 3 
days. Note that propranolol is only administered on Day 2. BP = blood pressure measurement.
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such that an effect of propranolol could not be detected. Therefore, 
we conducted a double-blind, placebo controlled experiment testing 
the effect of propranolol on cued-recall of emotionally aversive verbal 
stimuli, using a stimulus set known to cause a marked emotional memory 
enhancement effect that is also known to be dependent on the amygdala 
and NE (33, 440).
Briefly, on Day 1 subjects encoded neutral control nouns (C) with 
occasional nouns being emotionally aversive (E nouns) or perceptually 
distinct (P nouns) (440) (Figure 9.1a). On Day 2, subjects were 
administered either propranolol (40 mg) or placebo and 90 minutes later 
engaged in a cued recall test (Figure 9.1b). To rule out the possibility 
that any modulation of emotional memory retrieval by propranolol is 
restricted to testing in the presence of drug we again tested subjects 
24 hours later, in the absence of placebo or drug, using the cued recall 
test. We demonstrate enhanced memory for E relative to C nouns in the 
placebo group on both Day 2 and Day 3. Administration of propranolol at 
retrieval abolishes emotional memory enhancement on Day 2, an effect 
which is present at least 24 hours later on Day 3.
9.4 Methods and Materials
9.4.1 Participants
Twenty-four right handed native English speakers with normal/corrected 
to normal vision, without cardiorespiratory, neurological or psychiatric 
history participated in the study. The placebo and propranolol groups 
each comprised 12 subjects, 7 and 5 females respectively, with a mean 
age of 24.4 yrs (range: 19-34). One male subject in the propranolol group 
only completed Day 1 and Day 2 of the experiment. All subjects gave 
informed consent and the study had full ethics approval. The experiment 
was conducted on 3 consecutive days, with each session at the same time 
of day and in the same testing room for a given subject.
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9.4.2 Procedures
9.4.2.1 Day 1
Blood pressure (BP) was measured and an electrocardiogram acquired 
for each participant on arrival. During encoding, subjects viewed 360 
nouns presented visually in uppercase at a rate of one noun every 3 
s (stimulus duration 1 s). The nouns consisted of 300 neutral nouns 
all presented in the same font, 30 nouns were emotionally aversive 
oddballs (E), presented in the same font as the neutral nouns, and 
30 nouns were perceptual oddballs (P) presented in different fonts. E 
nouns were selected from the set employed in our previous studies (38, 
440). Subjects engaged in a deep encoding task (493), making a push-
button response to indicate whether the noun described a living or 
nonliving entity. Although we have previously shown emotional memory 
enhancement to be more pronounced following shallow encoding (440), a 
deep encoding task was chosen to ensure adequate memory performance 
on Day 2 and Day 3. Word presentation was randomized and oddballs 
were randomly presented after 4-6 (mean = 5) neutral words. Words were 
‘stem-unique’ in that the first 3 letters were different for each of the 360 
words. 120 words served as controls (C), with the constraint that these 
controls were more than 1 word before or after a given oddball.
9.4.2.2 Day 2
Blood pressure (BP) was again measured and subjects were then 
administered either an oral dose of 40mg propranolol or placebo 
(Vitamin C) in a double-blind experimental design. After 80 minutes 
subjects filled out the State form of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(STAIS) (200) and the Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI) (82). Subjects 
then performed a surprise memory task on the words encoded on Day 
1. In view of the kinetics of propranolol’s peak plasma concentration (1-2 
h), the memory task started 90 min after drug administration. Randomly 
selected word stems (first 3 letters) for 240 of the 360 nouns encoded 
on Day 1 were presented visually in uppercase in random order. Of these, 
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200 were neutral, 20 were emotional oddballs, and 20 were perceptual 
oddballs. All nouns were presented in the same font, including nouns that 
were perceptually distinct on Day 1, i.e. P nouns. Subjects were instructed 
to complete the stems to make a word encoded on Day 1. Presentation 
of stimuli was continuous and stems were presented every 4 s with a 
stimulus duration of 1 s. We employed a cued recall test of retrieval in 
order to increase recall performance from a large study list.
9.4.2.3 Day 3
This followed the same procedure as Day 2 except that no drug was 
administrated on Day 3. Furthermore, 360 stems were presented; the 240 
presented on Day 2 plus stems pertaining to the remaining 100 neutral 
words, 10 emotional oddballs, and 10 perceptual oddballs from Day 1 that 
had not been presented on Day 2.
9.5 Results
Propranolol did not affect cued recall of control nouns (Figure 9.2a). 
A Group (‘placebo’, ‘propranolol’) x Day (Day 2, Day 3) 2x2 repeated 
measures ANOVA on C noun recall revealed no main effects of Group 
(F
1, 10
 = 0.706, P = 0.420) or Day (F
1, 10
 = 2.124, P = 0.176) and no Group x 
Day interaction (F
1, 10
 = 0.381, P = 0.551). No memory enhancement was 
Figure 9.2: Propranolol at retrieval causes a sustained reduction of emotional memory enhancement.
a. Cued recall (% Hits) on Day 2 (upper panel) and Day 3 (lower panel) of emotional nouns (E, grey) and 
control nouns (C) for the Placebo (left column) and Propranolol (right column) groups. Drug manipulation 
prior to retrieval on Day 2 causes a significant reduction of E relative to C recall on Day 2, which is sus-
tained on Day 3 in the absence of drug. b. Cued recall (% Hits) of emotional nouns minus subject-specific 
control noun recall on Day 2 and Day 3 for the placebo (left column) and Propranolol (right column) groups. 
c . Systolic and Diastolic blood pressure (BP, mmHg) before Placebo (left column) or Propranolol (right 
column) administration (0 minutes) and after 90 minutes. No baseline difference in systolic or diastolic 
BP is present between groups. The Propranolol group displays a significant reduction in systolic BP 90 
minutes after application. Errorbars indicate s.e.m. ** = p<0.001 (two-tailed), * = p<0.05 (two-tailed), •  = 
p<0.05 (one-tailed).
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detected for perceptual oddballs (see supplemental Information) and as 
such remaining analyses were restricted to emotional vs neutral nouns. 
Importantly, recall performance for all words was significantly above 
chance as indicated in a separate experimental baseline cue-completion 
group (see Supplemental Information).
In our critical comparison, we tested for the effect of drug manipulation 
on E noun memory relative to subject-specific C noun recall (Figure 
9.2a). A Group (‘placebo’, ‘propranolol’) x Day (Day 2, Day 3) x Noun 
type (emotional, control) 2x2x2 repeated measures ANOVA revealed a 
significant main effect of Group (F
1, 10
 = 9.491, P = 0.012) and Noun type (F
1, 
10
 = 8.461, P = 0.016), and a significant Group x Noun type interaction (F
1, 10
 
= 13.174, P = 0.005), with no other significant main effects or interactions.
Planned comparisons confirmed that on Day 2 the Placebo group showed 
enhanced recall for emotional nouns relative to control nouns (t(11) = 
5.365, P < 0.001 (two-tailed)), while no emotional memory enhancement 
was evident in the Propranolol group (t(11) = 1.044, P = 0.319 (two-tailed)) 
(Figure 9.2b). On Day 3 the Placebo group continued to show enhanced 
recall for emotional relative to control nouns (t(11) = 2.702, P = 0.021 (two-
tailed)). Critically, subjects who had received propranolol on the previous 
day persist in showing an absent emotional memory enhancement on Day 
3 (t(11) = -0.202, P = 0.844 (two-tailed)) (Figure 9.2b). Directly comparing 
E noun recall between the Placebo and Propranolol group revealed 
reduced memory scores for the Propranolol group on Day 2 (t(22) = 2.900, 
P = 0.008 (two-tailed)) and on Day 3 (t(21) = 2.701, P = 0.013 (two-tailed)). 
In both groups, the E nouns remembered on Day 2 tended to be the same 
as those remembered on Day 3 (see Supplemental results, Figure S8.1).
Cued recall performance for perceptual nouns, as well as for nouns cued 
only on Day 3, is given in Supplemental Information (Figure S8.2). For the 
items that had not been presented on Day 2, drug manipulation did not 
affect mean recall of control nouns on Day 3 (t(21) = -1.177, P = 0.255 (two-
tailed)). Critically, no recall differences between the drug groups were 
found for the new emotional nouns (t(21) = 0.153, P = 0.880 (two-tailed)).
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On Day 2 there was no baseline systolic BP differences between groups 
(t(21) = -0.223, P = 0.826 (two-tailed)). In line with previous findings (491), 
we observe a drop in systolic BP in the Propranolol group (t(20) = 1.842, 
P = 0.04 (one tailed)) after 90 minutes, but no drop in diastolic BP. Note 
that at both time points BP measurements for a different Placebo subject 
was lost due to equipment failure.
9.6 Discussion
Our data provide a clear demonstration of a critical role for NE in the 
retrieval of emotional memory. We show that β-adrenergic blockade by 
propranolol at retrieval abolishes the declarative memory enhancement 
for emotional items. Secondly, we show that 24 hours after β-adrenergic 
blockade at retrieval, a sustained reduction of emotional item recall is 
still observed in a second retrieval test in the absence of propranolol. 
Our findings provide support for the possibility of lasting attenuation 
of emotional memory in therapeutic contexts by pharmacological 
interventions at retrieval.
Our finding of a role for NE in retrieval of emotional memory speaks 
directly to the discrepancy between neuroimaging data, which implicate 
the NE system in emotional memory retrieval (484), and human 
psychopharmacological studies which report no effect of propranolol 
administration at retrieval on the enhancing effect of emotion on memory 
(490, 491). The latter negative findings might be explained by an absence 
of robust memory enhancement for emotional items in these tasks, 
possibly due the presentation of equal numbers of neutral and emotional 
items and/or the presentation of emotional items of both positive and 
negative valence (491). The use of equal numbers of emotional and 
neutral items in these previous studies may have resulted in rapid 
amygdala habituation (494), attenuating the memory enhancement 
process. In the oddball task employed here the amygdala response to 
emotional items has been shown not to habituate over repeated exposure 
(495). Further, valence can enhance memory for low arousing items 
via prefrontal-based organisational strategies during retrieval that are 
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independent of the amygdala and noradrenergic modulation (496, 497). 
Indeed we note a suggestion (491) that a lack of an effect of propranolol 
might be attributable to a non-dependence of their task on the amygdala 
and/or NE. 
Animal data indicate that a role for NE in emotional memory retrieval is 
time-specific. Emotional memory retrieval is affected by noradrenergic 
manipulation at 2 hours, but not 1 hour, after learning and this effect 
is absent if the study-test interval is extended to 4 days (492). The 
modulation of emotional memory by propranolol in humans may, 
therefore, also be time-dependent. Thus, a second explanation for the 
discrepancy between our findings and a previous study (491) might reflect 
the difference in study-test interval. This previous study, which found 
no effect of propranolol administration on emotional memory retrieval, 
tested retrieval 1 week after initial learning (491) compared to the delay-
interval employed here of 24 hours. It will be of interest to test whether 
the effect of propranolol observed in the current study is still observed if 
memory is tested more than 4 days after learning.
A critical question pertains to the neurobiological basis for the 
dependency of emotional episodic memory retrieval on the β-adrenergic 
system. The current data do not directly address this but potential 
explanations include the requirement for a cue-evoked phasic rise in 
NE (34) such that there is congruence between NE signals at encoding 
and retrieval (498). Alternatively, the emotional memory trace may be 
dependent on tonic noradrenergic input (492, 499) such that engagement 
of β-adrenergic receptors is essential for retrieval. It is conceivable that 
tonic NE input is no longer required after completion of systems level 
consolidation (500), which concords with a time-limited role of NE in 
emotional memory retrieval derived from animal data (492).
In terms of a neuroanatomical basis for the effects we observe, 
neuroimaging studies demonstrate amygdala involvement in emotional 
memory retrieval. Amygdala activity has been reported during retrieval of 
neutral stimuli previously encoded in an emotional context (487, 489, 501, 
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502). The amygdala may directly support emotional memory retrieval 
or could achieve this through hippocampal modulation. Increased 
hippocampal-amygdala coupling during retrieval of information encoded 
in an emotional context has been demonstrated in human (488) and 
rodent (503) studies. We suggest, therefore, that the effects we observe 
result from a propranolol-evoked disruption of amygdala responses, or 
hippocampal-amygdala coupling.
Animal studies have provided evidence for a more general role of NE 
in retrieval (492, 504-506). Specifically, increasing NE activity through 
pharmacological manipulation or by stimulation of the LC can restore 
forgotten spatial memory in rats (504, 505), via engagement of 
β-adrenergic receptors (506). Thus, these studies extend the influence 
of NE at retrieval to include non-emotional memories. In contrast to 
this, the effect of propranolol in our task did not extend to cued recall 
of neutral words or items that were perceptually distinct at encoding 
(see Supplemental material), which may reflect the essential non-verbal 
nature of animal tasks or effective central propranolol concentrations in 
human versus animal studies.
Our second main finding is that β-adrenergic blockade at retrieval 
leads to a sustained reduction of emotional memory retrieval 24 hours 
later. The neurobiological basis for this effect could reflect a number 
of processes including a disruption of secondary encoding (449), a 
disruption of reconsolidation (50, 507) or an impairment of lingering 
consolidation (446). Secondary encoding is the process whereby during 
every retrieval episode, retrieved mnemonic information, together with 
incoming sensory information, is stored as a novel memory trace (319). 
This results in the accumulation of multiple, related, mnemonic traces of a 
single episode within a slightly altered neuronal and experiential context, 
which together aid the retrieval of an episode (319). Thus, blocking 
enhanced recall of emotional stimuli on Day 2 with propranolol may have 
prevented formation of a novel emotional memory trace, expressed as 
absent emotional memory enhancement in this group on Day 3.
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Alternatively, impaired reconsolidation may account for, at least in part, 
the memory effects observed on Day 3. Reconsolidation refers to the idea 
that, upon reactivation, memories return to a labile state and are once 
again sensitive to disruption (50). It is also known that reconsolidation 
of emotional memories is disrupted by blocking NE within the amygdala 
(507). The long-term memory impairment we observe on Day 3 could 
be attributed to propranolol having blocked reconsolidation of the 
episodic enhancement process. As such, the mechanisms mediating 
the enhancement of memory for emotional items might not have been 
expressed. Typically, in reconsolidation experiments, memories need 
to be reactivated to return to a labile state. However, in the case of 
amygdala processing of fear information, there is evidence that fear 
memories can undergo reconsolidation even if not expressed (508). Thus, 
propranolol might have impaired the reconsolidation of emotional items 
not remembered on Day 2, reducing their chance of memory retrieval on 
Day 3.
The third possible explanation for our effects on Day 3 is propranolol-
induced impaired lingering consolidation. The lingering consolidation 
hypothesis posits that iterations of reactivation and stabilization of 
memory traces are an essential feature of consolidation, which, in 
contradistinction to standard models of consolidation, is not time-limited 
(446). The memory effects observed on Day 3 could, therefore, be 
attributed to a disruption of ongoing consolidation. However, an argument 
against this explanation is the absence of any difference between 
propranolol and placebo groups on memory for emotional items on Day 
3 that were not cued on Day 2. Thus, the neurobiological mechanisms 
underlying our second main finding, that emotional memory impairment 
evoked by propranolol on Day 2 persists to Day 3, are likely to be a failure 
of secondary encoding, impaired reconsolidation or a combination of 
these processes. Thus, blocking enhanced recall of emotional stimuli 
on Day 2 with propranolol may have prevented formation of a novel 
emotional memory trace, expressed as absent emotional memory 
enhancement in this group on Day 3.
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The efficacy of pharmacological prevention of the acquisition of 
memories for traumatic experiences is limited by practicality (509, 
510). The possibility of pharmacologically modulating established 
emotional memory at retrieval we demonstrate here supports a potential 
therapeutic approach of attenuating unwanted established emotional 
memories. Our data support recent clinical findings  that propranolol 
administration to PTSD patients, following memory reactivation, reduces 
physiological responses to a subsequent script-driven trauma imagery 
session (404).  We extend these findings of post-reactivation modulation 
of implicit measures of emotional memory by propranolol (404, 405) 
by demonstrating specific attenuation of retrieval of emotional episodic 
memory, without an impact on neutral memory. Thus, we provide a 
theoretical justification for the potential application of propranolol in 
reducing retrieval of traumatic memories that justify studies of clinical 
interventions with β-adrenergic antagonists during reactivation of 
traumatic memory in anxiety-related disorders.
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10 β-adrenergic blo ckade affects 
the neural net work of 
extinction learning, causes the 
loss of fear and prevents the 
return of fear in humans.
10.1 In preperation as:
Kroes MCW, Tona KD, Den Ouden HEM, Vogel S, van Wingen GA, Fernández G (in 
prep). β-Adrenergic blockade affects the neural network of extinction learning, causes 
the loss of fear and prevents the return of fear in humans.
10.2 Abstract
The combined use of psychotherapy and noradrenergic antagonists has been 
advocated as beta-blockers can disrupt reactivated memory resulting in a loss 
of fear. However, animal studies have shown that beta-blockers can also impair 
consolidation of extinction memory, leading to increased fear. We therefore 
tested these opposing hypotheses in a double-blind placebo controlled functional 
magnetic resonance study and show that a single dose of propranolol prior to 
extinction learning eliminates contextual fear conditioned responses in healthy 
humans, causes a subsequent loss of fear and prevents the return of fear one day 
later in the absence of drug. Moreover, the elimination of differential conditioned 
responses is associated with absence of fear conditioned responses in the dorsal 
medial prefrontal cortex, whereas the loss of fear one day later is directly 
related to increased differential responses in the hippocampus. Our results 
extend our current understanding of the role of noradrenaline in contextual fear 
generalization, and provide face validity to treatments combining psychotherapy 
and beta-blockers.
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10.3 Introduction
Mental illness such as anxiety disorders rank amongst the leading causes 
of disability worldwide, significantly contributing to the global disease 
burden (WHO, 2011). Therefore, optimizing treatment of these disorders 
is of great importance. Over the last decades antidepressants medication 
has been used to treat affective disorders and their actions have been 
implicated to affect the monoamine systems including noradrenaline 
(27). yet, recent clinical studies have indicated that the combination of 
psychopharmacological treatments and psychotherapy is more effective 
than either treatment alone (511). However, little is known about the 
optimal combinations of pharmacological and psychological treatments 
and the mechanism that underlie optimization of treatment strategies.
Generally fear and anxiety disorders are treated by either 
pharmacological treatments or cognitive behavioural therapy 
including exposure therapy. During exposure therapy a fear response 
is extinguished or suppressed by repeatedly exposing a patient to 
a fear-evoking stimulus in a safe setting. The suppression of a fear 
response has been successfully modelled using Pavlovian conditioning. 
Here a neutral conditioned stimulus (CS, e.g. a light) comes to elicit a 
conditioned fear response (CR) after repeated pairing with an aversive 
unconditioned stimulus (US). The conditioned fear response can 
subsequently be reduced or suppressed through repeated exposure 
to the CS in the absence of the US in a procedure known as extinction 
learning. Importantly, extinction learning does not erase the CR memory, 
but reflects new learning, an association between the CS and safety. 
Thus, the conditioned memory trace and the extinction memory trace 
coexist and compete, such that the extinction memory inhibits expression 
of the CR (10, 512, 513). As such, although exposure therapy can lead 
to the reduction of fear responses in patients suffering from fear or 
anxiety disorders, patients are subject to spontaneous recovery of the 
fear response and to reinstatement of the fear response at subsequent 
re-exposure to the US. Therefore, a need exists for methods that more 
optimally reduce the expression of fear, the generalization of fear from 
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threatening situations to save contexts in which fear is maladaptive, and 
that prevent the return of fear following treatment.
Recent studies have shown that memories can be reactivated upon which 
they enter an instable state and require restabilization. The finding that 
this reconsolidation process can be disrupted causing an erasure of 
fear memories has sparked great interest as it may prevent the return 
of fear. Importantly, reconsolidation of fear memories can be disrupted 
by the application of the β1β2-noradrenergic antagonist propranolol in 
animals (507). Similarly, human studies have revealed that reactivation of 
fear memories in the presence of a beta-blocker can impair subsequent 
retrieval of these memories (405, 411). Interestingly, propranolol has 
also been found to impair retrieval of emotional memory (411, 514, 515). 
Such findings provide a theoretical justification for applying beta-blockers 
in combination with psychotherapy in order to reduce symptoms in 
anxiety disorders (404, 411, 464, 509). However, the methods by which 
a memory is reactivated and becomes susceptible to the disruption of 
reconsolidation, or is subject to extinction are very similar (432, 476). 
For example a brief single exposure to a CS is considered to evoke a 
reconsolidation process, yet a more prolonged exposure or repeated 
exposures to the CS evoke an extinction process and, hence, new learning. 
Propranolol in the presence of re-exposure to a CS could thus block 
reconsolidation resulting in the loss of fear, but could principally also 
impair extinction learning resulting in an increase of fear (402, 432, 516-
518). Interestingly, several animal studies indicate that beta-blockers may 
interfere with the consolidation of extinction memory (519, 520), whilst 
others have found no effects (521) or find beta-blockers to reduce fear 
expression during extinction learning (514, 522). Currently, the effects of 
beta-blockers on extinction learning in humans remain uninvestigated. 
To provide face validity to the use of beta-blockers in combination with 
psychotherapy to treat patients with anxiety disorders it is critical to 
elucidate the possible influence of beta-blockers on extinction learning. 
From literature opposing hypothesis arise where the combination of beta-
blockers with extinction learning either results in a subsequent increase 
or decrease of fear.
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Investigating the effects of beta-blockers on the neural circuits that 
underlie fear and safety learning can provide insight in the mechanisms 
that contribute to the optimization of combined pharmacological and 
psychotherapeutical treatments. The neural circuit that supports fear and 
safety learning in pavlovian conditioning and extinction paradigms is well 
defined. The amygdala is considered to mediate (conditioned) responses 
to adversity and the storage of associative fear memory (10, 12, 512, 513), 
in close coordination with the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dMPFC) 
and midbrain regions. Following extinction learning the ventral medial 
prefrontal cortex (vMPFC) is thought to inhibit the fear response (10, 12, 
512, 513). Additionally, extinction is context specific and the hippocampus 
is thought to provide this contextual information (523). Together, 
the idea is that during extinction learning a novel memory is formed 
through hippocampus-amygdala-vMPFC interactions, which, following 
consolidation, leads to a hippocampus-dependent vMPFC inhibition of 
the amygdala preventing the CR (513). Exactly this mechanism appears 
impaired in anxiety disorders (21). Further, this implies that optimal 
pharmacotherapies should support the flexible adjustment of specific 
conditioned fear responses during extinction learning by affecting the 
critical nodes in the neural network. Interestingly, recent work shows 
that the neural network involved in regulating extinction is affected by 
noradrenergic medication (175).
Considering the opposing hypothesis on the influence of beta-blockers on 
extinction, we tested whether a single administration of the beta-blocker 
propranolol affects extinction and the neural processes implicated 
in safety learning. Briefly, we conducted an experiment over three 
consecutive days (Figure 10.1a). On day 1, subjects were conditioned to a 
light in a specific context by pairing it with an electrical shock. Next, on 
Day 2 subjects received a single dose of propranolol and underwent an 
extinction paradigm. To test the long term effect of propranolol, subjects 
were tested on spontaneous recovery of the fear response and on the 
resistance to reinstatement of the fear response on Day 3, in the absence 
of propranolol. To investigate the influence of noradrenaline on the 
neural circuit underlying extinction learning brain activity was assessed 
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with BOLD fMRI on Day 2 and Day 3. Considering the findings that beta-
blockers can impair the consolidation of extinction learning in animals 
(519, 520), that propranolol blockade can abolish the retrieval of memory 
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Figure 10.1: Experimental design and task
A) In a three day between-subjects design participants were conditioned on Day 1. On Day 2 subjects heart-
rate (HR), blood pressure (Bp, pink boxes), and mood were measured at the start (T1), and subsequently 
received propranolol (40mg) or placebo. After 60 minutes (T2) heart-rate, blood pressure and mood were 
again assessed, and next subjects entered the MRI scanner and underwent an extinction task. Upon exiting 
the scanner (T3) heart-rate and mood was again measured. On Day 3 heart-rate and mood measures were 
acquired (T4), upon which subjects entered the scanner for a recall task testing spontaneous recovery, 
followed by a reinstatement procedure, and a reextinction task testing for the reinstatement of fear. At the 
end of Day 3 (T5) heart-rate, blood-pressure and mood were assessed and subjects received a contingency 
questionnaire. Skin conductance responses (SCR) was acquired on all three days, BOLD fMRI data was 
collected on Day 2 and Day 3. B) Subjects were exposed to a context conditioning task on Day 1. Following 
a fixation cross, a room was presented. Within the room a light 'turned on' either emitting yellow or blue 
light serving as conditioned stimuli. One of the lights was followed by a transcutaneous electrical shock 
33% of the time, the other colour light was never followed by a shock. On Day 2 and Day 3 the task was 
identical to Day 1 except that a different room, but the same lights were presented, and neither of the 
colour lights was followed by a shock. C) Propranolol caused a drop in systolic blood pressure at T2 and T3 
on Day 2 but no longer has an effect on Day 3.
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for emotional memories (411, 522), and that reactivating emotional 
memory in the presence of propranolol can result in elimination of 
emotional memory 24h later (411, 507), we perceived of several possible 
outcomes of our study. First, propranolol would have no effect on 
extinction learning on Day 2, but would impair consolidation and result 
in increased spontaneous recovery and reinstatement of fear. Second, 
propranolol might reduce retrieval of the conditioned fear response on 
Day 2 and due to new learning lead to an attenuation of the return of 
fear on Day 3. Third, irrespective of a possible effect of propranolol on 
the retrieval of the conditioned fear response on Day 2, the reactivation 
of memory in the presence of propranolol may lead to a subsequent loss 
of fear on Day 3 as a result of disrupted reconsolidation. The second and 
third hypothesis both result in the loss of fear on Day 3 but may yield 
differences the possible return of fear, and would thus have different 
clinical implications.
10.4 Methods and Materials
10.4.1 Participants
Fifty-four healthy young participants with normal- or corrected-to-
normal vision, normal uncorrected hearing, were included in the study 
(age-range: 19-26 yr, mean: 21.72, s.e.m.: 0.32). Subjects were pseudo-
randomly assigned to one of the drug groups so that for each of four 
consecutive subjects two would receive propranolol and two placebo. 
Subjects and investigators were blind to drug conditions. Five subjects 
were excluded as they displayed no conditioned responses, three subjects 
could not complete the study due to scanner problems. The placebo 
group comprised 24 subjects (11 males, 13 females) and the propranolol 
group 22 subjects (8 males, 14 females), and one subject (female) in the 
propranolol group did not complete the reinstatement and re-extinction 
task.
All subjects gave informed consent. Subject had to meet all inclusion 
criteria and none of the exclusion criteria. These included that subjects 
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were free of neurological, cardiovascular, endocrine or psychiatric history, 
and MRI- or propranolol contraindications. Subjects were predominantly 
right-handed, female subjects used oral hormonal contraceptives, and 
were tested in the second week of their menstrual cycle. Additionally, 
subjects had no history with psychotropic medication, or hard drug use. 
Moreover, subjects had not used over-the-counter medication or cannabis 
in the 72 hours, or alcohol in the 24 hours prior to study, with the 
exception of oral contraceptives and paracetamol, and were not recipients 
of investigational products as part of research studies in the three months 
prior to the initial dose in this study. Furthermore, subjects did not donate 
blood in the two months prior to initial study dose. Finally, subjects did 
not consume more than 3 units of alcohol daily. The study was approved 
by the institutional ethics committee (CMO Regio Arnhem-Nijmegen, The 
Netherlands).
10.4.2 Medication
Subjects were administered either an oral dose of 40mg Propranolol 
HGl or placebo (microcrystalline cellulose) in capsules. Propranolol is 
a non-selective β-adrenergic receptor blocking agent that crosses the 
blood-brain barrier. It is a competitive antagonist which competes with 
β-adrenergic receptor stimulating agents (like adrenaline) for both β1- 
and β2-adrenergic receptor sites.
10.4.3 Tasks
10.4.3.1 Conditioning 
As extinction learning in clinical situations occurs in a different context 
than that in which fear was acquired we employed a context conditioning 
task. A differential conditioning paradigm based on previous contextual 
conditioning paradigms was used with delay conditioning and partial 
reinforcement (524-526). Partial reinforcement was used to study the 
gradual development of fear learning, and slow down subsequent 
extinction learning (527, 528). Subjects were told that they would see on 
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a computer screen a picture of a room in which a light would turn on and 
emit a yellow or blue light while they could receive shocks. The level of 
the shocks was set before the experiment to a subjective intensity that 
was maximally uncomfortable without being painful. The instructions 
were to pay attention to the computer screen and subjects were told that 
a relationship existed between the stimuli and the shocks.
The context stimuli were images of two rooms with an identical lamp in 
them (Figure 10.1b). The CSs were images of the same rooms and lamp, 
but now the lamp emitted either a yellow or blue light. The US was a mild 
electric shock to the fingers (200msec asymetrical biphasic pulse with a 
pulsewidth of 250 μs at 150 Hz.) that co-terminated with the CS+. On a 
given trial the context was presented for 11, 12, or 13 sec followed by a CS 
presentation for 4 sec, with an 11, 12, or 13 sec inter-trial interval during 
which a fixation cross was presented. During conditioning, one light 
colour was paired with the US on one-third of the trials (CS+), and the 
other colour was never paired with the US (CS-). The order of the different 
trial types was pseudo-randomized so that half of each trial type occurred 
during the first half of the task (Early Phase), whilst the other half of each 
trial type occurred during the second half of the task (Late Phase), the 
assignment of light colour into CS+ and CS- was counterbalanced across 
subjects. During, conditioning there were 12 presentations of each CS that 
did not co-terminate with the US, intermixed with an additional 6 CS+ 
trials that co-terminated with the US. The conditioning task was preceded 
by a habituation phase consisting of 6 trials, during which each CS type 
was presented three times. Subjects were instructed that no shocks 
would occur during the habituation phase. The habituation phase and 
conditioning task were separated by a visual instruction on a computer 
screen that the actual task was going to start.
10.4.3.2 Extinction
The extinction task was conducted one day after the conditioning task 
and followed the same procedure as the conditioning task except that 
the instructions were to pay attention to the computer screen and 
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subjects were told that the task would continue as before. Further, 
during the extinction task an image of a different room, but with the 
same lamp served as context (Figure 10.1b). The CSs were the same 
as during conditioning, both were presented 12 times but neither co-
terminated with the US. Again, CS+ and CS- presentations were pseudo-
randomized according to an Early- and Late Phase, and the assignment 
of the room picture that served as conditioning or extinction context 
was counterbalanced across subjects. A habituation phase preceded the 
extinction task.
10.4.3.3 Recall
The recall task was conducted one day after the extinction task and 
followed the same procedure as the extinction task (Figure 10.1b).
10.4.3.4 Reinstatement
The re-instatement pocedure was conducted after the recall task and 
consisted of the continuous presentation of the extinction context during 
which four USs were administered (30, 100, 115, and 200 sec after context 
onset). Subjects received the same instructions as during the extinction 
task, but the shock level was not set again prior to reinstatement, and the 
task was not preceded by a habituation phase.
10.4.3.5 Reextinction
The re-extinction task was conducted after the reinstatement procedure 
and followed the same procedure as the extinction task, except that the 
shock level was not set again, and it was not preceded by a habituation 
phase (Figure 10.1b).
10.4.4 Skin conductance acquisition
Skin conductance was assessed with Ag/AgCL electrodes attached to the 
subject’s distal phalanges of the index and middle finger of the non-
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dominant hand with standard NaCl electrolyte gel. The skin conductance 
signal was amplified using MR compatible BrainAmp MR and BrainAmp 
ExG MR (BrainProducts GmbH) within the MR environment, trough an 
optical cable recorded outside the MR environment using BrainVision 
Recorder software. Data was continuously recorded at 5000 samples per 
second. 
10.4.5 Skin conductance analyses
Skin conductance data was assessed using an in-house analysis 
programme written in Matlab (the MathWorks) and using FieldTrip (529). 
Data was low-pass filtered at 5Hz and resampled to 100Hz. The level of 
skin conductance responses was determined for each trial as the peak-to-
peak amplitude difference in skin conductance of the largest deflection 
in the latency window from 0-8 s after stimulus onset. The raw skin 
conductance responses were square root transformed to normalize the 
distributions. Analyses are restricted to non-reinforced trials only.
10.4.6 fMRI sequences
MR data was acquired on a 3T MR scanner (TrioTim syngo, Siemens, 
Medical, Erlangen, Germany) equipped with 32-channel transmit-receiver 
head coil. The manufacturer’s automatic 3D-shimming procedure was 
performed at the beginning of each experiment. Subjects were placed in 
a light head restraint within the scanner to limit head movements during 
acquisition.
10.4.6.1 Functional image acquisition
Functional images were acquired with multi-echo gradient echo-planar 
imaging (EPI) sensitive to the blood-oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) 
response using the following parameters: 38 oblique transverse slices, 
slice thickness = 2.5mm, interslice gap = 17%, repetition time (TR) = 2.32s, 
flip angle α = 90°, echo times (TE) = 9, 19.3, 30, and 40 ms (FOV) = 211 x 
211 mm2, matrix size 64 x 64, fat suppression. A magnetic (B0) field map 
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was collected before each task and was used to unwarp the echo-planar 
images (160, 161, 530).
10.4.6.2 Structural image acquisition
A 3D magnetization-prepared rapid gradient echo (MPRAGE) image was 
acquired for normalization procedures using the following parameters: 
TR = 2300 ms, TE = 3.03 ms, 192 contiguous 1 mm slices, FOV = 256 x 256 
mm2, matrix = 256x256. 
10.4.7 fMRI analyses
10.4.7.1 Preprocessing
fMRI data were processed and analysed using the statistical software 
package SPM8 (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London, UK; 
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Fieldmaps were created for each 
subject using the Fielmap Toolbox (531). The first 6 EPI volumes were 
discarded to allow for T1 equilibration. The remaining functional images 
of the first echo series from each subject were realigned and unwarped 
using rigid-body transformation to correct for head movements to the 
mean functional image using 7th-degree B-spline interpolation. The 
subsequent realignment and unwarping parameters were applied to 
the other echo series. Next, the first 36 of the remaining volumes were 
used to calculate the signal to noise ratio of each echo for each voxel, 
and a voxel-wise weighting function was used to calculate weighted 
volumes for the remaining volumes. Hereafter, a three step coregistration 
procedure was used where first each subject’s anatomical T1-weighted 
MR image, and second each subjects’ mean-, and weighted functional 
images were coregistered to the MNI 152 T1-template, and third each 
subject’s anatomical T1-weighted MR image was coregistered to the 
mean functional image using a normalized mutual information function. 
Subsequently, the anatomical T1-weighted MR image was segmented. The 
weighted functional images were spatially normalized into a common 
stereotactic space (MNI 152 T1-template) by applying the normalization 
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parameters from the segementation procedure, and resampled to 2 x 
2 x 2-mm3 isotropic voxels using trilinear interpolation. Finally, spatial 
smoothing was applied with an isotropic 3D Gaussian kernel of 8 mm full-
width half-maximum.
10.4.7.2 General statistics
The data were modelled voxel-wise, using a general linear model. Trial-
specific effects were modelled by trains of stick- or boxcar functions 
and convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response basis function 
of SPM8. Additionally, realignment parameters were included to model 
potential movement artefacts. The data were high-pass filtered (cut-
off 128s) to remove low-frequency signal drifts, and a first-order 
autoregressive model was used to model the remaining serial correlations 
(163). Contrast images of testing parameter estimates coding condition-
specific effects were created for each subject. The single-subject contrast 
images were entered into a voxel-wise full factorial model to assess main 
effects of task and task by drug interactions, implemented in a second-
level random effects analysis. We report regions that survive cluster-level 
correction for multiple-comparisons (family-wise error, FWE) across the 
whole brain at p<0.05 using an initial height threshold of p < 0.001, unless 
otherwise indicated.  
10.4.7.3 Task specific model definitions
For the extinction and recall task regressors were created for CS+, CS-, 
and context presentations for the habituation, early, and late phase. 
In addition, a regressor modelling the occurrence of instructions was 
added resulting in 10 regressors. Respective durations of each trial were 
included in the model. The model for the reextinction task was the same 
with the exception that there was no habituation phase and this was 
thus not modelled resulting in 7 regressors. Contrast images for each 
regressor were created against an implicit baseline and taken forward to 
random effects second level analyses.
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10.4.8 Contingency questionnaire
The contingency questionnaire measures memory for the contingencies 
between the CSs and US as experienced on each day of the experiment. 
Subjects are presented with the CSs and first on a 10-point likert scale 
how pleasant they experienced seeing a given CS, this is done for each 
day of the experiment in order. Next, they indicate how many USs 
they experienced with the presentation of a given CS, and indicate the 
percentage of times the given CS co-terminated with the US, this is done 
for each day of the experiment in order.
10.4.9 Procedures
10.4.9.1 Screening
Subjects signed an informed consent form upon which they filled out 
a demographics and medical history questionnaire. Next, a 12-lead 
electrocardiogram was obtained, heart-rate, blood pressure, body height 
and body weight was measured, and the body-mass index was calculated. 
Finally, the list of Threatening Experiences Questionnaire and STAI-T was 
administered. When subject met all inclusion criteria and none of the 
exclusion criteria they were randomly assigned to a subject number. Drug 
randomization in groups of four coupled with subjects numbers by an 
independent pharmacy ensured double blind drug assignment. Subjects 
returned at a later time for the experimental sessions which were 
conducted on three consecutive days (Figure 10.1a).
10.4.9.2 Day 1
Upon arrival subject washed their hands and their fingers were cleaned 
with rubbing alcohol. Ag/AgCl electrodes filled with standard NaCl 
electrolyte gel were attached to the non-dominant index and middle 
finger with Velcro straps. Subjects entered a dummy scanner (i.e. a 
non-functional remake of a MRI scanner), and underwent a staircase 
procedure to adjust the strength of electrical shocks in order to 
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determine a level where the shock felt maximally uncomfortable, but 
not painful. SCR responses were checked with a Valsava maneuver. Upon 
receiving instructions, the conditioning task was started, and SCR was 
recorded (Figure 10.1a). If subjects did not show conditioned responses 
they were replaced.
10.4.9.3 Day 2
On the second day, subjects’ heart-rate and blood pressure were 
measured and mood questionnaires (STAI, PANAS) were filled out (Figure 
10.1a). Next propranolol or placebo was administered (time-point 1). For 
safety purposes heart-rate and blood pressure were assessed after 30 
minutes. After 60 minutes (time-point 2) heart-rate and blood pressure 
were assessed and mood questionnaires were administered (STAI, 
PANAS). Subject’s hands were cleaned as described for session 1. Next, 
subjects entered the MR scanner, Ag/AgCl electrodes were attached 
and subjects underwent a staircase procedure to set the shock level 
as described for Day 1. SCR responses were checked with a Valsava 
maneuver. After acquiring a fieldmap, the extinction task was started, 
fMRI data acquired and SCR and HR recorded. Next, a structural T1-
weighted scans was obtained. Subjects exited the MR scanner, heart-
rate and blood pressure was measured and mood questionnaires (STAI, 
PANAS) administered (time-point 3).
10.4.9.4 Day 3
On the third day (Figure 10.1a), subjects’ heart-rate and blood pressure 
were measured and mood questionnaires (STAI, PANAS) were filled 
out (time-point 4). Subject’s hands were cleaned as described for Day 
1. Next, subjects entered the MR scanner, Ag/AgCl electrodes were 
attached and subjects underwent a staircase procedure to set the 
shock level as described for Day 1. SCR responses were checked with 
a Valsava maneuver. The recall, reinstatement, and reextinction tasks 
were conducted in order and a fieldmap was acquired prior to each task. 
SCR was recorded during each task. Upon exiting the MR scanner, heart-
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rate and blood pressure was measured and mood questionnaires (STAI, 
PANAS) were administered (time-point 5). Finally, subjects filled out the 
contingency questionnaire, and the vTCI. Following completion of the 
study subjects were debriefed on the aims and details of the study.
10.5 Results
Here the results of the critical analyses are provided. Full and detailed 
analyses can be found in the Supplementary Information.
10.5.1 Participants
The placebo and propranolol group did not differ in terms of age, 
STAI-T scores, HR, and BP measures as obtained during screening (See 
supplemental information and Table 10.1).
10.5.2 Propranolol administration affects blood pressure on 
Day 2
At the start of Day 2, there was no baseline systolic BP difference 
between groups (t(44) = -0.048; p = 0.962, two-tailed). In line with 
previous findings (411, 491), we observe a drop in systolic BP in the 
propranolol group after 60 min (t(21) = 3.571; p = 0.002; Mean time-point 
1: 122, s.e.m: 2.975, Mean time-point 2: 113.45, s.e.m: 2.628), and after 
105 minutes (t(21) = 2.670; p = 0.014, Mean time-point 1: 122, s.e.m: 2.975; 
Mean time-point 3: 116.32, s.e.m: 2.270), and group differences at trend 
after 60 minutes (t(44) = -1.874; p = 0.068, Mean Propronolol: 113.45, 
s.e.m: 2.628; Mean Placebo: 119.33, s.e.m: 1.794) and 105 minutes (t(44) 
= -1.711; p = 0.094, Mean Propranolol: 116.32, s.e.m: 2.270; Mean Placebo: 
121.29, s.e.m: 1.850), but no differences in diastolic BP (Figure 10.1c top 
panel). Although both groups show a decrease in HR over time, no group 
differences were observed. Furthermore, no group differences in BP or 
HR measures are observed on Day 3 24h after propranolol administration 
(Figure 10.1c bottom panel). 
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10.5.3 SCR results
We tested for the effect of propranolol administration on skin 
conductance responses for each task using repeated measures ANOVAs. A 
full overview of ANOVA results can be found in Supplementary Table 10.2. 
Here only the critical main effects of Group or interaction effects with 
Group are provided.
10.5.3.1 Both drug groups show development of conditioned responses 
during the conditioning task
Critically we find an interaction effect of CStype x Phase (F
1, 44
 = 5.503, P < 
0.024) revealing that both drug groups learn differential responses over 
time (Figure 10.2). Following up on this finding, we found that differential 
conditioned responses were learned over time as paired T-tests on the 
difference scores between average responses to the CS+ and CS- for the 
Early and Late phase revealed greater differential responding in the Late 
compared to the Early phase (t(45) = -2.356, P = 0.023). Follow up T-test 
revealed that subjects had greater responses to the CS+ than the CS- 
during the Early phase (t(45) = 3.760, P < 0.001), and Late phase (t(45) = 
6.134, P < 0.001). Hence, greater skin conductance responses to the CS+ 
compared to the CS- were observed, this difference increases over time, 
but critically, no differences between drug groups is detected.
10.5.3.2 Propranolol eliminates differential conditioned responses during 
the extinction task
For the extinction task (Figure 10.2) we find an interaction effect of 
CStype x Phase x Group (F
1, 44
 = 7.779, P = 0.008), but no main effect of 
Group (F
1, 44
 = 0.471, P = 0.496). Next, we find that the groups differed in 
differential conditioned responses in the Early Phase (F
1, 44
 = 10.120, P = 
0.003) but not the Late Phase (F
1, 44
 = 0.006, P = 0.938) as revealed by 
one-way ANOVAs on the difference scores between average responses 
to the CS+ and CS-. Follow up paired T-tests revealed greater responses 
to the CS+ compared to the CS- during the Early phase in the Placebo 
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Group (t(23) = 5.127, P < 0.001), but not in the Propranolol Group (t(21) 
= 1.054, P = 0.308), and no differences during the Late Phase in both 
the Placebo Group (t(23) = 1.147, P = 0.263), and the Propranolol Group 
(t(21) = 1.341, P = 0.194). Interestingly, the effects were not caused by 
absolute group differences in responses to CS+ or CS- trials in the Early 
nor Late phase as revealed by independent samples T-tests; Early Phase 
CS+ (t(44) = -1.138, P = 0.261), Early Phase CS- (t(44) = 0.493, P = 0.624), 
Late Phase CS+ (t(44) = -0.813, P = 0.420), Late Phase CS- (t(44) = -1.065, 
P = 0.293). Thus, whereas the Placebo group showed greater responses 
to the CS+ compared to the CS- during the Early Phase, this differential 
effect is eliminated in the Propranolol group. Further, the Propranolol 
group displayed reduced responses during the habituation trials, and 
a trend towards attenuated responses to context presentations (See 
Supplemental Information).
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Figure 10.2: Results skin conductance 
On Day 1 subject in both group initially do not differentiate between CS+ and CS- trials in the early phase 
(mean over first half of the trials), show greater responses to the CS+ than CS- during the late phase 
(average over the last half of the trials), indicating successful conditioning. Critically no group differences 
exist on Day 1. On Day 2 the placebo group shows a differential conditioned response during the early 
phase of extinction, but this differential response disappears over the course of extinction learning in 
the late phase. In contrast, the propranolol group shows no differential conditioned responses during the 
early phase of extinction, and also not during the late phase. On Day 3 the placebo group shows evidence 
for spontaneous recovery of fear during the early phase of the recall task (average over the first third 
of the trials), but this effect disappears over time. In contrast, the placebo group shows no evidence for 
spontaneous recovery of fear. Furthermore, following a reinstatement procedure, the placebo group shows 
a reinstatement of fear during the re-extinction task, but the propranolol group shows no return of fear. 
Placebo group (solid bars), propranolol group (open bars), CS+ (red), CS- (blue), error bars reflect s.e.m.
230
10.5.3.3 Propranolol causes a loss of fear during the recall task
As the recall paradigm is principally a second extinction session and 
follows the actual extinction task, extinction learning can be expected to 
occur rapidly. In order to maximize sensitivity to spontaneous recovery 
effects, we therefore recalculated for each CS type (CS+, CS-) the Early 
Phase as the average skin conductance response over the trials 1-4, a 
Middle Phase as the  average skin conductance response over the trials 
5-8, and the Late Phase as the average response over trial 9-12. Critically, 
for the recall task (Figure 10.2) we find a main effect of Group (F
1, 44
 = 
4.968, P = 0.031) and an interaction effect of Phase x Group (F
1.676, 73.739
 = 
7.565, P = 0.002). Follow up one-way ANOVAs on the average responses 
to the CS+ and CS- reveal that the Placebo group showed greater general 
responses compared to the Propranolol group in the Early Phase (F
1, 44
 
= 7.852, P = 0.008) and Middle Phase at trend (F
1, 44
 = 2.966, P = 0.090) 
but not the Late Phase (F
1, 44
 = 0.490, P = 0.487). Further, the Placebo 
group exhibited greater differential conditioned responses than the 
Propranolol group in the Early Phase (F
1, 44
 = 4.116, P = 0.049) but not 
in the Middle Phase (F
1, 44
 = 0.026, P = 0.872) and not the Late Phase (F
1, 
44
 = 0.236, P = 0.629) as revealed by one-way ANOVAs on the difference 
scores between average responses to the CS+ and CS-. Follow up, paired 
T-tests revealed that only the placebo group showed greater responses 
to the CS+ compared to the CS- during the Early phase (t(23) = 5.127, P < 
0.001), but not the Propranolol Group (t(21) = 1.515, P = 0.145), and both 
the Placebo Group (t(23) = 1.181, P = 0.250) and Propranolol Group (t(21) 
= 1.573, P = 0.131) show no differences during the middle phase and the 
Placebo  (t(23) = 0.797, P = 0.434)  and Proranolol group (t(21) = 0.490, 
P = 0.630) showed no differences during the late phase. In conclusion, 
propranolol application prior to extinction learning on Day 2 caused a 
loss of fear responses 24h later in the absence of drug. More specifically, 
this effect was most pronounced during the early phase of extinction 
recall. Further, the Propranolol group showed elimination of differential 
responses during the early phase compared to the Placebo Group. Thus, 
whereas the placebo group shows spontaneous recovery the propranolol 
group does not.
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10.5.3.4 Propranolol prevents the return of fear during the re-extinction 
task
Following previous work (406) we calculated a reinstatement score as 
the difference between the first re-extinction trial and the last trial of the 
recall task for the CS+ and CS- for each subject.  For the resinstatement 
task (Figure 10.2) we find a main effect of Group (F
1, 43
 = 5.438, P = 0.024), 
and an interaction effect of CStype x Group (F
1, 43
 = 5.560, P = 0.023). 
Follow up one-way ANOVAs on the average responses to the CS+ and 
CS- reveal that the placebo group showed greater general responses 
compared to the Propranolol group (F
1, 44
 = 5.438, P = 0.024). Critically, 
the Placebo group exhibited a differential reinstatement effect at trend 
(t(23) = 2.005, P = 0.057), but not the Propranolol Group (t(20) = -1.371, P 
= 0.186). Independent Samples T-tests revealed that this effect is specific 
to reinstatement group differences to the CS+ (t(37.021) = 2.991, P = 
0.004), not the CS- (t(43) = 0.232, P = 0.818). Critically, the reinstatement 
effect was only detected for the CS+ in the Placebo Group (t(23) = 3.376, 
P = 0.003), not the Propranolol Group (t(20) = -0.396, P = 0.696). In 
conclusion, propranolol application prior to extinction learning prevents 
the return of fear 24h later.
10.5.4 The Propranolol group underestimates the number of shock received on 
Day 1 at the end of the experiment
At the end of the experiment on Day 3 subjects estimated the number of 
shocks they had received following the presentation of each CS on each 
day (Figure 10.3A). A Day (Day1, Day2, Day3) x CStype (CS+, CS-) x Group 
(Propranolol, Placebo) 3x2x2 repeated measure ANOVA with Group as 
between subjects variable revealed a main effect of Day (F
2, 86
 = 112.951, 
P < 0.001), a main effect of CStype (F
1, 43
 = 97.888, P < 0.001), a main 
effect of Group at trend (F
1, 43
 = 2.904, P = 0.096), an interaction effect of 
Day x Group (F
2, 86
 = 3.102, P = 0.050), an interaction effect of CStype x 
Group (F
1, 43
 = 7.303, P < 0.010), an interaction effect of Day x CStype (F
2, 
86
 = 83.084, P < 0.001), and an interaction effect of Day x CStype x Group 
(F
2, 86
 = 3.484, P < 0.035). Next we calculated the difference in estimated 
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Number of USs that were received following the CS+ and CS- for each 
day per subject. Testing for the effect of Group, independent samples 
T-tests revealed a group difference on Day 1 (t(44) = -2.340, P = 0.024), 
but no differences on Day 2 or Day 3. Following up on these findings, 
independent T-tests revealed that the Propranolol group estimated a 
lower number of USs received following CS+ presentation on Day 1 (t(44) 
= -2.580, P = 0.013), but no group difference for the CS- (t(44) = 0.407, P = 
0.686). Conclusively, when asked after completion of the study on Day 3, 
subjects who were administered propranolol on Day 2 underestimated the 
number of shocks they had received following CS+ presentation on Day 1.
10.5.5 The propranolol group accepts higher intensity settings of the shocker and 
this affects persists 24h later
On each day the setting of the shocker level was documented. Although 
we find no Group differences in shock levels on Day 1 between-subjects 
variance is high. Therefore we corrected for baseline differences by 
calculating for each subject the relative change in shock level on Day 2 
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Day 1 Day 2 Day 3
US estimation Plac CS+
Plac CS-
Prop CS+
Prop CS-
N
um
be
r o
f  
sh
oc
ks
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Day 2 Day 3
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
of
 s
ho
ck
 s
et
tin
g 
D
ay
 1
Shock level settingA B Plac
Prop
Figure 10.3: Results contingency questionnaire and shock settings
A) At the end of Day 3 subjects estimated the number of shock received following each CS for each Day. The 
propranolol group underestimates the number of shocks received following CS+ presentations on Day 1. 
Dotted line represents the actual number of received shocks on Day 1. B) The intensity of the shocker was 
set on each day, and the propranolol group allowed higher shocker settings on Day 2 and Day 3 expressed 
as a change in percentage relative to the setting on Day 1. Placebo group (solid bars), propranolol group 
(open bars), CS+ (red), CS- (blue), error bars reflect s.e.m.
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and Day 3 as a percentage of the setting on Day 1. A Day (Day 2, Day3) x 
Group (Propranolol, Placebo) 2x2 repeated measure ANOVA with Group as 
between subjects variable revealed a main effect of Group (F
1, 42
 = 4.969, P 
= 0.031), with no other main effects or interactions (Figure 10.3B). One-
way ANOVAs revealed a greater change in the setting of the shock level 
from Day 1 to Day 2 for the Propranolol group than the Placebo group (F
1, 
43
 = 4.852, P = 0.033), and for the change from Day 1 to  Day 3 at trend 
(F1, 42 = 3.411, P = 0.072). Limiting the analyses to shock level settings 
within groups, paired T-tests reveal an increase in shock level setting in 
the Propranolol Group from Day 1 to Day 2 (t(20) = -2.660, P = 0.015), 
and from Day 1 to Day 3 (t(20) = -2.210, P = 0.039), but not in the Placebo 
Group from Day 1 to Day 2 (t(23) = 0.756, P = 0.458), and not from Day 1 
to Day 3 (t(22) = 0.569, P = 0.575). Thus, propranolol application on Day 
2 causes subjects to accept higher shock level settings, and this effect 
persists 24h later in the absence of drug. 
10.5.6 fMRI results
We first tested which brain regions were involved in fear and safety 
memory for each task (Tables 10.3, 10.5, 10.7). Subsequently we tested 
how these regions were influenced by propranolol administration using 
orthogonal contrasts. Specifically, following previous region of interest 
analyses in the field (10, 524, 525), we extracted data from the regional 
clusters revealed by comparing CS+ trials to the CS- trials for each task. 
Here only analyses on the extracted data for regions that showed an 
effect of drug administration on differential conditioned responses are 
reported. Additional analyses for regions that do not show effects of 
propranolol are provided in Supplementary Information. Furthermore, 
we run for each task a Phase (Early, Late) x CStype (CS+, CS-) x Group 
(Propranolol, Placebo) 2x2x2 repeated measure ANOVA on the regions of 
interest. A full overview of ANOVA results can be found in Table 10.9. Here 
only the critical main effects of Group or interaction effects with Group 
are provided.
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10.5.6.1 The dorsal mPFC and midbrain are affected by propranolol 
administration during extinction learning
Comparing CS+ trials to the CS- trials reveals differential BOLD signal in 
regions including the insula, dorsal mPFC, ventral mPFC, and midbrain 
(Table 10.3, Figure 10.4).
Testing for the effect of propranolol administration on dorsal mPFC 
responses (Figure 10.5) we find an interaction effect of CStype x Group (F
1, 
44
 = 4.894, P = 0.032). Critically, within the Placebo group paired T-tests 
revealed greater responses to the CS+ than CS- (t(23) = 3.062, P = 0.006), 
but no such effect was observed within the Propranolol Group (t(21) = 
0.223, P = 0.826). Thus, the Placebo group exhibits greater dorsal mPFC 
responses to the CS+ than CS- whereas no such effect is detected in the 
Propranolol group. Further, within the Placebo group the differential 
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Figure 10.4: Results fMRI
fMRI reveals the neural network of fear extinction and recall.  During extinction activation (CS+ vs CS-, 
red) of the dorsal MPFC, bilateral insula, and midbrain is detected, and a deactivation (CS- vs CS+, blue) of 
the vMPFC. At recall activation of the right insula and midbrain, and deactivation of the hippocampus and 
ventral visual areas is evident. During re-extinction we find activation of the bilateral insula and dorsal 
MPFC. Bars indicate T-values of main effects, activation cluster are displayed overlaid on selective slices 
of a template brain, and thresholded at p<0.001. Display view follows neurological convention, i.e. right 
hemisphere is depicted on the right. 
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dorsal mPFC responses disappear over the course of extinction learning 
(See Supplementary Information).
Further, testing for the effect of propranolol on midbrain responses 
(Figure 10.5), revealed an interaction effect of CStype x Group (F
1, 44
 = 
4.509, P = 0.039). Critically, within the Placebo group paired T-tests 
revealed no differential responses between the CS+ and CS- (t(23) = 1.045, 
P = 0.307), whereas the Propranolol group showed greater responses to 
the CS+ than CS- (t(21) = 3.045, P = 0.006). Thus, the Propranolol group 
exhibited greater midbrain responses to CS+ compared to CS- trials than 
the Placebo group.
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Figure 10.5: Results drug effects on fMRI
Propranolol administration affects the neural network of extinction learning. Analyses on the extracted 
data from regions revealed by the main effects of task shows that during extinction learning propranolol 
eliminates differential conditioned responses in the dorsal mPFC whilst increasing differential responses in 
the midbrain. During the recall task the propranolol group shows differential conditioned responses in the 
hippocampus, an effect not observed in the placebo group. During the re-extinction task the propranolol 
group shows reduced differential conditioned responses in the dorsal mPFC. Placebo group (solid bars), 
propranolol group (open bars), CS+ (red), CS- (blue), early = average over the first half of the trials, late = 
average over second half of the trials, error bars reflect s.e.m.
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10.5.6.2 The hippocampus is affected by propranolol administration during 
recall of extinction learning
Comparing CS+ trials to the CS- trials reveals differential BOLD signal in 
regions including the right insula, midbrain, hippocampus, and amygdala 
(Table 10.5, Figure 10.4). 
Testing for the effect of propranolol administration on left hippocampus 
responses (Figure 10.5) we find an interaction effect of CStype x Group at 
trend (F
1, 44
 = 3.820, P = 0.053), with no other main effects or interactions. 
Critically, the Placebo group showed no differences between the CS+ and 
CS- in the Early Phase (t(23) = 0.097, P = 0.924), and at trend in the Late 
Phase (t(23) = -2.039, P = 0.053), but we found clear differences in the 
Propranolol group in the Early Phase (t(21) = -3.085, P = 0.006) and the 
Late Phase (t(21) = -2.615, P = 0.016). In conclusion, the Propranolol group 
showed greater differential hippocampal responses during the early 
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Figure 10.6: Correlations BOLD fMRI and SCR
Activity in brain regions that show effects of propranolol administration correlates with skin conductance 
responses. The differential response (CS+ - CS-) BOLD fMRI response in the dorsal mPFC correlates with the 
differential SCR response during the extinction and recall tasks. Thus the greater the differential condi-
tioned dorsal mPFC response the greater the differential SCR response. The hippocampus shows an effect 
of drug administration during the recall test, and the differential hippocampus response during recall 
correlates with the differential reinstatement SCR response during the reextinction task. Thus, the greater 
the differential hippocampus response during recall the smaller the reinstatement effect is.
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phase of recall, evidence for this differential response only arises in the 
late phase for the Placebo group.
10.5.6.3 The dorsal mPFC shows reduced differential responses during the 
re-extinction task.
Comparing CS+ trials to the CS- trials reveals differential BOLD signal in 
regions including the dorsal mPFC, and insula (Table 10.7, Figure 10.4).
Testing for the effect of propranolol administration on dorsal mPFC 
responses (Figure 10.5) revealed a main effect of Group (F
1, 43
 = 4.371, P 
= 0.042). When averaging over all conditions an independent samples 
T-test showed that the Placebo group displayed greater responses than 
the Propranolol group (t(43) = 2.091, P = 0.042). In conclusion, during re-
extinction the Placebo group displayed greater dorsal mPFC responses.
10.5.7 fMRI BOLD responses in areas affected by propranolol 
correlate with SCR responses and US estimation
We find effects of propranolol on extinction learning, recall, and the 
recovery of fear, and additionally find similar effects of propranolol on 
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Figure 10.7: Correlations BOLD fMRI and US estimation
The differential BOLD fMRI response in the hippocampus during recall correlates with the differential 
number of shock subjects estimate to have received on Day 1 following completion of the study. Thus, the 
greater the differential hippocampus response the lower the estimated number of received shocks.
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brain function. As such we attempted to determine whether changes in 
brain function could be associated with changes in behaviour. Therefore, 
we correlated the difference in SCR scores to CS+ and CS- trials with the 
difference in BOLD fMRI responses to CS+ and CS- trials for those regions 
of interest that showed an effect of drug administration during the early 
task phases that showed the largest differences between CS+ and CS- 
trials (Figure 10.6). We find positive correlations between SCR responses 
and neural responses in the dorsal mPFC during the early phase of the 
extinction task (r
s
 = 0.346, P = 0.020), and during the early phase of the 
recall task at trend (r
s
 = 0.276, P = 0.066). Thus, greater differential dorsal 
mPFC responses are associated with greater differential SCR response. 
Furthermore, we find a negative correlation between hippocampus 
responses during the recall task and the subsequent reinstatement 
effect in SCR responses during the re-extinction task (r
s
 = -0.337, P = 
0.025). Hence, greater differential hippocampus responses are related 
to smaller differential SCR responses. In summary, brain areas that 
are affected by propranolol administration show a relationship to the 
differential conditioned responses as expressed in SCR measures. These 
correlations were not significantly different between groups (using 
Fisher’s z-transformation). Considering these findings, we tested whether 
BOLD fMRI responses might also correlate with the US estimation for Day 
1. We find that greater differences in US estimation between the CS+ and 
CS- correlate negatively with the hippocampus response during recall (r
s
 
= -0.292, P = 0.049, Figure 10.7), and again this correlation does not differ 
between groups. Thus, greater differential hippocampus responses are 
also associated with a smaller number of US estimation.
10.5.8 Ventral striatal prediction error responses are not 
affected by propranolol administration and show no relation 
with the loss of fear
To further investigate the three different hypotheses, and distinguish 
between the neural mechanisms that may underlie our behavioural 
results we set out to investigate neural reinforcement learning signals 
as the three hypothesis yield different predictions. One explanation 
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for the loss of fear and prevention of the return of fear on Day 3 in the 
Propranolol group is a disruption of reconsolidation. Reconsolidation 
only occurs when memory is reactivated in a situation that requires new 
learning to update memory (403). This has lead to the suggestion that 
a reconsolidation is only initiated when there is a mismatch between 
the expectation of the retrieved memory and the outcome of the actual 
situation, i.e. a prediction error (532, 533). If the loss of fear and the 
absence of the return of fear that we report here is attributable to a 
disruption of reconsolidation, then a relationship between a neural 
prediction error response and the amount of loss of fear would provide 
supportive evidence for this explanation. An variant of the new learning 
hypotheses is that propranolol enhances extinction learning by affecting 
a reinforcement learning signal, that may subsequently also effect the 
consolidation process. If propranolol enhances extinction by affecting 
reinforcement learning signals we should be able detect a group 
difference in prediction error related neural responses. Therefore, in 
a complementary analysis we investigated the neural basis of errors 
in aversive prediction during the extinction task (see Supplemental 
Information). From a Rescorla-Wagner model (534) we generated a 
prediction error regressor for each subject, and, after taking covariates 
of no interest into account, group analyses revealed a cluster within the 
ventral striatum (Figure S10.4). An independent samples T-test on the 
extracted data from this cluster does (Figure S10.4), however, not reveal 
an effect on prediction error related BOLD responses (t(43) = 1.022, P 
= 0.313; Placebo Mean: 2.485, s.e.m., 0.672, Propranolol Mean: 1.432, 
s.e.m., 0.790). Investigating the relation between the ventral striatal 
prediction error response and the differential SCR response during 
extinction learning reveals that greater mean differential SCR responses 
are correlated with greater ventral striatal PE responses (rs = 0.396, P 
=  0.007, Figure S9.4). Critically however, ventral striatal PE responses 
are not correlated with spontaneous recovery (r
s
 = 0.039, P = 0.801), 
nor the reinstatement of SCR responses on Day 3 (r
s
 = 0.136, P = 0.379). 
Additionally, we find no group differences in these correlation scores 
(using Fisher’s Z-transformation). Thus, although the neural prediction 
error response correlates with the reduction in SCR responses during 
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extinction learning we find no group differences in ventral striatal PE 
responses and no relation to the loss of fear or the return of fear on Day 
3 and, hence, no support for enhanced extinction or a reconsolidation 
explanation.
10.6 Discussion
We show in a double-blind placebo controlled experiment that a single 
dose of the β1- β2-adreneric receptor antagonist propranolol administered 
prior to extinction learning eliminates differential conditioned fear 
responses during extinction learning, causes a subsequent loss of 
fear and prevents the return of fear one day later. The elimination of 
conditioned responses during extinction learning was associated with 
a loss of responses to a fearful stimulus (CS+) in the dorsal mPFC and 
increased conditioned responses in the midbrain. The loss of fear one 
day later was accompanied by increased conditioned responses in the 
hippocampus during recall, whereas the absence of the return of fear was 
reflected in reduced conditioned responses in the dorsal mPFC.  These 
findings support the second hypothesis that propranolol reduced retrieval 
of conditioned fear response during the extinction task, and due to new 
learning led to an absence of fear during the recall and re-extinction 
tasks. The combined used of noradrenergic medication and psychotherapy 
may thus be a beneficial strategy to treat anxiety disorders.
The dorsal mPFC is considered to be the human homologue of the rodent 
prelimbic cortex (303, 304), and suggested to be a memory storage site 
that drives the sustained expression of conditioned fear responses (535-
538). In line with our findings, firing rates of neurons in prelimbic cortex 
increase during conditioning, decrease during extinction (537, 538), and 
are reduced after systemic propranolol injections, resulting in reduced 
expression of conditioned fear (522). Similarly, we found that propranolol 
eliminated enhanced responses to the CS+ in the dorsal mPFC. We also 
observed greater differential conditioned responses for the propranolol 
group in a midbrain region that largely overlaps with the periaqueductal 
gray (PAG). The PAG has been implicated as an output structure for 
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specific reactions to fearful stimuli, such as freezing (5, 539). Activation 
of the PAG causes expression of fear responses (540), yet in contrast we 
found increased midbrain responses in the absence of fear responses 
following propranolol application. This finding is indicative of a potential 
compensatory mechanism for ineffective noradrenergic signalling. 
Furthermore, we observed that propranolol induced differential 
hippocampus responses during the recall task. Moreover, we already 
detected greater hippocampus responses to context presentations during 
the extinction task that persisted during the recall and re-extinction tasks. 
Previous studies suggested a critical role for the hippocampus in context 
representations (208) and context conditioning (524-526, 541). Critically, 
where we observed that the reduction of dorsal mPFC responses were 
related to reduced fear responses, greater hippocampus responses 
as detected in the propranolol group were related to both reduced 
measures of implicit and explicit fear. The latter findings suggest that the 
hippocampus provides a safety signal resulting in reduced fear.
Our results extend our current understanding of the role of noradrenaline 
in fear and safety learning and provide support for the second hypothesis 
that blocking noradrenaline reduces fear memory retrieval and prevents 
the return of fear due to new learning. Cue-evoked phasic rises in 
noradrenaline (34) appear to regulate the retrieval of fear memory via 
the dorsal mPFC (522, 535-538, 542), possibly via dynamic interactions 
with midbrain structures including the locus coeruleous. This brain 
region is the central source of noradrenergic projections (485) that 
has previously been implicated in extinction learning, retention, and 
retrieval (411, 492, 519, 521, 543-545), and perhaps also enhances the 
amygdala contribution to retrieval (487, 489, 502, 546). Considering 
that in our paradigm extinction, recall, and re-extinction occurred in a 
different context as in which conditioning took place, we hypothesize 
that the elimination of differential conditioned responses during 
extinction prevented the formation of an association between the new 
context and the retrieved fear memory or even caused the formation 
of a novel memory association between the new context and a safe 
situation (449). Here phasic noradrenaline release associated with the 
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expression of fear would function as an intrinsic US (547) resulting in the 
association of conditioned fear with a novel context effectively supporting 
fear generalization. Blocking the differential noradrenergic response 
prevents contextual fear generalization, and leads to an association of 
a new context with relative safety, as expressed in the introduction of 
a differential conditioned response in the hippocampus. This critically 
indicates that phasic noradrenergic signals are directly or indirectly 
involved in the modulation of hippocampal function in contextual fear and 
safety learning.
Alternatively noradrenergic blockade may result in a general reduction 
in fear expression by affecting output structures responsible for the 
behavioural expression of fear (548-552), or tonic noradrenergic input 
through engagement of β-adrenergic receptors may be essential for 
retrieval of fear memory (492, 499). Critically, during the extinction 
task we found an interaction effect between drug administration and 
conditioned stimuli but no main effect suggesting not a general decrease 
in fear responses or memory retrieval but an inability to differentiate 
between stimuli at the time of cue-evoked retrieval. Subsequently, we 
observed a loss of fear and no return of fear during the recall and re-
extinction tasks, not merely an elimination of differential conditioned 
responses. Even though we detected a main effect of reduced responses 
during habituation trials and context presentations during the extinction 
task, no such general reduction of fear expression was observed for the 
recall and re-extinction tasks (see Supplemental Information). Hence, 
a general reduction of fear expression could only partially explain the 
results.
Furthermore, alternative explanations for our finding that β-adrenergic 
blockade during extinction learning results in a subsequent loss of 
fear and prevents the return of fear one day later are a disruption of 
reconsolidation (50, 507), impaired lingering consolidation (446), or 
enhanced extinction (446). Distinguishing between these alternative 
hypotheses is clinically relevant as a disruption of lingering consolidation 
or reconsolidation suggest a loss of the original fear memory, and 
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thus a reduced risk for the return of fear. Our findings argue against a 
reconsolidation or lingering consolidation interpretation as these would 
predict the loss of memory representations. Although the propranolol 
group displayed a loss of differential responses in the dorsal mPFC 
during the extinction task, only a decrease in conditioned responses was 
detected during the re-extinction task. Moreover, many brain regions 
still reflected conditioned responses despite a behavioural absence of 
fear. Furthermore, in contrast to the loss of memory representation 
we actually observe the introduction of a novel hippocampus memory 
representation in the propranolol group. The results of our prediction 
error analyses yield further arguments against the alternative 
explanations of reconsolidation and enhanced extinction learning. First, 
the loss of fear and the absence of the return of fear could have been the 
result of enhanced extinction due to increased reinforcement learning 
signals by propranolol administration. Second, reconsolidation has been 
postulated to be initiated in case of a mismatch between expectancy 
and outcome, i.e. a prediction error, at the time of memory reactivation 
(403, 532, 533). In contrast to these predictions we found ventral striatal 
prediction error related responses to be associated with extinction 
learning, but these were not affected by propranolol and had no relation 
with the loss of fear or the return of fear. Finally, the enhanced extinction 
hypotheses would predict greater ventral mPFC responses as this region 
is critical for the inhibition of fear; however, we observed no such 
effect. In conclusion, we found no supportive evidence for a disruption 
of reconsolidation, impaired lingering consolidation, or an enhanced 
extinction explanation. Interestingly, this conclusion also casts doubt on 
studies investigating reconsolidation by applying beta-blockers prior to 
memory reactivation and that lack tests of immediate memory.
Our findings speak to an important discrepancy in the literature on 
the influence of beta-blockers on extinction. Our results are in line 
with studies that report a role for noradrenaline in the retrieval of 
fear memory (411, 514, 515) and expression of fear during extinction 
learning (520, 522), but contrast with studies that find no effects on fear 
expression during extinction learning (519, 521, 553), and those studies 
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that report impaired consolidation of extinction due to noradrenergic 
blockade that results in increased fear one day later (519, 520, 553). The 
detection of an effect of noradrenergic blockade on fear memory retrieval 
was only possible because we employed a differential conditioning 
paradigm, whereas most animal studies have not used such a design 
(519-522). Also, we used systemic propranolol application and found 
effects on the dorsal mPFC and hippocampus in line with animal studies 
applying systemic administration or local infusions within these regions 
(522, 542), whereas several animal studies have performed local infusions 
in other regions (519, 520), possibly explaining discrepancies. Further, in 
our study extinction and memory retention was tested in a novel context 
and we have argued that the loss of fear and the absence of the return 
of fear is the result of new contextual safety learning. In contrast, animal 
studies that have reported impaired consolidation of extinction due to 
noradrenergic blockade have tested extinction memory in the same 
context as in which conditioning took place (519, 520, 553).
Finally, a recent human study reports effects of beta-blockers on 
explicit expectancy ratings of fear but not on an implicit measure of fear 
expression (553), supporting the idea that multiple memory systems (230, 
233, 466) may be effected differently by noradrenergic blockade (476, 
515). Our findings support these ideas, as we found that although subjects 
explicitly know which stimulus was threatening, and found this stimulus 
less pleasant, they no longer showed implicit fear responses following 
noradrenergic blockade. Moreover, while we detected a loss of fear 
memory representations in the dorsal mPFC, several other brain areas 
retained these representations. A critical question for future research 
pertains to the contribution of these regions to fear memory, and the 
possibility for the expression of fear to recover or the maintenance of a 
cognitive representation of fear that may be less sensitive to disturbances 
(466).
To conclude, our results provide supportive evidence for a method to 
reduce fear expression, prevent generalization of fear to contexts in 
which fear is maladaptive, and that prevents the return of fear following 
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treatment. Our results extend our current understanding of the role of 
noradrenaline in fear memory retrieval and the generalization of fear 
to novel contexts. Taken together we provide face validity to studies 
investigating the combined used of noradrenergic medication and 
psychotherapy aiming to improve treatment and reduce the disease 
burden of affective disorders.
Competing interests
The authors declare no conflict of interest.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank S Kooijman for additional subject recruitment, screening 
and clinical coordination, and N Müller for contributions to reinforcement learning 
analyses.
Author contributions
MCW Kroes, GA van Wingen and G Fernández designed the study. MCW Kroes, KD 
Tona, and S Vogel acquired data. MCW Kroes analyzed data. MCW kroes and H 
den Ouden programmed the reinforcement learning algorithm. MCW Kroes and G 
Fernández wrote the manuscript. All authors agreed on the final manuscript.
246
11 the serotonin transporter-
linked promoter region 
polymorphism modulates fear 
conditioned responses in the 
human brain.
11.1 In preperation as:
Kroes MCW, Klumpers F, Franke B, van Wingen GA, Fernández G (in prep). The sero-
tonin transporter-linked promoter region polymorphism modulates fear conditioned 
responses in the human brain.
11.2 Abstract
Understanding vulnerability factors such as genetic variations on brain 
functioning holds the promise to tailor psychiatric treatment to individual needs. 
The serotonin transported-linked polymorphic region (5-HTTLPR) has been 
associated with anxiety and mood disorders and one hypothesis is that genetic 
variance in 5-HTTLPR contributes to susceptibility for affective disorders by 
modulating emotional learning. We therefore tested whether genetic variance in 
5-HTTLPR determines emotional learning and modulates specific brain processes 
as assessed by functional magnetic resonance imaging. We show that 5-HTTLPR 
has no effect on Pavlovian fear conditioning and extinction as assessed with skin 
conductance responses, but does modulate functioning of the neural network 
that supports fear and safety learning. Furthermore, we show that critical 
nodes in the neural network of fear learning that are modulated by the variance 
in 5-HTTLPR are related to sympathetic fear responses, whereas other brain 
regions show a genetic variance-dependent differential association with coping 
strategies. Our findings suggest that 5-HTTLPR mediates emotional learning, 
thus contributing to a mechanistic understanding of the neural processes that 
determine individual susceptibility to affective disorders, and the development of 
optimized treatments for specific individuals.
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11.3 Introduction
To tailor psychiatric treatment to individual needs recent research has 
focussed on understanding vulnerability factors for anxiety and mood 
disorders (554, 555). Particular attention has been directed towards the 
effects of genetic variations on functioning of brain regions involved in 
fear and mood (555-557). Understanding the effect of genetic variations in 
serotonin neurotransmission has been an important focus as studies have 
revealed associations between short (S)-allele carriers of the serotonin 
transporter-linked polymorphic region (5-HTTLPR) and anxiety-related 
traits as well as neuroticism (558), posttraumatic stress disorder (559, 
560), and depression (561, 562).
The functional deletion/insertion polymorphism within 5-HTTLPR 
produces short (S’) and long (L’) repetitive sequences, which influences 
5-HTT protein expression and function (558, 563). The functional 
consequence of the S’-allele has been associated with relatively less 
5-HTT mRNA transcription and 5-HTT binding, reduced 5-HT platelet 
reuptake (563-565), and reduced 5-HT1a binding in the brain (566). 
Hence, genetic variance in 5-HTTLPR influences serotonergic signalling, 
but an open critical question pertains to the functional neural mechanism 
by which genetic variance in 5-HTTLPR affects susceptibility to the 
development of anxiety and depression disorders.
Emotional learning contributes to the development of anxiety disorders 
(3), and an early study showed an association between genetic variance 
in 5-HTTLPR and emotional memory in humans (463). An effective 
model for fear and anxiety has been Pavlovian fear conditioning, which 
allows the investigation of fear and safety learning (5). During Pavlovian 
conditioning a neutral conditioned stimulus (CS, e.g. a light) comes to 
elicit a conditioned fear response (CR) after repeated pairing with an 
aversive unconditioned stimulus (US). The conditioned fear response can 
subsequently be reduced or suppressed through repeated exposure to the 
CS in the absence of the US in a procedure known as extinction learning. 
Importantly, extinction learning does not erase the CR memory but 
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reflects new learning, namely the association between the CS and safety 
(567). Thus, the conditioned memory trace and the extinction memory 
trace coexist and compete, such that the extinction memory inhibits 
expression of the CR (10, 512, 513). Studies have reported increased 
sensitivity to conditioning and impaired extinction learning in S’-carriers 
of the 5-HTTLPR in both humans and animals (568-571), although other 
have not found effects on behavior (572, 573). 
Investigating the influence of genetic variance in 5-HTTLPR on the neural 
network that supports fear and safety learning may provide mechanistic 
insight into individual pathophysiology that would allow personalized 
treatment. The neural circuit that supports fear and safety learning 
in Pavlovian conditioning and extinction paradigms is well defined (5, 
518). The amygdala is considered to mediate (conditioned) responses to 
adversity and the storage of associative fear memory (10, 12, 512, 513), 
in close coordination with the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex (dMPFC), 
and midbrain regions. Following extinction learning the ventral medial 
prefrontal cortex (vMPFC) is thought to inhibit the fear response (10, 12, 
512, 513). Additionally, extinction is context specific and the hippocampus 
is thought to provide this contextual information (523). Together, 
the idea is that during extinction learning a novel memory is formed 
through hippocampus-amygdala-MPFC interactions, which, following 
consolidation, leads to a hippocampus-dependent vMPFC inhibition of 
the amygdala preventing the CR (513). Exactly this mechanism appears 
impaired in anxiety disorders (21), and this network has been found to be 
affected by effective pharmacological treatment targeting serotonergic 
transmission in depression (3, 25). Beyond these regions, sensory cortical 
areas have been implicated in conditioned fear learning and have been 
found to be modulated by serotonergic treatment in animals (574, 575). 
Furthermore, recent studies provided initial evidence for an association 
between genetic variance in 5-HTTLPR and amygdala responses (576), and 
amygdala-vMPFC coupling (577, 578) during exposure to emotional events. 
More recent work in animals reported a change in amygdala-vMPFC 
communication via theta-synchronization as a consequence of 5-HTTLPR 
genotype during Pavlovian conditioning (570). Additionally, recent human 
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work has revealed enhanced conditioned responses in S’-carriers in the 
insula, dMPFC, and occipital cortex (572, 573), and decreased amygdala 
responses during conditioning and vMPFC responses during extinction 
learning (573), albeit in relative small sample sizes (579, 580).
Here we set out to test the influence of 5-HTTLPR genotype on the neural 
network of fear and safety learning. Moreover, we were particularly 
interested in the relation between elements of the neural network that 
may be modulated by 5-HTTLPR and their relation to fear responses 
and fear regulation. Briefly, 106 subjects were differentially conditioned 
to coloured squares by pairing with an electrical shock in a partial 
reinforcement regime. The conditioning task was immediately followed 
by an extinction task during which the same coloured squares were 
presented but no shocks were administered. To investigate the influence 
of 5-HTTLPR genotype on the neural network of fear and safety learning 
BOLD fMRI was acquired throughout the experiment as well as skin 
conductance responses.
11.4 Methods and Materials
11.4.1 Participants
One hundred and six predominantly right-handed healthy young male 
participants with normal- or corrected-to-normal vision, and normal 
uncorrected hearing were included in the study (age-range: 18-31 yr, 
mean: 21.87, s.e.m.: 2.63). Six subjects could not be genotyped, and 
one subject was excluded due to SCR data loss. The S’-allele carriers 
comprised 69 subjects and the L’L’-allele carriers 30 subjects. All subjects 
gave informed consent, were free of cardiovascular, neurological, 
endocrine, and psychiatric history. Subjects did not consume more than 
three alcoholic beverages daily, did not use psychotropic medication 
or recreational drugs weekly or more, and were not habitual smokers. 
Subjects did not consume alcohol in the 24h prior to testing and did not 
use psychotropic medication or recreational drugs in the 72 hours prior 
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to testing. The study was approved by the institutional ethics committee 
(CMO Regio Arnhem-Nijmegen, The Netherlands).
11.4.2 Genotype
Genetic analyses were carried out at the Department of Human Genetics 
of the Radboud University Nijmegen Medical Centre, in a laboratory that 
has a quality certification according to CCKL criteria. High molecular 
weight DNA was isolated from saliva using Oragene containers (DNA 
Genotek, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada) according to the protocol supplied 
by the manufacturer. The 5-HTTLPR genotype was the genotype at the 
single-nucleotide polymorphism (rs25531) in this region, with alleles 
designated as LG, LA, and S (581). Because it is thought that the LG is 
comparable to the S-allele with regard to gene transcription and function, 
we reclassified the alleles on the basis of the resulting expression levels 
of the SLC6A4/5-HTT gene into L’L’, S’L’, and S’S’ genotypes (582). Testing 
for Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium did not show deviation from the expected 
distribution (P < 0.05).
11.4.2.1 STAI-T
The State-State Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T) measures anxiety as a general 
long lasting quality (trait) (200). Subjects indicate on a 4-point likert scale 
for 20 statements to which degree these apply to them.
11.4.2.2 CISS
The Coping Inventory for Stressful Situations (CISS) measures coping 
strategies in adult samples (583). Subjects indicate on a 5-point likert 
scale for 48 statements to which degree these apply to them. The CISS 
assesses three basic coping dimensions: Task-oriented coping (coping by 
altering the situation), emotion-oriented coping (coping by regulating 
emotional distress), and avoidance-oriented coping (coping by distraction 
or seeking other peoples company).
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Figure 11.1: Conditioning-extinction task
Subjects were cue-conditioned to coloured squares. Following a fixation cross, either a blue or yellow 
square was presented serving as conditioned stimuli. During the conditioning part of the experiment one 
of the coloured squares was followed by a transcutaneous electrical shock 33% of the time, the other 
coloured square was never followed by a shock. During the extinction part of the experiment neither 
coloured squares were followed by a shock.
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11.4.3 Conditioning-extinction task
A differential delay conditioning paradigm (Figure 11.1) with partial 
reinforcement was conducted (524-526). Partial reinforcement was 
used to study the gradual development of fear learning, and slow down 
subsequent extinction learning (527, 528). Subjects were told that they 
would see on a computer screen a yellow or blue square while they could 
receive shocks. The level of the shocks was set before the experiment 
to a subjective intensity that was maximally uncomfortable without 
being painful to the subject. The instructions were to pay attention to 
the computer screen and subjects were told that a relationship existed 
between the stimuli and the shocks. The US was an electric shock to the 
fingers (200msec asymetrical biphasic pulse with a pulse width of 250 
μs at 150 Hz.) that co-terminated with the CS+. On a given trial a CS was 
presented for 4 sec, with an 11, 12, or 13 sec inter-trial interval during 
which a fixation cross was presented. During conditioning, one square 
colour was paired with the US on one-third of the trials (CS+), and the 
other colour was never paired with the US (CS-). Thus, during conditioning 
each CS was presented 18 times, out of which 6 CS+ trials were reinforced. 
During extinction each CS was presented 12 times and never paired with a 
shock. Only non-reinforced trials were used for analyses, thus leaving 12 
trials of each stimulus type per task. The order of the different trial types 
was pseudo-randomized so that half of each trial type occurred during the 
first half of the task (Early Phase), whilst the other half of each trial type 
occurred during the second half of the task (Late Phase). The assignment 
of light colour into CS+ and CS- was counterbalanced across subjects. 
The conditioning task was preceded by a habituation phase consisting of 
6 trials, during which each CS type was presented three times. Subjects 
were instructed that no shocks would occur during the habituation phase. 
The habituation phase and conditioning task were separated by a visual 
instruction on a computer screen indicating that the actual task was going 
to start. In between the conditioning and extinction task, subject saw an 
instruction screen informing them on a short (20sec) break after which 
the task would continue in the same manner.
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11.4.4 Skin conductance acquisition
Skin conductance was assessed with Ag/AgCL electrodes attached to the 
subject’s distal phalanges of the index and middle finger of the non-
dominant hand with standard NaCl electrolyte gel. The skin conductance 
signal was amplified using MR compatible BrainAmp MR and BrainAmp 
ExG MR (BrainProducts GmbH) within the MR environment, trough an 
optical cable recorded outside the MR environment using BrainVision 
Recorder software. Data was continuously recorded at 5000 samples per 
second. 
11.4.5 Skin conductance analyses
Skin conductance data was assessed using an in-house analysis 
programme written in Matlab (the MathWorks) and using FieldTrip (529). 
Data was low-pass filtered at 5Hz and resampled to 100Hz. The level of 
skin conductance responses was determined for each trial as the peak-to-
peak amplitude difference in skin conductance of the largest deflection 
in the latency window from 0-8 s after stimulus onset. The raw skin 
conductance responses were square root transformed to normalize the 
distributions.
11.4.6 fMRI
MR data was acquired on a 1.5 T MR scanner (Avanto, Siemens, Medical, 
Erlangen, Germany) equipped with an 32-channel transmit-receiver 
head coil. The manufacturer’s automatic 3D-shimming procedure was 
performed at the beginning of each experiment. Subjects were placed in 
a light head restraint within the scanner to limit head movements during 
acquisition. 
11.4.6.1 Functional image acquisition
Functional images were acquired with gradient echo-planar imaging (EPI) 
sensitive to the blood-oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) response using 
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the following parameters: 32 oblique transverse slices, slice thickness = 
3.5mm, interslice gap = 10%, repetition time (TR) = 2.34s, flip angle α = 
90°, echo times (TE) = 35 ms, (FOV) = 212 x 212 mm2, matrix size 64 x 64, 
fat suppression. 
11.4.6.2 Structural image acquisition
A 3D magnetization-prepared rapid gradient echo (MPRAGE) image was 
acquired for normalization procedures using the following parameters: 
176 slices, slice thickness = 1.0 mm, no slice gap, TR = 2730 ms, TE = 2.95 
ms, FOV = 256 x 256 mm2, matrix = 256x256. 
11.4.6.3 Functional imaging data analyses
11.4.6.4 Preprocessing
fMRI data were processed and analysed using the statistical software 
package SPM8 (Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, London, UK; 
http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). The first 5 EPI volumes were discarded 
to allow for T1 equilibration. The remaining functional images from each 
subject were realigned using a three step coregistration procedure where 
first each subject’s anatomical T1-weighted MR image, and second each 
subjects’ mean-, and weighted functional images were coregistered to the 
MNI 152 T1-template, and third each subject’s anatomical T1-weighted MR 
image was coregistered to the mean functional image using a normalized 
mutual information function. Subsequently, the anatomical T1-weighted 
MR image was segmented. The weighted functional images were spatially 
normalized into a common stereotactic space (MNI 152 T1-template) 
by applying the normalization parameters from the segmentation 
procedure, and resampled to 2x2x2-mm3 isotropic voxels using trilinear 
interpolation. Finally, spatial smoothing was applied with an isotropic 3D 
Gaussian kernel of 8 mm full-width half-maximum.
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11.4.6.5 General statistics
The data were modelled voxel-wise, using a general linear model. Trial-
specific effects were modelled by trains of stick- or boxcar functions 
and convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response basis function 
of SPM8. Additionally, realignment parameters were included to model 
potential movement artefacts. The data were high-pass filtered (cut-
off 128s) to remove low-frequency signal drifts, and a first-order 
autoregressive model was used to model the remaining serial correlations 
(163). Contrast images of testing parameter estimates coding condition-
specific effects were created for each subject. The single-subject contrast 
images were entered into a voxel-wise full factorial model to assess main 
effects of tasks and tasks by genotype interactions, implemented in a 
second-level random effects analysis. We report regions that survive 
cluster-level correction for multiple-comparisons (family-wise error, FWE) 
across the whole brain at p<0.05 using an initial height threshold of p < 
0.001, unless otherwise specified. 
11.4.6.6 Task specific model definitions
For the conditioning-extinction task regressors were created for the CS+ 
and CS- for the habituation, and early and late phase per task. Reinforces 
CS+ trials were separately modelled for the early and late phases of 
each task. In addition, a regressor modelling the occurrence of shocks 
and a regressor modelling the presentation of instructions were added. 
Respective durations of each trial were included in the model. Contrast 
images for each regressor were created against an implicit baseline and 
taken forward to random effects second level analyses.
11.4.7 Procedures
Upon arrival subject washed their hands and their fingers were cleaned 
with rubbing alcohol. Ag/AgCl electrodes filled with standard NaCl 
electrolyte gel were attached to the non-dominant index and middle 
finger with Velcro straps. Subjects underwent a staircase procedure to 
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adjust the strength of electrical shocks in order to determine a level 
where the shock felt maximally uncomfortable, but not painful. SCR 
responses were checked with a Valsava maneuver. Upon receiving 
instructions, the conditioning-extinction task was started during which 
fMRI and SCR data was recorded. Following completion of the study 
subjects were debriefed on the aims and details of the study.
11.5 Results
Here the results of the critical analyses are provided. Full and detailed 
analyses can be found in the Supplementary Information.
11.5.1 Participants
The S’-carriers group and L’L-carriers group did not differ in terms of age 
or STAI-T scores (Table 11.1).
11.5.2 SCR results show that both genotypes develop conditioned 
responses during the conditioning task and lose fear with 
extinction training.
To test for possible baseline differences between genotypes we tested a 
CStype (CS+, CS-) x Trial (1,2,3) with Genotype (S’-carriers, L’L’-carriers) 
as a between subjects variable 2x3x2 repeated measure ANOVA on the 
habituation trials which revealed a main effect of Trial (F
2, 194
 = 12.77, P < 
0.001). Further, A Trial (1,2,3,4,5,6,) x genotype (S’-carriers, L’L’-carriers) 
6x2 repeated measure ANOVA on the responses to the US revealed a 
main effect of Trial (F
1, 97
 = 59.08, P < 0.001), with no other main effect or 
interaction. Thus, there were no baseline differences and no differences 
in response to shock application between genotypes.
For each CS type (CS+, CS-) skin conductance responses were averaged 
over the first half of the trials (Early Phase) or the last half of the trials 
(Late Phase) for each task (Conditioning, Extinction). A Task (Conditioning, 
Extinction) x Phase (Early, Late) x CStype (CS+, CS-) with Genotype (S’-
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carriers, L’L’-carriers) as a between subjects variable 2x2x2x2 repeated 
measure ANOVA revealed a main effect of Task (F
1, 97
 = 31.93, P < 0.001), 
Phase (F
1, 44
 = 43.78, P < 0.001), CStype (F
1, 97
 = 61.83, P < 0.001), and an 
interaction effect of CStype x Phase (F
1, 97
 = 58.72, P < 0.001), Task x Phase 
(F
1, 97
 = 6.82, P = 0.010), Task x CStype (F
1, 97
 = 8.13, P = 0.005) and Task 
x Phase x CStype (F
1, 97
 = 3.91, P = 0.051) with no other main effects or 
interactions (Figure 11.2). Thus, skin conductance responses to the CS+ 
and CS- differ and change over the course of conditioning and extinction 
learning.
To gain further insight into interactions revealed by the ANOVA test, we 
calculated the difference scores in responses to the CS+ and CS- per 
phase for each task per subject. Paired T-tests revealed greater response 
differences in the late phase of conditioning compared to the early phase 
(t(98) = -2.28, P = 0.025). Further, we found a decrease in differential 
conditioned responses from the late phase of conditioning to the late 
phase of extinction (t(98) = 4.72, P < 0.001), although we found no further 
change in differential conditioned responses during the extinction task 
(t(98) = -0.63, P = 0.522). Finally, during all phases of the experiment 
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Figure 11.2: Results skin conductance revealed no effect 5-HTTLPR genotype
Both genotypes developed differential conditioned fear responses during conditioning and showed a sub-
sequent reduction in conditioned fear responses with extinction training. No differences between genotype 
were observed. Left: responses to CS+ and CS- trials are plotted per phase per task for both genotypes. 
Right: Difference scores between responses to CS+ and CS- trials per phase and task for each genotype are 
plotted. S'-carriers (solid bars), L'L'-carriers (open bars), CS+ (red), CS- (blue), Early = average over first 
half of trials of task per CS type, Late = average over second half of trials of task per CS type, error bars 
reflect s.e.m.
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Figure 11.3: Results task on fMRI
fMRI revealed the neural network of fear and safety learning. Activation (CS+ vs CS-, red) of the dMPFC, 
bilateral insula, and midbrain was detected, and a deactivation (CS- vs CS+, blue) of the vMPFC, and visual 
cortex during both conditioning and extinction. Bars indicate T-values of main effects, activation cluster 
are displayed overlaid on selective slices of a template brain, and thresholded at p<0.001. Display view 
follows neurological convention, i.e. right hemisphere is depicted on the right.
subjects showed greater responses to the CS+ than CS- as revealed 
by paired T-tests (Early conditioning: (t(98) = 6.22, P < 0.001; Late 
conditioning: (t(98) = 8.49, P < 0.001; Early extinction: (t(98) = 4.80, P < 
0.001; Late extinction: (t(98) = 5.32, P < 0.001). In conclusion, although 
subjects developed differential conditioned responses over the course of 
conditioning, and showed a reduction of fear responses with extinction 
training, we found no differences in skin conductance responses between 
genotypes.
11.5.3 Genetic variance in 5-HTTLPR is associated with changes 
in differential conditioned responses in the dorsal medial 
prefrontal cortex, bilateral insula and ventral visual cortex
We first tested which brain regions were involved in fear and safety 
memory. Subsequently, we tested how these regions were influenced by 
genetic variance in 5-HTTLPR using orthogonal contrasts. Specifically, 
following previous region of interest analyses in the field (10, 524, 525), 
we extracted data from the regional clusters revealed by comparing CS+ 
trials to the CS- trials for each task. Note, data extraction was limited 
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to those a-prior hypothesized regions that also showed a main effect of 
CStype (CS+, CS-), which were the dMPFC, bilateral insula, visual cortex, 
and vMPFC (Table 11.2, Figure 11.3). For each region of interest we tested 
a Task (Conditioning, Extinction) x Phase (Early, Late) x CStype (CS+, 
CS-) x Genotype (S’-carriers, L’L’-carriers) 2x2x2x2 repeated measure 
ANOVA. Only the highest order interaction with Genotype or main effect 
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Figure 11.4: Results 5-HTTLPR genotype effects on fMRI
5-HTTLPR genotype affects the neural network of extinction learning. Results of analyses on the extracted 
data for regions that exhibited effects of 5-HTTLPR genotype are plotted. S'-carriers (solid bars), L'L'-car-
riers (open bars), CS+ (red), CS- (blue), Early = average over the first half of the trials, Late = average over 
second half of the trials, errorbars reflect s.e.m.
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of Genotype are provided here, all other significant main effects and 
interactions can be found in Table 11.3.
The effect of genetic variance in 5-HTTLPR on the dorsal medial 
prefrontal cortex and bilateral insula followed a similar pattern. Following 
up the Task x CStype x Genotype interaction in the dMPFC (F
1, 96
 = 15.54, P 
< 0.001), right insula (F
1, 96
 = 15.54, P < 0.001), and left insula (F
1, 96
 = 16.10, 
P < 0.001), we calculated for each task the difference in responses to CS+ 
and CS- trials over both phases for each subject and subsequent one-way 
ANOVAs revealed greater differential responses in the S’-carriers during 
conditioning in the dMPFC (F
1, 97
 = 12.96, P = 0.001), right insula (F
1, 97
 = 
19.60, P < 0.001), and left insula (F
1, 97
 = 15.74, P < 0.001), but not during 
extinction in the dMPFC (F
1, 97
 = 2.49, P = 0.118), right insula (F
1, 97
 = 0.49, 
P = 0.486), and left insula (F
1, 97
 = 1.47, P = 0.228). Following up on these 
findings, we calculated for each task the average in responses to CS+ and 
CS- trials over both phases for each subject and subsequent independent 
samples T-tests revealed greater responses to the CS- during conditioning 
in the L’L’-carriers in the dMPFC (t(97) = -2.68, P = 0.009; Mean S’-
carriers: 0.13, s.e.m.: 0.03; L’L’-carriers mean: 0.28, s.e.m.: 0.06), right 
insula (t(97) = -4.09, P < 0.001; Mean S’-carriers: 0.12, s.e.m.: 0.03; L’L’-
carriers mean: 0.34, s.e.m.: 0.04), and left insula (t(97) = -3.59, P = 0.001; 
Mean S’-carriers: 0.07, s.e.m.: 0.02; L’L’-carriers mean: 0.18, s.e.m.: 0.03). 
Thus, S’-carriers showed greater differential conditioned fear responses 
in the dMPFC and bilateral insula, but this appeared due to L’L’-carriers 
showing greater responses during conditioning to the CS- (Figure 11.4).
Following up the Task x CStype x Genotype interaction in the visual 
cortex (F1, 97 = 5.03, P = 0.027), we calculated for each task the difference 
in responses to CS+ and CS- trials over both phases for each subject 
and subsequent one-way ANOVAs revealed no difference in differential 
responses during conditioning (F
1, 97
 = 1.58, P = 0.21), but greater 
differential responses in the S’-carriers during extinction at trend (F
1, 97
 = 
3.02, P = 0.085). Following up on this finding, we calculated for each task 
the average in responses to CS+ and CS- trials over both phases for each 
subject and subsequent independent samples T-tests revealed greater 
262
responses to the CS+ during extinction in the L’L’-carriers (t(97) = -3.79, 
P < 0.001; Mean S’-carriers: 0.08, s.e.m.: 0.03; L’L’-carriers mean: 0.28, 
s.e.m.: 0.05), and increased responses to the CS- at trend (t(97) = -1.76, 
P < 0.001; Mean S’-carriers: 0.26, s.e.m.: 0.03; L’L’-carriers mean: 0.36, 
s.e.m.: 0.05). Finally, following up the main effect of Genotype (F1, 97 = 
8.45, P = 0.005) we calculated the average response across conditions 
and a independent samples t-test revealed increased responses in the 
L’L’-carriers (t(97) = -2.91, P = 0.005; Mean S’-carriers: 0.24, s.e.m.: 0.02; 
L’L’-carriers mean: 0.36, s.e.m.: 0.04). In conclusion, S’-carriers showed 
greater differential conditioned responses in the visual cortex during 
extinction, but this effect appears due to greater responses to the CS+ 
during extinction in L’L’-carriers. Additionally, the L’L’-carriers displayed 
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Figure 11.5: Correlations BOLD fMRI and SCR
Activity in brain regions that showed effects of 5-HTTLPR genotype correlated with skin conductance 
responses. The differential response (CS+ - CS-) BOLD fMRI response in the dorsal mPFC, right insula, left 
insula, thalamus, and supramarginal gyrus correlated with the differential SCR response during the early 
and late phase of conditioning. For the right insula, left insula, and thalamus we also observed a correla-
tion during the late phase of extinction.
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greater responses across the experiment (Figure 11.4). For the vMPFC we 
found no interaction with genotype.
11.5.4 Bold fMRI - SCR correlation results
We found clear differences in neural functioning of the dMPFC, bilateral 
insula, and the visual cortex as determined by 5-HTTLPR genotype. 
The dMPFC and sensory cortex have been implicated as storage sites 
for fear memory (518, 535-538, 584), where the former has also been 
associated with fear expression (535-538). In contrast the insula has 
been suggested to play a role in the interoceptive awareness of visceral 
responses that lead to subjective feeling states. Despite an absence of 
genotype on behaviour we were interested in examining the relationship 
between neural functioning and behaviour and possible differences 
between genotypes. Therefore, we determined whether changes in brain 
function could be associated with changes in behaviour, and might have 
differential relations between genotypes. We correlated the difference 
in SCR scores to CS+ and CS- trials with the difference in BOLD fMRI 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
-1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1
differential BOLD
Ta
sk
-d
ire
ct
ed
 c
op
in
g 
sc
or
e
S'-carriers
L'L’-carriers
Figure 11.6: 5-HTTLPR genotype determined correlation ventral visual BOLD fMRI and Task-directed coping 
score 
Differential visual cortex activity correlated with the Coping Inventory for Stressful Situation scores during 
the late phase of conditioning. Moreover, the S'-carriers showed a greater negative correlation than the 
L'L'-carriers.
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responses to CS+ and CS- trials from the regions of interest that showed 
effects of genotype per phase (Figure 11.5).
For the dMPFC we found a correlation between SCR responses and neural 
responses during the early phase of conditioning (r
s
 = 0.30, P = 0.002), 
and during the late phase of conditioning (r
s
 = 0.30, P = 0.003), but no 
correlations during extinction. Next, for the right insula we report a 
correlation between SCR responses and neural responses during the 
early phase of conditioning (r
s
 = 0.33, P = 0.001), and during the late 
phase of conditioning (r
s
 = 0.39, P < 0.001), during the early phase of 
extinction at trend (r
s
 = 0.17, P = 0.099), and during the late phase of 
extinction (r
s
 = 0.26, P = 0.010). Additionally, for the left insula we found 
a correlation between SCR responses and neural responses during the 
early phase of conditioning (r
s
 = 0.26, P = 0.009), and during the late 
phase of conditioning (r
s
 = 0.21, P = 0.039), but only during the late phase 
of extinction (r
s
 = 0.26, P = 0.010). Interestingly, for the visual cortex we 
observed no correlations between SCR responses and neural responses. 
Thus, neural responses in the dMPFC and bilateral insula that were 
determined by 5-HTTLPR genotype showed a positive relationship with 
SCR, whereas neural responses in the visual cortex did not. Moreover, we 
observed no differences in the BOLD fMRI and SCR relationship between 
genotypes (using Fisher’s z transformation).
11.5.5 Relationship between task-directed coping and neural 
responses in the visual cortex is determined by 5-HTTLPR 
genotype
The visual cortex showed reduced activity in response to CS+ trials 
compared to CS- trials. The differential responses in the visual cortex 
did not, however, show a relationship with fear reflected in SCR. One 
hypothesis could be that subjects diverted attention away from the CS+ 
resulting in decreased activation in the visual cortex. Therefore, we 
correlated the differential visual cortex activity with the Coping Inventory 
for Stressful Situation scores and found that higher task-directed coping 
scores were correlated with less differences in visual cortical activations 
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during the Late Phase of conditioning (r
s
 = -0.29, P = 0.003). Interestingly, 
the S’-carriers showed a greater negative correlation (r
s
 = -0.42, P < 
0.001) than the L’L’-carriers (r
s
 = -0.04, P = 0.852) as revealed by Fisher’s 
z transformation at trend (Z = -1.8, P = 0.075). Interestingly, we found 
no group differences in terms of CISS scores, but task-directed coping 
scores did correlate with differential SCR responses during the late phase 
of conditioning at trend (r
s
 = -0.17, P = 0.078). Thus, higher task-directed 
coping scores were associated with reduced differential neural responses 
in the visual cortex and this correlation was greater in ‘S-carriers. 
Furthermore, higher task-directed coping scores were associated with 
smaller differential SCR.
11.6 Discussion
In this study we show that a genetic variation in the serotonin 
transported-linked polymorphic region (5-HTTLPR) that has been 
associated with increased vulnerability to anxiety and depressive 
disorders (558-562) modulates functioning of the neural network that 
supports fear and safety learning.
Although we found that both S’-carriers and L’L’-carriers acquired 
conditioned fear and extinguish fear as measured by skin conductance 
responses, we found no differences between genotypes. This finding is in 
line with previous reports (569), but conflicts with others (572, 573). The 
skin conductance response is a highly variable measure of sympathetic 
fear responses, yet fear is a multidimensional emotion of which not all 
dimensions may be reflected in SCR analyses. Therefore, we further 
analysed possible genotype effects on neural activity despite an absence 
of genotype effects on behaviour. We found clear differences in neural 
functioning of the dMPFC, bilateral insula, thalamus, supramarginal 
gyrus, and the visual cortex as determined by 5-HTTLPR genotype. 
For the dMPFC and bilateral insula we observed greater differential 
responses during conditioning which appeared attributable to greater 
responses to the CS- during conditioning in the L’L’-carriers, in line with 
previous findings (568, 572, 573). The dMPFC is considered to be the 
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human homologue of the rodent prelimbic cortex (303, 304), which has 
been suggested to be a memory storage site that drives the sustained 
expression of conditioned fear responses (535-538). As differential 
conditioning was largely driven by a reduction in responses to the CS- 
over time, it appears that S’-carriers more rapidly acquired differential 
conditioned fear responses in an area critical for the expression and 
retention of fear. The insula has been implicated in the anticipation 
of aversive stimuli (17), with the introceptive awareness of visceral 
responses (18, 19), and subjective feeling states (20). Greater differential 
conditioned responses in the S’-carriers may thus imply a greater 
degree of subjective experienced fear. In line with a possible role for 
the dMPFC in the expression of fear and the insula in the interoceptive 
awareness of visceral responses that lead to subjective feeling states we 
found correlations between neural responses in these regions and skin 
conductance responses.
A different pattern was observed for the visual cortex where greater 
differential responses during extinction in the S’-carriers were observed 
which appeared due to greater responses to the CS+ in the L’L’-carriers 
during extinction. Furthermore, the L’-L’-carries showed a general 
increase in visual cortical responses across the tasks. Sensory cortices 
have been implicated as long-term storage sites for fear memory (518, 
585), where sparse coding of memory representation has been observed 
(575) that could explain the relative deactivation in BOLD signal. 
Moreover, heightening serotonin level by pharmacological treatment has 
been found to increase plasticity in sensory cortices during extinction 
learning (574). Again, this suggests that genetic variance in 5-HTTLPR 
modulated the formation of long-term fear memories. Interestingly 
enough we found no relation between neural visual cortical responses 
and skin conductance responses, suggesting no direct involvement of 
the visual cortex in fear expression, at least not at short time intervals. 
However, we did find a relation between task-directed coping strategies 
and visual cortical responses, suggesting that differences in coping 
strategies and 5-HTTLP genetic variance could contribute to individual 
differences in fear and safety learning.
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Throughout several regions of the neural network that supports fear and 
safety learning we found faster acquisition of conditioned fear responses 
in the S’-carriers that only arises in L’-L’ carriers later on. This finding 
is in line with the suggestion that 5-HTTLPR genotype determines the 
rate of adaptive behaviour where S’-carriers are thought to adapt more 
rapidly to a changing environment and hence exhibit faster learning 
(586). An impaired adaptation to a safe environment during extinction 
learning has been observed in posttraumatic stress disorder (21), and 
in 5HTT knock-out mice (587). This suggests that there may be inter-
individual differences determined by 5-HTTLPR variation in the efficacy 
of psychotherapy treatments that are based on extinction learning, 
such as exposure therapy. Interestingly, recent work on a different 
polymorphism in the serotonin transporter showed that a specific variant 
of this polymorphism is associated with impaired extinction retention, 
but critically that this impairment could be reversed by pharmacological 
treatment aimed at increasing serotonergic transmission (588). Again 
indicating that variants in genotypes related to serotonergic signalling 
may determine efficacy of specific treatments.
Our results indicate that 5-HTTLPR modulates emotional learning 
providing a possible mechanism for 5-HTTLPR contribution to 
susceptibility to affective disorders. However, a limitation of our study is 
that we only included men, whereas a recent study showed that 5-HTTLPR 
genotype and sex may interact (589). Furthermore, several studies 
have indicated an interaction between 5-HTTLPR and (early) life stress 
(570, 572, 573, 589), an issue not investigated here. Nevertheless, our 
findings contribute to the development of a mechanistic understanding 
of the neural processes that underlie individual susceptibility to anxiety 
and mood disorders, and the development of optimized treatments for 
specific individuals.
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12.1 General conclusion
The intrusive memories in the form of flashbacks that patients like Ben 
experience are highly disturbing and disabling. Despite intensive research 
optimal treatments for affective disorders are lacking. This thesis has 
tried to contribute to a greater fundamental understanding of the neural 
mechanisms that underlie emotional memory and contribute to the 
aetiology and persistence of affective disorders, PTSD in particular, and 
to investigate novel methods to alter memories for emotional experiences 
that hopefully open up novel avenues for the development of optimized 
treatment.
To end this thesis a summary of the findings of the reported studies will 
be provided. Next, an extension of the classical view of memory formation 
and the dominant model of emotional memory will be provided. 
Hereafter, limitations and peculiarities of the work in this thesis will be 
discussed, open questions for future research will be presented, and 
finally the story of this thesis will come to an end.
12.2 Summary of findings
The aim of this thesis was to provide insight into the neural mechanisms 
that underlie emotional memory and contribute to the aetiology and 
persistence of affective disorders, presents evidence for the ability 
to alter memory for emotional experiences and to contribute to the 
development of novel strategies to optimize treatment of affective 
disorders. Here a summary of the findings of the studies in presented in 
this thesis is provided that will come to form the bases of the extension 
of the classical view of memory formation, and the dominant model of 
emotional memory.
The first chapters (Chapter 2-4) of this dissertation describe structural 
and functional brain abnormalities in PTSD and depression patients 
in regions implicated in memory and emotion regulation, specifically 
related to re-experiencing traumatic events from memory during so-
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called flashback episodes. Next, we went on to show that food targeted 
to increase central serotonergic signalling lifts mood and affects 
mood-regulating neurocircuits (Chapter 5). Although the alleviation of 
psychiatric symptoms is beneficial, it does leave patients susceptible 
to relapse, as it does not alter emotional memories that contribute to 
the aetiology and persistence of affective disorder. It is therefore of 
considerable interest to permanently alter or even erasing memory 
for traumatic experiences, but this requires an understanding of the 
mechanisms that allow alteration of memory. A description of the 
dynamics of the neural system that enables adaptive and flexible 
memories (Chapter 6) provides insights into the mechanisms that 
contribute to flexible memory, including systems consolidation, sleep, 
schema consolidation, and reconsolidation, and provide hints at 
opportunities to alter memory. We first focussed our studies on the 
reconsolidation hypothesis, which postulates that upon reactivation, 
memory traces return to a labile state and are once again susceptible to 
disruption and require restabilization to be maintained. Evidence shows 
that (emotional) episodic memories can indeed be permanently altered 
upon reactivation in humans in line with a reconsolidation mechanism 
(Chapter 7 & 8). Furthermore treatment of affective disorders may be 
optimized by the combination of psychotherapy and pharmacology. The 
use of noradrenergic antagonists was found to abolish episodic memory 
enhancement for emotional experiences, and this memory decrement 
was found to persist one day later in the absence of drug (Chapter 9). 
However, single reactivation of emotional memory is hard to control in 
clinical settings and most psychotherapy methods incorporate methods in 
which patients are repeatedly required to retrieve memories of emotional 
experiences and actively learn to reduce fear responses and rely on 
extinction learning mechanisms. Noradrenergic antagonists may however 
impair consolidation of extinction. yet, administration of a single dose 
of a noradrenergic antagonist prior to extinction eliminated differential 
fear responses during extinction learning, caused the loss of fear and 
prevented the return of fear one day later in the absence of drug (Chapter 
10). This phenomenon was mirrored by specific alterations in the neural 
network of fear and safety learning. Finally optimization of treatment 
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may be obtained by increased understanding of vulnerability factors 
such as genetic variations on brain functioning as this holds the promise 
to tailor psychiatric treatment to individual needs. Genetic variation in 
the serotonin transported-linked polymorphic region (5-HTTLPR) that 
has been associated with anxiety and depressive disorders, was found to 
determine functioning of the neural network of fear and safety learning, 
and contributes to an understanding of the neural mechanisms underlying 
increase vulnerability to anxiety disorders (Chapter 11).
In summary, the results of the studies presented in this thesis show 
extended brain abnormalities in patients with affective disorders in the 
neural network that supports emotional memory. A theoretical overview 
of the dynamic neural systems that support adaptive and flexible 
memories highlights possible mechanisms that would allow the alteration 
of memory for such emotional experiences. Subsequently, evidence for 
the occurrence of reconsolidation of episodic memories in humans is 
provided. In addition, the results of the subsequent studies highlight 
that interventions with the noradrenergic system can cause a sustained 
loss of memory for emotional experiences and differentially modulates 
the dynamic neural network that support emotional memory. Finally, 
our results reveal a critical role for serotonin in the neural network of 
emotional memory. These results considerably advance the field, and 
in the next paragraph a discussion is provided that highlight how these 
results contribute to the extension of the classical view on memory 
formation, and lead to an innovative neural model of emotional memory.
12.3 An extended view of memory formation and neural model of 
emotional memory
12.3.1 Extending the classical view on memory formation
The classical view on memory formation states that information is 
initially encoded and labile but stabilizes over time during a process 
known as consolidation. Subsequently, memories can be retrieved but are 
considered to remain stable and stored, insensitive to further alterations. 
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The work presented in this thesis contributes to an extension of this 
view on memory formation by showing that memories are flexible and 
adaptive (Figure 12.1A). Upon retrieval the reactivation of a memory 
trace may render it instable and require restabilization in accordance 
with the reconsolidation hypothesis ((50, 400, 413); Chapters 7 and 8). 
In addition, upon retrieval a novel memory may be formed that includes 
a combination of the retrieved memory and the incoming sensory 
information at the time of retrieval, known as secondary encoding ((319); 
Chapters 9 and 10). Furthermore, at the time of retrieval a novel memory 
trace may be formed due to new learning that can theoretically be fully 
independent of the retrieved information. Extinction may be such an 
instant where a novel independent memory trace is created that may 
come to compete with an earlier fear memory during retrieval at a later 
point in time ((541, 590); Chapters 10 and 11). The relative independence 
of an extinction or safety memory from a fear memory is evidenced by 
the finding that a safety memory trace may also be created prior to the 
formation of a fear memory, such as in latent inhibition (591, 592). We 
thus contribute to an extension of the classical view on memory formation 
by including the processes of reconsolidation, secondary encoding, and 
new learning that may occur upon memory retrieval. Next, an innovative 
neural model of emotional memory for the extended view on memory 
formation will be provided.
12.3.2 Extending the neural model of emotional memory
12.3.2.1 The dominant neural model: encoding and consolidation
The dominant model on emotional memory considers the amygdala to 
be a critical site of plasticity for associative fear learning at the time of 
encoding (Figure 12.1B). In addition, the amygdala and noradrenaline 
release form the locus coeruleus increase processing in sensory regions 
(34-36) and the hippocampus is important for the formation of contextual 
and episodic memory. Furthermore, the amygdala is considered to 
strengthen contextual and episodic memory by upregulating neural 
excitability and plasticity in the hippocampus through a beta-adrenergic 
276
encoding consolidation retrieval
new learning
secondary encoding
reconsolidation
information
B: encoding C: consolidation
A
D: retrieval
E: reconsolidation
fear responses
Hippocampus
Contextual 
information
Amygdala
Salience & 
Aquisition
Locus 
coeruleus
NE modulation
dmPFC
Storage/
Excitation
F: secondary encoding G: extinction
fear responses
Hippocampus
Contextual 
information
Amygdala
Salience & 
Aquisition
Locus coeru-
leus
NE modulation
dmPFC
Storage/
Excitation
fear responses
Hippocampus
Contextual 
information
Amygdala
Salience & 
Aquisition
Sensory cortex
Perception
Locus coeru-
leus
NE modulation
fear responses
Hippocampus
Contextual 
information
Amygdala
Salience & 
Aquisition
Locus coeru-
leus
NE modulation
fear responses
Hippocampus
Contextual 
information
Amygdala
Salience & 
Aquisition
Locus 
coeruleus
NE modulation
dmPFC
Storage/
Excitation
fear responses
vmPFC
Inhibition
Hippocampus
Contextual 
information
Amygdala
Salience & 
Aquisition
Locus 
coeruleus
NE modulation
dmPFC
Storage/
Excitation
Raphe nucleus
5HT modulation
fear responses
vmPFC
Inhibition
Hippocampus
Contextual in-
formation
Amygdala
Salience & Aqui-
sition
Sensory cortex
Perception
Locus coer-
uleus
NE modulation
dmPFC
Storage/
Excitation
Raphe nucleus
5HT modulation
Insula
Introceptive 
awareness
H: More complete model
277
12. general discussion
mechanism during consolidation (Figure 12.1C). Beyond this dominant 
model the neural mechanisms that contribute to additional memory 
processes of emotional memory are being uncovered.
Here a model neural network that supports emotional memory retrieval, 
reconsolidation, secondary encoding, and extinction will be presented.
12.3.2.2 Retrieval
First the neural model on emotional memory will be extended to include 
retrieval (Figure 12.1D). The amygdala has been found to be important to 
the retrieval of emotional memory (487, 489, 492, 502, 504-506, 546) and 
amygdala-hippocampal connectivity has been found to increase during 
retrieval (488, 503). In addition, the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex 
(dmPFC) is considered to be important to the retrieval and expression 
of emotional memory (535, 537, 593, 594). Furthermore, noradrenergic 
modulation originating from the locus coeruleus supports memory 
retrieval (484, 492). The work presented in this thesis contributes to 
our understanding of retrieval of emotional memories by showing that 
the dmPFC contributes to the retrieval of emotional memory and is 
subject to beta-adrenergic modulation most likely originating from the 
locus coeruleus (Chapters 9 and 10). The dmPFC is an optimal candidate 
to support a retrieval function. Amygdala firing rate responses to 
conditioned stimuli are short lived (~50 -500 msec) (595) and may initiate 
emotional responses but do not sustain the response. The dmPFC receives 
inputs and projects back to the amygdala, the hippocampus and midbrain 
regions (596-602), and shows sustained firing rate responses throughout 
Figure 12.1: Extended view on memory formation and neural model of emotional memory.
A) An extension of the classical view on memory formation includes reconsolidation, secondary encoding, 
and new learning. B) Neural model for emotional memory. Per memory function or stage critical regions 
and connections are indicated. Dashed lines indicate neuromodulatory connections. Thicker lines and 
dashed circles around regions indicate effects as shown in work presented in this thesis. C) A more com-
plete neural model of emotional memory includes many regions and different memory functions will arise 
from dynamic interactions between these regions.
278
the entire presentation time of conditioned stimuli which is associated 
with emotional responses (594). The dmPFC thus appears to play a 
pivotal role in the retrieval and expression of emotional memory. Having 
identified regions involved in retrieval of emotional memories next we will 
turn to the neural network involved in reconsolidation.
12.3.2.3 Reconsolidation
Evidence for reconsolidation was first obtained by blocking protein 
synthesis upon memory reactivation in the amygdala (50, 400), indicating 
a role for the amygdala in reconsolidation (Figure 12.1E). Subsequently, 
the hippocampus was found to be involved in the reconsolidation of 
context-dependent memories (401, 603-607). In addition a role for the 
dmPFC in reconsolidation has been detected (608-610). Furthermore, 
blocking noradrenaline in the amygdala or hippocampus can disrupt 
memories following reactivation (401, 515, 542, 606, 609-611). This 
suggests that reconsolidation may occur in all these regions and is 
modulated by noradrenaline. Whether a brain region is involved in the 
reconsolidation of a particular memory is determined by the dependency 
of the memory on that region. In addition, differences between regions, 
and in the dependency of memories on interregional connectivity may 
determine sensitivity to reconsolidation disturbances (Chapter 6). The 
work presented in this thesis has contributed to advancement in the 
understanding of reconsolidation, and has suggested an interaction 
between the amygdala, hippocampus and noradrenergic system during 
reconsolidation (Chapter 6, 7, 8, and 9). Next, the neural network that 
supports secondary encoding of emotional memories will be discussed.
12.3.2.4 Secondary encoding
Secondary encoding is the process whereby during every retrieval 
episode, retrieved mnemonic information, together with incoming sensory 
information, is stored as a novel memory trace (319). This results in the 
accumulation of multiple, related, mnemonic traces of a single episode 
within a slightly altered neuronal and experiential context, which together 
279
12. general discussion
aid the retrieval of an episode (319). In Chapter 9 it has been suggested 
that blocking enhanced recall of emotional stimuli with propranolol may 
prevent formation of a novel emotional memory trace, expressed as 
absent emotional memory enhancement on the next day. Considering that 
the task is known to involve the amygdala and hippocampus at encoding, 
this suggests an interaction between these regions and noradrenaline 
during secondary encoding. Indeed, a subsequent imaging study using 
a similar design showed involvement of the amygdala and hippocampus 
to be modulated by noradrenaline at the time of secondary encoding 
(471). The idea that during secondary encoding the retrieved mnemonic 
information becomes stored together with the experiential context at the 
time of retrieval predicts the involvement of the hippocampus. Evidence 
for this is provided in Chapter 10, where safety learning in a novel context 
is accompanied by hippocampal responses to the context presentation 
itself during retrieval, and subsequently this hippocampal involvement is 
detected during presentation of conditioned stimuli one day later, which 
correlates with the absence of fear. Noradrenaline was found to modulate 
the hippocampal involvement, and eventually lead to altered responses 
in the dmPFC (Chapter 10). Alternatively, the hippocampal involvement 
may reflect new learning (see below). In summary, this suggests that the 
amygdala, hippocampus, and dmPFC are involved in secondary encoding 
and under modulation of noradrenaline (Figure 12.1F). Finally, the neural 
network that underlies extinction will be discussed.
12.3.2.5 New learning: Extinction
At the time of retrieval a novel memory trace may be formed due to new 
learning that is independent of the retrieved memory trace. Extinction 
may be such an instance where a novel safety memory is created that 
is stored independent of a fear memory but may compete with it for 
expression. Here the neural network that supports extinction memory is 
described (Figure 12.1G).
The amygdala projects to the hippocampus, ventral- and dorsal mPFC, 
and locus coeruleus and in turn receives afferent inputs from the same 
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regions (598, 612-616). The hippocampus projects to the amygdala, 
vmPFC and dmPFC where the projections to the dmPFC appear to be 
inhibitory (334, 613, 616-618). The dmPFC and vmPFC are reciprocally 
connected, but the projections from the vmPFC to the dmPFC are likely 
inhibitory (619). Further, the dmPFC and vmPFC both project to the 
hypothalamus and monoaminergic nuclei in the brainstem (34, 614, 
620-623), these latter connections are significant in that the vmPFC 
and dmPFC are the only neocortical regions in a position to exert 
control over neuromodulatory systems in the brainstem. In addition the 
locus coeruleus projects to wide spread regions of the neocortex, the 
hippocampus and amygdala (624). The connectivity of this neural network 
supports fear and safety learning.
Simple associative fear memories as formed during conditioning 
critically rely on plasticity within the amygdala (5, 625-628). Contextual 
information on the relative danger or safety of a stimulus in a given 
environment is co-provided by the hippocampus (12, 518, 541, 629). 
As discussed above, the dmPFC is thought to support the retrieval and 
sustained expression of fear memories (594). Upon extinction learning 
the vmPFC is considered to come to inhibit the output of the amygdala 
(12, 518, 602, 629, 630) by projecting to the GABA-ergic intercalated cells 
of the amygdala (631). The work presented in this thesis directly shows 
the involvement of the vmPFC, dmPFC, and hippocampus in extinction 
(Chapter 10, 11). Indeed the vmPFC appears to function as a safety signal 
inhibiting fear, the dmPFC to relate to the expression of fear, and the 
hippocampus to provide a contextual safety signal. The novelty of the 
presented work highlights a role for noradrenaline in modulating dmPFC 
and hippocampus involvement in fear and safety learning (Chapter 
10). In addition the work in this thesis extends understanding of the 
neural network of fear and safety learning by determining a modulatory 
influence of serotonin on dmPFC, insula, and sensory cortical functioning 
(latter two not depicted in Figure 12.1G for simplicity).  These findings 
add to earlier work showing modulation of the dmPFC and vmPFC 
by noradrenaline (514, 519, 542), and effects of serotonin on vmPFC-
amygdala connectivity related to fear and safety learning (570).
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To conclude, an extensive neural network supports fear and safety 
learning as revealed by studies on extinction, and this network is critically 
modulated by noradrenaline and serotonin. yet, the neural network 
underlying emotional memory is more complex than so far described.
12.3.2.6 Conclusion on the extended neural model of emotional memory
Here an extension of the classical view on memory formation and an 
innovative neural model of emotional memory have been provided. In 
doing so hopes are to increase understanding of the neural mechanisms 
that underlie emotional memory. yet some notes are required.
In reality, the processes that support memory are not easily captured in 
boxes and psychological terminology such as in Figure 12.1A. Memory 
arises from the dynamic and complex system that is the brain (Chapter 
6) and mnemonic processes will occur iteratively in high temporal 
resolution, and distinct process may even occur simultaneously in 
different regions of the brain. A more full depiction of the so far 
described neural network underlying emotional memory is provided in 
Figure 12.1H. Different memory functions will arise through dynamic 
interactions between these regions and neuromodulators may affect 
the state of the network and govern emotional memory. A model such 
as Figure 12.1H is necessarily a simplification and in this case excludes 
regions important for emotional memory that have been outside of 
the scope of this discussion. It will be a significant challenge for future 
research to come to a more complete description and understanding of 
the full dynamics of the neural network that supports emotional memory.
In conclusion, regardless of possible limitations, the models described 
in Figure 12.1 could aid in understanding the relative contributions of 
different regions within the neural network of emotional memory and 
provide insight into the neural mechanisms that underlie affective 
disorders.
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12.4 Overlap brain regions
Investigating overlap between the neural network underlying emotional 
memory and the brain abnormalities in affective disorders could 
provide insight into the mechanism that contributes to the aetiology and 
persistence of these disorders.
Striking overlap exists in brain structures (Figure 12.2) that display 
structural abnormalities in PTSD and depression (Chapter 2), where neural 
responses are affected by propranolol administration prior to extinction 
learning (Chapter 10), affected by serotonin enhancement during 
instructed fear (Chapter 5), and determined by 5-HTTLPR genotype during 
conditioning-extinction (Chapter 11). The overlap pertains particularly to 
the dmPFC and the bilateral insula. Both regions have been reported to 
display altered functioning in patients with affective disorders that can 
restore their functionality following effective treatment (3). The dmPFC 
has been associated with fear memory storage and expression (535-538), 
with integration of cognitive information and motor output (205), and 
with cognitive control over emotional responses (14). Similarly, the insula 
has been implicated in pain perception (16), the anticipation of aversive 
stimuli (17), with the introceptive awareness of visceral responses (18, 
19), and subjective feeling states (20). Despite initial investigations into 
the mechanistic processes supported by the dmPFC (537, 538), to date 
little is known about the functional role of this region in  fear and safety 
learning, and its contribution to affective disorders. Even less is known 
about the mechanistic role of the insula. Increasing understanding of the 
contributions of these regions to fear and safety learning is critical and 
could contribute to understanding individual differences in symptoms and 
sensitivity to specific treatments.
To conclude, investigating the overlap between the neural network of 
emotional memory (Figure 12.1) and the brain abnormalities observed in 
affective disorders highlight contributions of the dmPFC and insula in the 
aetiology and persistence of affective disorders. Increasing understanding 
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of the contribution of these regions to emotional memory and affective 
disorders will be of considerable interest for future studies.
12.5 Integrating neuromodulatory function.
In this thesis the functional role of several neuromodulators has been 
studied, namely noradrenaline (Chapter 9, 10), serotonin (Chapter 5, 
11), and to some extend dopamine (Chapter 5). Unlike direct synaptic 
transmission (through the neurotransmitters glutamate, y-aminobutyric 
acid, and glycine) where neurotransmitter release from one presynaptic 
site targets one postsynaptic site, neuromodulators are released by a 
small group of cells and diffuse through larger areas affecting multiple 
neurons, and ‘modulate’ the direct synaptic transmission. Here theories 
on the functional role of noradrenaline, and a theory on the functional 
interactions between serotonin and dopamine will briefly be presented, 
and a proposal of integration between these neuromodulators will be put 
forward.
Classically noradrenaline has been associated with arousal and been 
proposed to set the gain of activation in the neural network (632-
634). However, these theories do not account for the observation 
that intermediate levels of noradrenaline are optimal for behaviour, 
Left Right
Insula dMPFC Insula
Figure 12.2: Brain regions that show volumetric changes in PTSD and depression are involved in fear learn-
ing and expression and affected by noradrenergic and serotonergic treatments.
Overlap exists between brain structures found to be volumetrically different between PTSD and depres-
sion patients compared to healthy controls (Purple), that are affected by serotonergic treatment during 
instructed fear (Blue), affected by noradrenergic antagonists during fear extinction (Red), or affected by 
genetic variations affecting serotonergic neurotransmission (Green). Structural alterations and neural 
activation clusters are displayed overlaid on selective sagittal slices of a template brain, and tresholded at 
p<0.001.
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according to the yerkes-Dodson law, and do not reflect stimulus-specific 
phasic responses of locus coeruleus neurons (34, 635). A prominent 
theory of the function of noradrenaline suggests that phasic and tonic 
responses by locus coeruleus neurons serve different, yet interacting, 
functions largely based on studies on stimulus detection (34). Phasic 
locus coeruleus responses are driven by outcome of task-related decision 
processes and facilitate ensuing behaviour. The idea here is that as 
evidence for decision options are collected in a layer of the neural 
network, and activity within a layer of the network crosses a critical 
threshold, locus coeruleus responses are triggered that drive neural 
processing in downstream layers towards the direction of the decision 
(34). Thus, phasic locus coeruleus responses may upregulate processing 
of relevant stimuli. In concordance with this suggestion we observe 
that processing of salient stimuli and memory formation are affected 
by propranolol which would have its greatest effect on postsynaptic 
phasic responses (Chapter 9 and 10) Alternatively, during periods of 
high tonic state of locus coeruleus activity a reduction in the ability to 
discriminate stimuli is observed reflecting a disengagement from the 
task and a search for alternative behavioural options (34). Together this 
suggests that tonic locus coeruleus activity serves as a gain function 
where phasic responses can facilitate task related performance, but 
increased tonic activation causes the system to become hyper-responsive 
to any stimulus initiating switching behaviour (636). Thus, interactions 
between the tonic and phasic responses of locus coeruleus neurons 
may determine whether the neural system exploits optimal processing 
of stimuli of high utility, or explores alternative options when utility of 
task-relevant stimuli are low (34, 624, 637, 638) Indeed locus coeruleus 
responses are generally observed prior to behavioural switches, and 
track changes in contingencies prior to behavioural adaptation (624). 
Building on the proposal that noradrenaline plays a role in optimizing 
neural decision processing according to stimulus utility, noradrenergic 
locus coeruleus activity may drive gross network reorganization and 
promote rapid network plasticity (175, 624), possibly driving the 
formation of novel neural ensembles associated with behavioural 
adaptation. In concordance, we observe noradrenergic dependent 
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changes in multiple regions that are part of the neural network of fear 
and safety learning (Chapter 10). Interestingly, locus coeruleus neurons 
do not appear to reflect stimulus valance or respond to the relative 
outcome of a situations, and hence, the relative evaluation of the stimulus 
utility changes over time are likely determined by different systems. 
One possibility than is that locus coeruleus responses are governed by 
prefrontal cortical inputs where reward and cost outcomes of on-going 
behaviour are evaluated (34, 624), that may depend on an integration of 
serotonergic and dopaminergic signals which will be discussed next.
Interestingly, a recent theory integrating serotonin and dopamine 
function also emphasizes different contributions of the relative tonic and 
phasic responses of these neuromodulators (191). Classically dopamine 
has been associated with positive affect (reward) and behavioural 
activation (vigour), whereas serotonin has been associated with negative 
affect (aversion) and behavioural inhibition (inactivation). Cools and co-
workers (2011) extent upon an earlier proposal on the role of dopamine 
that posits that the control of behavioural activation is a problem of 
trading off the cost (energetic) and benefits (faster reward gathering) 
over time (639). Thus, when rewards are frequently available, behaviour 
is sped up, but if rewards are infrequent behaviour is slowed down as the 
energetic cost to obtain the rewards becomes too high (639). Here, the 
tonic level of dopamine sets the average rate of reward against which 
phasic dopamine responses originating from the ventral tegmental area 
reflect the relative reward value (639). Cools and co-workers (2011) 
extent this by suggesting a similar function for serotonin responses of 
the dorsal raphe nucleus in signalling relative aversion and an interaction 
between dopamine and serotonin. Thus, when aversive outcomes are 
frequently available, behaviour is inhibited, but if aversive outcomes 
are infrequent behaviour is sped up (191). In a complex environment 
where rewarding and aversive outcomes will co-occur, phasic reward 
and aversive outcomes will be relative to a running weighted average of 
the tonic dopaminergic and serotonergic signals (191). Indeed, raising 
tonic serotonin levels modulates neural activity in a task that is known to 
activate the dopamine system, and neural functioning changes in a brain 
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region where an integration between serotonergic and dopaminergic 
projections occur (Chapter 5). Further, the medial frontal cortex is 
optimally situated to evaluate this integrative signal as it receives 
projections from both the ventral tegmental area and the dorsal raphe 
nucleus, and in turn projects back to both regions and the locus coeruleus 
(34, 640-642). The medial prefrontal cortex may thus track the relative 
value of a stimulus in a specific context based on dopaminergic and 
serotonergic signals and subsequently drive locus coeruleus responses.
When attempting to integrate the roles of noradrenaline, dopamine, 
and serotonin it is important to realize that noradrenergic responses 
are associated with stimulus onset and not the outcome of a situation 
(i.e. valance unspecific), whereas dopamine and serotonin responses 
are thought to reflect outcomes. Thus, during initial phases of a task 
dopamine and serotonin may signal the relative outcome or value of 
a stimulus and an integrated evaluation of the situation within the 
prefrontal cortex drives tonic locus coeruleus activity to an intermediate 
level so that subsequent phasic locus coeruleus responses enhance 
processing of salient stimuli. If the utility of a stimulus unexpectedly 
changes and becomes inadequate locus coeruleus activity is shifted to 
a higher tonic level, favouring enhanced processing of any incoming 
stimulus though gross network reorganization resulting in switching 
behaviour. This occurs because the gain amplification of stimuli with 
a previously sub-threshold value for selection in the decision process 
now cross the threshold. This could explain the finding in Chapter 10 
that subjects during extinction learning do not show a general reduction 
of fear responses, but an inability to differentiate responses when 
given a noradrenergic antagonist. It is conceivable that dopamine and 
serotonin are able to provide a relative affective value signal, but the 
gain is too low due to the noradrenergic blockade that expression of 
this affective signal is hindered. Of interest here is also the functional 
role of the neuromodulator acetylcholine (not under direct investigation 
in this thesis). Both noradrenaline and acetylcholine neurons increase 
responses following contingency changes, but acetylcholine responses 
stay increased over a longer period, whereas noradrenaline responses 
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habituate quickly, which has led to the suggestion that acetylcholine is 
important for expected uncertainty (637, 638). Thus, where noradrenaline 
is important for unexpected uncertainty, increases bottom up processing, 
and triggers network reorganization; acetylcholine might be important 
for expected uncertainty, may maintain top-down processing, and 
considering its generally inhibitory function in the central nervous system 
might achieve so by preventing network reorganization.
In conclusion, neuromodulators influence neural processing indirectly and 
appear critical in the reorganization of network plasticity through effects 
on neural plasticity (624). The precise effects of neuromodulators likely 
depend on a critical interaction between the tonic level of activity and 
relative phasic responses. In addition, whereas dopamine and serotonin 
appear to provide a relative valance signal, allowing an integrated 
evaluation of the value of stimuli given a overall situation, noradrenaline 
and acetylcholine may be involved in modulating processing of stimuli 
themselves, and dependent on unexpected or expected changes in 
contingency trigger or inhibit a reorganization of neural network state. 
This view on the roles of different neuromodulators has implications for 
the interpretation of the studies presented in this thesis. Specifically, 
the realization that tonic and phasic activity of neuromodulators serve 
different functional roles has important implication for the interpretation 
of the pharmacological intervention studies in this thesis. The use of 
food targeting the serotonergic system (Chapter 5) likely increased 
central tonic serotonin levels. Thus the effects reported should be 
interpreted as effects of an increased running average of cost against 
which phasic (task evoked) signals are weighted. In contrast the 
studies manipulating noradrenaline (Chapter 9, 10) employed the β1β2-
adrenoceptor antagonists propranolol. Considering that beta-adrenergic 
receptors are post-synaptic receptors this manipulation likely affected 
phasic noradrenergic responses and not the tonic state which is under 
control of alpha-adrenergic receptors, effects in these studies probably 
reflect the gain of stimulus processing. This interpretation of phasic 
versus tonic neuromodulatory signals is interesting but has not been 
directly investigated in the studies presented in this thesis limiting the 
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conclusions that can be drawn from the results. Next several limitations of 
the studies presented in this thesis will be discussed. 
12.6 Limitations and outstanding questions
The studies presented in this thesis often raise questions that remain 
unanswered, have had unexpected results, and result in limitations of 
the conclusion that can be drawn. In addition, the results often call for 
further investigation in the future, and highlight topics that have so far 
been unexplored. Here several of these issues and future interests will be 
discussed.
12.6.1 Finding the amygdala isn’t peanuts.
Considering the prominent role of the amygdala in emotional memory 
(see also Figure 12.1) it is striking that we do not find amygdala 
involvement as revealed by BOLD-fMRI in the majority of the studies in 
this thesis. Both methodological considerations and the intrinsic neural 
function and architecture of the amygdala could provide an explanation 
for this discrepancy.
Animal studies have clearly revealed a critical role for the amygdala in 
emotional memory and particularly in the acquisition of learned fear 
(5, 9). Although several seminal papers have also revealed amygdala 
involvement in learned fear in humans using fMRI (6, 10, 643, 644), the 
detection of amygdala involvement in fear conditioning using fMRI in 
humans is far from ubiquitous (645). One explanation for an absence 
of amygdala detection is a dropout or distortion of the fMRI signal in 
this region of the brain (156). However, in the studies presented in this 
thesis signal was in fact obtained from the amygdala and specific effort 
was made to minimize distortion through the use of e.g. temporal lobe 
optimized sequences, multi-echo imaging, and fieldmaps. In addition, 
clear task-related amygdala activation was found during an emotional 
processing task (Chapter 5) indicating that the employed imaging methods 
are principally able to detect amygdala involvement in cognitive tasks. A 
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second explanation pertains to the observation that amygdala responses 
to salient stimuli in terms of increased firing rates are short lived (595). 
In contrast to the brief increases in firing rates of amygdala neurons, the 
BOLD-fMRI signal is slow and reflects an integrated average over longer 
periods of time. In addition, the use of box-car modulated regressors 
including the entire duration of stimulus presentation (Chapter 10 and 
11), would limit the detection of short-lived neural responses and favour 
responses of longer duration. However, specifying regressors as stick-
functions also did not result in the detection of task-related amygdala 
involvement (results not presented). A third explanation may be provided 
by the functional and architectural organization of the amygdala and the 
limited spatial resolution of fMRI. The spatial resolution of fMRI is in the 
millimetre order and the human amygdala is only few cubic millimetres 
in size. In addition, the amygdala is not a unitary nucleus, but consists of 
several subnuclei that serve different roles in the expression, acquisition, 
and extinction of fear (5, 518, 646, 647). Furthermore, the glutamatergic 
neurons of the amygdala subnuclei are interspersed with gaba-ergic 
intercalated cells (618, 631). Finally, recent studies indicate that even 
within the subnuclei of the amygdala a certain class of neurons increase 
their firing rates with the acquisition of fear, whereas others show a 
decrease and an increase in firing rates when fear is extinguished (598). 
Summating a neural signal over multiple subnuclei, over neurons with 
different neurotransmitters, and over functional subsets of cells could 
explain the absence of a net difference between experimental conditions 
in fMRI studies.
In conclusion, although the absence of amygdala effects in the studies 
presented in this thesis may appear striking this finding is not uncommon, 
and could be explained by the limitations of the imaging method used 
in interaction with the intrinsic neural function and architecture of the 
amygdala.
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12.6.2 The vmPFC regulation of fear, and the default mode 
network.
The exact functional contribution of the vmPFC to fear and safety learning 
in humans as detected by BOLD-fMRI is obscured by its involvement in the 
so-called default mode network.
Rodent work has consistently indicated that the infralimbic cortex inhibits 
the output of the amygdala and in doing so regulates the expression of 
fear following extinction training (12, 513, 630, 648-651). The vmPFC is 
considered the human analogue of the rodent infralimbic cortex and in 
human BOLD-fMRI studies on extinction learning has consistently shown 
a relative deactivation that is greater in response to the CS+ than CS- (10, 
524, 526, 528). In addition, this relative deactivation correlates negatively 
with the differential physiological fear responses (10). This has lead to 
the suggestion that the vMPFC response in humans reflects an inhibitory 
control signal over the amygdala, and idea supported by findings that 
the vmPFC and amygdala BOLD fMRI signal correlate negatively (10, 577). 
In Chapter 10 and 11 we replicate these findings. However, the relative 
deactivation of the vmPFC already becomes apparent during conditioning, 
and in our study is even greater following conditioning than extinction 
(Chapter 11). This could be the result of dynamic interactions between 
the amygdala and the vmPFC, where the vmPFC has a gating function 
over the amygdala but will reduce its gating signal if the amygdala 
drive is strong enough. Alternatively, it is of interest to note that the 
vmPFC is part of the so-called ‘default mode network’ (127, 128, 652-
657). The default mode network is a set of brain regions that shows 
strong correlated activity under resting-state conditions, and activation 
of this network has been associated with internal processing (658). In 
contrast, the brain regions found to activate during conditioning and 
extinction (Chapter 10 and 11) also show correlated activity under resting-
state conditions and are generally considered to be part of a ‘salience’ 
network (175, 658). The deactivation of the the vmPFC observed during 
conditioning and extinction could thus reflect a deactivation of the 
default mode network and an activation of the salience network, shifting 
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attention away from internal monitoring to salient external stimuli. In 
support of this argument, we also observe a relative deactivation of the 
posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus during conditioning and extinction 
(Chapter 10 and 11), another region considered to be part of the default 
mode network. Finally, it is of interest to note that the deactivation of 
the default mode network has been associated with optimal learning and 
memory formation (659, 660) a necessity for efficient conditioning and 
extinction.
In conclusion, although human imaging studies have consistently 
detected the involvement of the vmPFC in extinction learning and have 
associated relative activity in this region with reduced fear responses, the 
determination of its causal role in safety learning in humans is obscured 
by its role in the default mode network. 
12.6.3 Reconsidering reconsolidation.
Reconsolidation potentially allows the permanent alteration of memory 
and has been discussed extensively in this thesis. yet, it is important to 
point out several limitations and outstanding questions of reconsolidation 
research.
Initial studies on reconsolidation showed that reactivation of memory 
traces renders these susceptible to disruption by treatments similar 
to those that impair initial consolidation (50). A critical problem to the 
demonstration of both consolidation and reconsolidation by disturbance 
of memory is that this results in the absence of behaviour and thus 
concords with instead of refutes the null-hypothesis. Hence, the absence 
of a behavioural indication of memory could be due to many alternative 
explanations, e.g. an insensitivity of the measuring method to detect 
the expression of memory (400, 437, 661). For this reason an important 
criteria that has been generated to demonstrate is reconsolidation is that 
the memory impairment should not be due to an temporary inability to 
access memory traces (448), hence should not return after longer delays. 
The literature on the permanence of memory disturbance following 
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reactivation has been mixed with some studies finding disturbances 
for long periods of time (401, 406, 409, 424), whereas others have 
found the return of memories, specifically when memories are older 
or stronger (414-417). In addition memory enhancement following 
reactivation has been found (427, 476), and have led to the suggestion 
that reconsolidation serves to update memory (407, 444, 456). Together 
this raises the question whether reconsolidation is a generic process 
affecting all memories, and/or only parts of certain memories. In Chapter 
6 the hypothesis has been postulated during reconsolidation synapses 
destabilize putting memories that depend on a limited number of synaptic 
weight changes or connections at risk of disruption, whereas memories 
that rely on re-wiring changes in cortico-cortical connections would be 
less sensitive to disturbance (466). Thus, simple associative conditioned 
fear memories that potentially depend on plasticity between a limited 
number of synaptic connection in the amygdala might particularly be 
sensitive to alteration following reactivation (420, 662), whereas episodic 
memory that is considered to depend on a more extensive neural 
network would be less sensitive to disturbance. As in Chapter 7 and 8 
reconsolidation of episodic memory has been studied this raises several 
questions.
Memory performance as described in Chapter 7 and 8 is relatively low. 
This raises the question whether a similar disruption of reactivated 
memory had occurred if memories had been stronger. In addition, 
consolidation and reconsolidation impairments have been described 
as cue-dependent amnesia (46, 661, 663, 664), where the idea is that 
the absence of memory expression is dependent on the strength of the 
retrieval-cue. Thus, providing a stronger cue might trigger the expression 
of memory. In Chapter 7 during the study session subjects were shown all 
stimuli three times. Further, a stem-completion task was used to probe 
memory retrieval and subjects were instructed only to respond when 
certain of the to be recalled word in order to reduce the single-to-noise 
ratio of the task. Similarly, in Chapter 8 subjects were shown the stimuli 
only once, and received a multiple-choice recognition test, but were not 
shown the original stimulus material (except for the first slide). One may 
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wonder whether disturbances of memory would have been observed if 
memory encoding had been performed more often resulting in stronger 
memories, or would have been observed if stronger cueing paradigms 
had been used. Nevertheless, even if under such conditions memory 
expression would be evident this would still indicate that memory traces 
could be significantly weakened following reactivation.
Another concern pertains to the permanence of the disturbance 
of reactivated memory traces. Especially in the view of possible 
psychotherapeutical applications targeting the reconsolidation 
phenomena it is paramount that the alterations of memory are long-
lasting. In Chapter 7 the disruption of reactivated memory persists 
at least for one week. A second interesting observation reported in 
Chapter 7 is that the correct recall of reactivated memory traces soon 
after an amnestic manipulation prevents the emergence of impaired 
reconsolidation. This finding either reflects that retrieval of a destabilized 
memory prior to the completion of reconsolidation restabilizes the 
memory trace, or that secondary encoding at the time of retrieval 
forms a trace that can be retrieved at subsequent testing. It would be of 
considerable interest to further examine the permanence and possible 
restabilization by retrieval effects of reactivated memories at risk of 
disturbance.
An interesting issue is whether the return of disturbed reactivated 
memories by definition excludes reconsolidation having occurred. Bio-
molecular studies have convincingly shown that synapses do destabilize 
upon reactivation, and that the restabilization of synapses can be 
disturbed resulting in alteration of memory (418-420, 422). It is however 
conceivable that only part of the connections of the neural ensemble that 
constitutes a memory trace are destabilized and disturbed, especially in 
the case of episodic memory that is thought to rely on extensive long-
range neural networks. Further, the re-emergence of a functional neural 
memory ensemble may be initiated based on activity in only a subset of 
the neurons (270). One can phantom that in the case of a partial memory 
trace disruption, reiterative reactivation of the partial memory trace may 
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through synaptic plasticity re-recruit the connections and neurons that 
originally (or partially by replacement) constituted a neural ensemble that 
enables memory expression. In this dynamic view on memory the return 
of a behavioural expression of memory does not exclude the possibility 
that a reconsolidation mechanisms has occurred. This idea touches on an 
important concept of what a memory trace actually is and will be one of 
the most exciting questions to address in neuroscience in the near future.
Two other issues related to the studies on reconsolidation in this thesis 
are worth mentioning. One criticism on studies of reconsolidation 
has been that the disturbance of memory might be attributable to a 
heightened state of arousal at the time of memory reactivation evoked 
by the reminder rather than a general memory process (665). The 
disturbances of memory would than result from a state difference at 
the time of encoding and reactivation and test. The studies reported in 
Chapter 7 and 8 both contain arousing elements, either the application 
of ECT, or the occurrence of emotional items during encoding. However, 
especially for the results in Chapter 7 it is hard to phantom why only a 
subset of items would suffer from memory impairment whilst all items 
are reactivated and retrieved in the same state. A related issue concerns 
the idea that possibly only amygdala dependent memories show the 
reconsolidation phenomena. Although reconsolidation has predominantly 
been studies in task that are known to depend on the amygdala (400), 
disturbances of memories that are generally considered to be amygdala 
independent (403, 407), and disturbances by manipulations of brain 
regions outside the amygdala (401, 552, 666) have been observed. 
However, the amygdala may modulate neural activity in other areas 
and therefore it remains possible that only an amygdala contribution is 
disturbed in these studies. It would be of interest to study reconsolidation 
in the absence of amygdala influences, e.g. following lesions or in patients 
with Urbach-Wiethe disease. 
A final limitation is specific to the results presented in Chapter 8. 
Electroconvulsive therapy was used to investigate the disturbance of 
reactivated memories. Two elements of ECT could contribute to the 
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observed memory impairment: the applied electrical stimulation itself, or 
the anaesthetics. We find electrode placement to be related to related to 
general memory performance suggesting that the electrical stimulation 
itself may cause the observed disruption of reactivated memory traces. 
In contrast, we do not observe a relationship between the anaesthetic 
dose and memory performance. Nevertheless it could be that the memory 
impairment is attributable to GABA-ergic medication.
Regardless of the issues discussed here, the results in Chapter 7 and 8 
satisfy the criteria of the reconsolidation hypothesis, and thus provide 
evidence for the reconsolidation of episodic emotional memories in 
humans. In particular, the effects are found to be time-dependent, a 
critical criteria for a demonstration of reconsolidation that is often 
neglected. As evidenced in Chapter 9 and 10, the loss of memory 
following reactivation may also be attributable to new learning and 
effects at the time of retrieval. Therefore, any study on reconsolidation 
lacking a time-dependent demonstration should be treated with caution. 
The studies presented in Chapters 7-10 only differ on details in terms of 
memory reactivation yet instigate different memory processes. For future 
studies it is of considerable interest to determine the boundary conditions 
under which reconsolidation takes place.
Finally, several specific issues raised by studies in this thesis will be 
discussed.
12.6.4 Beta-blockers and skin conductance responses.
A possible confound in the study presented in Chapter 10 is the combined 
use of skin conductance responses and propranolol, which will be 
discussed here.
The study presented in Chapter 10 used skin conductance responses to 
parameterize fear responses, and employed the beta-blocker propranolol 
to alter fear memory. This raises the possibility that propranolol may have 
directly affected the peripheral sweet response obscuring the assessment 
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of fear memory. Historically there has been much debate about direct 
peripheral effects of noradrenaline on the skin conductance response 
(667), however eventually it became clear that myoepithelial cells 
responsible for the contractions of the secretory segment of sweat glands 
react to cholinergic stimulation only (667, 668). In addition, although 
arterial blood pressure and heart responses to stress are reduced by the 
beta-adrenergic antagonists nadolol, which does not cross the blood brain 
barrier, and therefore only has peripheral effects, it does not affect skin 
conductance responses (669). Also, local application of propranolol on 
the skin does not affect the sweat response during exercise (636). In line 
with this, in the study presented in Chapter 10 no effect of propranolol 
on baseline skin conductance responses to context presentations, 
or habituation trials are detected. In addition, the responses to the 
conditioned stimuli are far greater than the responses to these control 
measures, and therefore the obtained results are unlikely to be due a 
peripheral effect of propranolol on the sweat response.
In conclusion, the effects of propranolol on fear responses as described in 
Chapter 10 do not appear to be confounded by peripheral effects.
12.7 Understanding dynamic interactions within fear neural 
network
As summarized in Figure 12.1 and revealed by studies presented in this 
thesis (Chapter 5, 10, and 11), a large interactive neural network supports 
memory for emotional experiences. To date studies have large focussed 
on revealing the functional role of specific regions, however much less is 
known about the dynamic interactions between regions.
Beyond understanding function of specific regions a need exists to gain 
insight into the dynamic interactions within the neural network that gives 
rise to fear and safety learning. Recent methodological advancements 
have been developed to study dynamic interactions in brain networks 
based on BOLD-fMRI data. These methods include psychophysiological 
interaction (PPI) analyses and dynamic causal modelling (DCM) (670-672). 
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These methods allow one to study network interactions dependent on 
task performance. However, these methods are necessarily limited by 
the temporal sluggishness and spatial precision of the BOLD-fMRI signal. 
In addition, in practice DCM and PPI analyses require strong consistent 
statistical effects on single-subject level, and work most optimally for a 
restricted number of regions, and relative simple cognitive tasks. Thus, a 
true understanding of dynamic neural interactions in the fear and safety 
network may require invasive experiments.
Only a limited number of studies have invasively investigated dynamic 
neural interactions and provide a wealth of insight into fear and safety 
network functioning (175, 503, 518, 570, 630, 673-675). However, most of 
these studies measure changes in oscillatory coherence between regions 
within the neural network, but oscillatory coherence does not necessitate 
effective connectivity in terms of information processing (309). Therefore, 
a critical question to future research will be how oscillatory coherence 
between regions affect local spike rates, and drives behavioural 
expression. In addition such studies could provide critical information on 
the emergence and dissipation of neural ensembles that form a memory 
trace and reveal the nature of memory.
A need exists for more systems level studies to truly understand the 
interactions between brain regions that collectively give rise to emotional 
memory, and hence allow a more specific understanding of the ability 
to alter memories. Such studies would undoubtedly contribute to 
understanding dynamic nature of memory and the foundation of altering 
memories.
12.8 Offline periods
This thesis has focussed on the ability to alter memory for emotional 
experiences and has investigated the neural activity at the time of 
manipulation and at the time of outcome, i.e. retrieval. However, it is 
eminent that most alterations of memory occur in between these points 
of assessment.
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The ability to alter memory often depended on processes that occur after 
the moment of learning of reactivation during so-called ‘off-line’ periods, 
e.g. consolidation, and reconsolidation. Neural activity patterns reflecting 
learned experiences are replayed during sleep and post-learning wake 
periods resulting in strengthening or weakening of memory (348, 369, 
370). Although it is attractive to assume that similar processes occur 
following memory reactivation, and underlie reconsolidation effects, 
this remains not yet investigated. Understanding ‘off-line’ processing 
of memory following reactivation might provide further insight into the 
ability to alter memory for emotional experiences.
Future studies aimed at investigating the off-line replay of memory 
following reactivation would be of considerable interest and could provide 
fundamental insight into the mechanisms that allow alteration of memory.
12.9 Thoughts on the hippocampus, context, and memory systems.
Throughout this thesis studies have been presented that provide 
possibilities to alter memory for emotional experiences resulting in a loss 
of fear. An important outstanding question is under which circumstances 
fear may return. Of specific interest here is the role of contextual safety 
memory, it’s dependence on the hippocampus, and interactions between 
simple-associative and episodic memory.
Learning that a stimulus is safe is highly dependent on context, and the 
hippocampus is considered to be critical for contextual safety learning. 
Over time memories can undergo systems consolidation (248, 316, 
318, 321), referring to the process whereby memories that are initially 
hippocampus dependent become incorporated within the neocortex 
and less dependent on the hippocampus. With systems consolidation, 
memories’ contextual information may be lost resulting in a return of fear, 
but could also lead to a generalization of safety to other contexts, yet 
little is known about these processes. In Chapter 10 hippocampal activity 
was found to be associated with less fear following contextual safety 
learning. For future studies it would be of considerable interest to test 
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whether fear would return if subjects were retested in the original context 
in which fear was acquired, or if the inhibition of fear also generalizes to 
a new context. Such studies would have important clinical implications, as 
it might indicate that optimal psychotherapy would require safety training 
in either the original fearful context, or require safety training over 
multiple contexts to obtain generalization of fear inhibition.
Most animal studies on memory alteration following reactivation have 
investigated simple associative learning that may rely on plasticity of 
several synapses within the amygdala. However, whereas the expression 
of fear can be disrupted following reactivation (Chapter 8 and 9), and 
emotional enhancement of memory may be abolished at reactivation 
(Chapter 9), memory is not fully lost, and moreover explicit episodic 
knowledge of a fearful event still remains (Chapter 10). In line with 
idea of the existence of multiple memory systems (229, 230, 233), 
episodic memory (memory for specific experiences) has been proposed 
to depend on the hippocampus, emotional expression of fear on the 
amygdala, and the emotional enhancement of episodic memory on up-
regulation of hippocampal processing by the amygdala. Recent work on 
animals suggests that fear memories for episodic experiences that are 
hippocampus dependent return following disturbances at reactivation 
(476, 515). To which extent episodic memories for emotional experiences 
can be permanently altered, and to which extend episodic memory 
can contribute to the reinstatement of fear responses remains to be 
investigated. Here it is interesting to notice that explicit knowledge of 
the association between a stimulus and an aversive stimulus modulated 
the acquisition and persistence of fear (479). Following this issue is 
the question of the nature of memory for emotional experiences that 
contribute to fear and anxiety disorders. Are these memories simple 
associative and intrinsically amygdala centred, dependent on up-
regulation of the hippocampus by the amygdala, or truly episodic? The 
answer to this question will determine the direction of future research 
investigating the ability to alter memory for emotional experiences aimed 
to optimize treatments.
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In sum, to further increase understanding of the circumstances under 
which fear may return require investigation of the role of contextual 
safety learning and the role of the hippocampus. In addition, different 
elements of a memory trace, or memory systems, may interact in 
emotional memory, and altering one element of a fear memory but not 
another runs the risk that fear may return, another issue that requires 
further investigation.
12.10 Clinical implications.
The ability to alter memories for emotional experiences holds the promise 
to develop novel strategies to optimize treatment of affective disorders. 
Here the clinical implication of the work presented in this thesis will be 
discussed.
The relationship between structural brain abnormalities in posttraumatic 
stress disorder and depression were under investigation in Chapter 2 
and 3. Several regions showed altered volume in both disorders, most 
notably the dmPFC and insula, and flashback re-experiences were found 
to be associated with regional volume reductions in posttraumatic stress 
patients. However, many of the detected regions that show volumetric 
abnormalities fall outside the neural network of emotional memory 
as depicted in Figure 12.1 This might be due to the specific patient 
population under investigation, but could alternatively reflect regions that 
contribute to the aetiology and persistence of affective disorders. Future 
studies will have to reveal if these results hold up, and if so, what the 
contribution of these regions is.
In addition, in Chapter 4 neural activity between the retrieval of normal 
emotional episodic memory and memories that evoke flashbacks were 
compared. Several brain regions were found to display greater activity 
to flashback evoking items, and notably regions in the medial temporal 
lobe were not found to be more active or even showed reductions in 
activity. These results can be taken to support the dual-processing 
theory (132, 133, 676), which states that flashback memories are vivid 
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memories but lack temporal context, and are supported by the dorsal 
visual stream that processes egocentric representations. However, there 
are several limitations to this study that could also explain the absence 
of the detection of involvement of medial temporal structures such as the 
hippocampus and amygdala in flashbacks. A first limitation is the relative 
small number of posttraumatic stress disorder patients that could be 
included in the final analyses. Thus, the study may not have had enough 
power to detect involvement of medial temporal regions. In addition, 
the definition of flashback evoking events versus normal emotional 
episodic memories was troublesome. Following the creating of their 
trauma script, posttraumatic stress patients indicated which items evoked 
flashback experiences. They also indicated when items evoked flashback 
experiences in the scanner. These indications overlapped, but not 
perfectly, and patients even indicated having had flashback experiences 
to items that were not from their own traumatic script. All items that 
patients indicated as having elicited flashback experiences were assigned 
flashback items for maximal power in the analyses, which may not have 
been an optimal definition. In addition, the normal emotional episodic 
items still came from subjects own trauma script, and are thus likely 
to be highly arousing as well. It could be that both conditions evoked 
such strong responses in regions like the amygdala that detection of 
involvement in flashbacks was obscured. Future studies will have to 
further address these concerns.
Several studies presented in this thesis indicate that altering memory for 
emotional experiences is possible at the time of retrieval or reactivation 
(Chapter 7-11). These findings serve as a proof-of-principle that altering 
memory is possible, findings that hold a promise for clinical application. 
An intriguing question is whether the methods that allow one to alter 
memory in well-controlled experimental settings translate to clinical 
practice.
Initially successful efforts to translate basic science findings on learning 
and memory into clinical practice have attempted to enhance extinction 
or exposure based therapy in clinical settings (517). The discovery that the 
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NMDA agonist D-cycloserine could enhance extinction learning in animals 
has led to applications in humans in combination with exposure therapy 
and shown promise in clinical studies for patients with posttraumatic 
stress disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, phobia, and social anxiety 
disorder (666, 677-681). Similarly, administration of the noradrenergic 
agonist yohimbine prior to exposure therapy has been found to decrease 
fear across exposures in claustrophobic patients and results in reduced 
fear in a follow-up rug free session (682, 683). Thus, initial translations 
form basic science to clinical application aimed to enhance extinction 
learning and exposure therapy have had promising results.
Clinical studies have started to build on basic science findings that 
memories can be altered by the pharmacological administration at the 
time of memory reactivation (405, 411, 507). The reactivation of traumatic 
memory through a trauma script driven reactivation in the presence of 
propranolol was found to reduce physiological responses at re-exposure 
to the trauma script in PTSD patients one week later (404). However, 
although propranolol and the benzodiazepine alprazolam were found to 
decrease negative affect scores during brief exposure therapy session, no 
sustained reductions were detected after a 48h wash-out period in four 
patients (684). yet, reactivation of drug-related words in the presence 
of propranolol in abstinent heroin addicts reduced subsequent retrieval 
of these words (685). Hence, initial studies suggest that the combined 
reactivation of memory with propranolol administration may be beneficial 
in clinical populations.
The most exciting translation of basic science on the ability to alter 
memory to clinical practice exploits the memory reactivation-extinction 
paradigm (406, 454, 686). In a truly translational study, rats with a heroin 
dependence after daily retrieval of drug-associated memories prior 
to extinction training showed attenuated drug-induced reinstatement, 
spontaneous recovery, and renewal of drug conditioned effects and drug 
seeking. In parallel, reactivation of drug-associated memories in heroin 
addicts prior to extinction training resulted in attenuated drug cravings 
up to 130 days following the procedure (686). Hence, the reactivation-
303
12. general discussion
extinction procedure promises to be of great clinical potential. Beyond 
applied techniques, knowledge of the neural mechanism underlying 
emotional memory might also contribute to optimized treatments.
The identification of the neural networks that underlie emotional 
memory and an increased understanding of neuromodulatory function 
could serve as a template to optimize treatments to the personal needs 
of patients. The identification of abnormal brain structure of brain 
function in particular regions could contribute to a specification of the 
cause of psychiatric disorders for a particular patient. For example one 
patient with posttraumatic stress disorder may have a hyper-reactive 
amygdala, triggering exaggerated fear responses; another suffer from 
distorted vmPFC function, resulting in a lack of inhibitory control 
over fear responses; or hyperbolic dmPFC functioning, resulting in 
increased sustained fear responses; yet another from abnormal insula 
functioning, resulting in hypersensitive cognitive awareness of fear 
responses; or over activity of the locus coeruleus resulting in increased 
general arousal states, or hippocampal hypoactivity causing an inability 
to inhibit fear in safe contextual situations. It is easy to imagine that 
dependent on the specific brain abnormality specific treatments may 
be more optimal. For example, extinction training specifically optimizes 
vmPFC regulated inhibitory fear regulation, thus patients with abnormal 
vmPFC functioning might benefit most (or least) from extinction-based 
treatments, such as exposure therapy. Similarly, the studies presented in 
Chapter 10 and 11 suggest that patients suffering from abnormal dmPFC 
or hippocampus functioning might benefit from propranolol treatment, 
whereas serotonergic treatment might have positive clinical outcomes 
in patients with altered dmPFC or insula activity. In addition, the theory 
on neuromodulators set out in this discussion suggest that propranolol 
might be effecting in patients that show hyperactivity in regions receiving 
input from the locus coeruleus, whereas patients with hyperactive locus 
coeruleus functioning itself might benefit more from clonidine treatment. 
Increased understanding of the neural mechanism that support emotional 
memory, and its malfunctioning in patients could thus contribute to 
optimize treatments. Of particular interest is here the development of 
304
evidence-based personalized medicine. Apart from requiring progress in 
scientific understanding and an ability to characterize neural functioning 
on an individual basis, the development of personalized medicine in 
psychiatry will require a better specification of the individual symptoms 
of patients and a move away from the clustering of symptoms under a 
single disease label.
One final limitation worth mentioning is that treatment of affective 
disorders by altering memories may be beneficial, but is not a magic cure. 
After the many years patients struggle with psychiatric disease, patients 
social and professional lives are often highly disrupted, may suffer from 
unhealthy living styles, or have come to personify with their disease state, 
fully solving these situation will require active social counselling and/or 
cognitive and behavioural restructuring therapy. Altering memories for 
emotional experiences is just a first step.
In conclusion, basic scientific studies towards brain abnormalities in 
affective disorders and the ability to alter memories for emotional 
experiences holds the promise to develop novel strategies to optimize 
treatment of affective disorders. The first promising clinical studies 
targeting enhancement of extinction, or alteration of memory at 
reactivation have been conducted.
12.11 Conclusion
The work presented in this thesis has contributed to increased 
understanding of the ability to alter memories for emotional experiences. 
By presenting an extended view on memory formation, a model of 
the neural network that supports emotional memory, identifying the 
overlap between this neural network and brain abnormalities in patients 
with affective disorders, and putting forward an integrated view on 
neuromodulatory function, hopes are that this work will both have 
increased fundamental understanding of the mechanism that drive 
behaviour and contribute to the development to optimize treatments for 
affective disorders. 
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“When you wake up we will  have months, maybe years to piece 
together the broken fragments of your past; better yet we 
can invent memories that fit your fantasies.  For the time 
being, I wil l  tel l  you about myself and the other members 
of this family we both belong to, but don’t ask me to be 
precise, because inevitably errors will  creep in. I  have 
forgotten a lot, and some of the facts are twisted.  There 
are places, dates, and names I don’t remember; on the 
other hand, I never forget a good story”
-Paula-
Isabel Allende, 1995
THE STORy COMES TO AN END.
KABOOM! Glass splinters. Swiftly we turn our heads. ‘The principles of 
neuroscience’ has fallen of the bookshelf and shattered a vase on its 
way down. I look at Ben, he smiles: “This would have brought me back in 
the past, made me experience it all over again, but now, nothing.” Anna 
smiles and says: “I am happy the treatment has worked so well for him.”
Let’s hope that fundamental science can contribute to make this a clinical 
reality for patients like Ben in the near future 
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NederlaNdse sameNvattiNg
NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING.
Emotionele gebeurtenissen worden vaak goed onthouden en helpen ons bij 
het aanpassen aan onze omgeving, maar kunnen ook leiden tot traumatische 
herinneringen zoals in het geval van posttraumatische stressstoornissen 
(PTSD). Marijn Kroes onderzocht wat er in het brein van patiënten met PTSD 
veranderd, wat er gebeurt als zij zich traumatische gebeurtenissen herinneren, 
en of het mogelijk is om geheugen voor emotionele gebeurtenissen permanent 
te veranderen of zelfs uit te wissen. Zijn onderzoek toont aan dat zowel de 
structuur als het functioneren van het brein bij PTSD patiënt is veranderd. 
Verder laat zijn werk zien dat het mogelijk is om herinneringen aan emotionele 
gebeurtenissen uit te wissen door de elektrische activiteit van het brein te 
verstoren na geheugen heractivatie. Hiernaast blijken emotionele herinneringen 
permanent te kunnen worden veranderd door het blokkeren dan wel activeren 
van de stoffen noradrenaline en serotonine in het brein tijdens het herinneren 
van emotionele gebeurtenissen of het afleren van angstreacties. Deze 
aanpassingen van emotioneel geheugen gaan gepaard met veranderingen 
in hersengebieden die belangrijk zijn voor de regulatie van emoties en deze 
gebieden overlappen met de abnormale brein functies in patiënten met 
PTSD. Marijn Kroes bevindingen geven aan dat geheugen voor emotionele 
gebeurtenissen permanent kunnen worden veranderd en kunnen een belangrijke 
bijdrage leveren aan de ontwikkeling van nieuwe psychiatrische behandelingen.
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appreciated over the years. Everyone is different, me, highly chaotic, all over 
the place, hyper-active, etc., yet you've somehow found a way to supervise me 
that allowed me to work independently, stay enthusiastic about science and our 
projects, whilst slowly but steadily teaching me to "FOCUSS!", learn brevity, and 
comprehensiveness, and be put in place when necessary (yes sometimes this 
was necessary). It is an amazing quality if a supervisor can adjust its supervising 
style to a student so that he most optimally functions and develops, and I've 
much appreciated you for it. I've greatly enjoyed our scientific discussion whilst 
writing our review, often extending to discussion that allowed me to have a peak 
into what it means to have a research group; our visit to Edinburgh, and our 
discussions on how to implement the ERC programme; interactions that were not 
only scientifically interesting but very pleasant on a personal level. Exemplary 
for your efforts to allow your PhD students to develop most optimally is your 
decision to allow to me work in Francesco's lab for the last remainder of my PhD 
period so that I could learn a branch of neuroscience that I was very interested 
in. Which employer allows an employee to go work for someone else? Who 
does that? Guillen Fernandez, that's who, and I am very grateful for it. I fondly 
hope that we will be able to work together, and collaborate in the future and to 
continue our very amiable interactions. Guillen I would like to thank you, not just 
for allowing me to develop as a scientist, but, more important, as a person.
Big Barrie, Uncle Buck, yoda, Dude, Mate, Bryan, where to start? Sometimes 
you meet people in your life that you just click with. What began as an interview 
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for an internship position at the FIL soon ended up on a terrace over coffee, 
and in a bar over beers (and peanuts of course), culminating in a unstoppable 
flow of research ideas, critical discussions and loads of laughs. One research 
project became two research projects became x-research projects, as too many 
questions needed to be investigated, and results needed to be scrutinized. 
Late nights following hospital hours, weekends outside shifts, interactions 
full of enthusiasm, fun, and an absolute love for science you've infected me 
with. One can learn a lot from books, but someone has to show you the ropes. 
you are my scientific mentor and I can only say that I can't phantom anyone 
better. your incredible intelligence, scientific knowledge, complete dedication 
to train a student to the best of your abilities, are characteristics I much 
appreciate. All that amidst your ever cheerful perseveration issues: "Well done 
young skywalker", or more often "you Muppet!", "reeeeeconsolidation", make 
it incredibly stimulation, informative, and just good fun to have worked with 
you over the years. This thesis would have never existed if not for you driving 
the Barry Beamer across a grass field in Nijmegen, just one example of your 
incredible support and I can only thank you for it. It's an absolute privilege to 
have been able to keep working together during my PhD and to have you as a 
promotor. The lines between supervisor and friend have long become blurred, 
you've become so much more, a friend, and at times a bigger brother perhaps. 
We'll now continue to work together in your lab in Madrid, and hopefully 
keep our collaborations going even after that, and I'm sure we'll keep up the 
amazingly fun times we've had in London, during your visits to Amsterdam, mine 
to Madrid and Marbella. "On to the mattresses", and lets introduce Madrid to the 
'... Dr. Strange'!
Guido. Barely done with your own PhD you managed to get me acquainted 
with the Donders and up and running with my PhD in no time at all. Interaction 
with you has been smooth sailing from the start. We've worked together as 
colleagues, you've given me incredible independence, but we're always there 
whenever I needed advise or help. The road towards a PhD is not always easy, 
there are bumps and potholes to stumble over, and it's incredible helpful and 
pleasant to have someone around whom has just conquered them all and shows 
you the way. you've been an incredible support and have always had my back 
when needed, which has made this PhD a much more enjoyable journey, and I 
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am grateful of you for it. We've had long discussion on our research projects, its 
progress, how to deal with the issues facing us, which I have much enjoyed and 
have contributed greatly to completion of this thesis. you've been an incredible 
source of advice and help even after you left the Donders, a quality and effort 
I am thankful for. you've now successfully gone on to start your own lab in 
Amsterdam, and will even be following up on the work we've done together. I can 
only hope to follow your example one day. Hopefully we can continue to work 
and socially interact together in the future as I've much enjoyed and appreciated 
you over the last years.
To me neuroscience is fundamentally interesting, yet its relationship to clinical 
practice is a strong motivating factor to do research. Whilst in London I was 
offered the opportunity to explore the clinical side of neuroscience. Chris I am 
very grateful to have been involved in your research endeavours. you and Mat 
had put forward an incredible effort to study PTSD and depression patients 
within an MRI scanner, an absolutely monumental task, and allowed me hitch 
along for the ride. you've taught me great insight into the problems that faces 
these patients and enlightened me with the relationship between clinical 
abnormalities and theories of brain function. your enthusiasm and friendly 
demeanour, wonderful interactions during my stay in London, return visits, and 
Skype conversations made it an absolute pleasure to have worked with you. I'm 
very happy that our three papers together have made it into this thesis. Thank 
you, and I hope we will soon meet up over a wonderful glass of wine. 
Diner during the first Fernandez lab retreat I was at (and I'm paraphrasing here). 
Marijn: "I've been studying reconsolidation in humans, but the problems is that 
we can't just use protein synthesis inhibitors or ECT or so to impair memory", 
Indira: "oh, but we have a lot of patients that receive ECT that participate in 
studies, we could try to work with them." This marked the start of what might 
be the most monumental study in this thesis, and certainly one of the most 
interesting research projects I have found myself to be involved in. Indira 
without you this study would have never some about. you helped me work out 
the study design, arranged contacts within the RUNMC and with the psychiatrists 
in Arnhem. Working with severely depressed patients is not always easy, but 
you've helped me out here, taught me about their condition, and have been 
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supportive throughout the course of this project. I much enjoyed our meetings, 
both scientific, and social, like during the annual BBQ at your home, and hope 
we will continue to do so in the future.
One email, an incredibly friendly response, and before I knew it I was standing 
in the OR witnessing an ECT session and trying to keep up with the high-speed 
train of uncanning enthusiasm that is Jeroen. When we met you had just started 
your own PhD and were setting up your first study, all that while running a full 
time psychiatric clinical job. you've truly made our research project see the light. 
Everything needed was arranged, everything explained, dealt with and solved in 
no time at all. It is a wonderful characteristic of you: never a problem, always a 
solution, deal-with-it-immediately attitude, all with great flair. you, and the other 
clinicians: Bas, Michael, Joep, Boudewijn, Lucas, made me feel right at home 
in Arnhem, welcomed me into your circle. Each visit, and every ECT session I 
was at was accompanied by fruitful discussions, essential questions, insightful 
explanations, and an incredible helpfulness from all of you. I've had an amazing 
time in Arnhem thanks to all of you. I felt honoured to be able to help out, even 
if only a little, on your own projects, and am intrigued to see how you and Guido 
will continue the work we've started. Jeroen thank you for everything, and I hope 
I will be able to defend my thesis as well as your outstanding performance. 
One more person form Arnhem deserves to be mentioned separately. Oscar you 
have been the backbone of our ECT study. Kept an eye on possible candidates, 
helped me approach them, collect information, allowed me to crash your office, 
and been helpful in any way possible. On most visits we ended up talking about 
our daily lives, what we had been up to over the weekend, future plans, etc, etc. 
I've much enjoyed our talks and working with you, and would much like to thank 
you for the wonderful time in Arnhem.
Ray you allowed me into a lab few-to-none interns ever make it into. My time 
in your lab, and at the FIL in general have truly shaped me as a scientist, both 
in work attitude, scientific thinking, and goals to strive for. The FIL was an 
incredibly inspiring environment and one I have very fond memories of. I’ve 
much enjoyed working with you, learning from you, am honoured to have been 
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able work with one of the great scientists to have founded the field I now work 
in. Thank you.
Joris, Jonas, Hasan, working with you on our joint research project has been 
a very insightful and pleasant experience. I enjoyed our interactions, and am 
appreciative to have gained some insight into the workings of scientific projects 
within a commercial environment. I was quite amazed by the results of our 
study, hope it will see the light of publication soon, and would like to thank you 
for all your patients and support.
Several internship students have profoundly contributed to the work in this 
thesis. Klodiana running our propranolol study would not have been possible 
without you. you are an incredibly motivated and fun student, and I much 
enjoyed our time together testing all those subjects. I hope you are enjoying 
your new PhD position and will do well, and wish you all the best. Sanne its been 
a pleasure to work with you, and your rigidity, attention to detail, and hard work 
have led to great stimulus material, and together with Martijn a huge data set I 
still have to figure out what to do with, and eventually contributed greatly to our 
subsequent studies.
Thank you Hans-Christiane Pape, Roshan Cools, and Sander Daselaar for 
being on the evaluation committee of my thesis. I am sorry for making you read 
this much text, but I hope you found it interesting, and would like to thank you 
for the feedback on my thesis, which might not have been normal procedure but 
was very informative for me. 
A special thank you goes out to all the participants of the studies presented in 
this thesis. Especially to the patients for whom participation is not always easy, 
but were willing to put forward their best efforts, and often shared their highly 
insightful stories. 
The Fernandez lab is a delight to work in largely because of all the great 
colleagues that make the lab into a highly interaction, stimulation, social, and 
supportive environment. I've absolutely loved all the discussion during lab 
meetings, retreats, coffees, and lunches, and am very grateful to all your help 
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and support in shaping and reflecting upon the work in this thesis. Atsuko, 
Carly, Daphne, Dirk, Eelco, Erno, Frauke, Floris, Hein, Isabella, Jan-
Willem, Jenny, Linda, Lindsey, Marieke, Mariet, Marlieke, Marloes, Mark, 
Mirre, Nicole, Nils, Noortje, Olga, Ruud, Sarah, Susanne, Shaozheng, Yu, 
and all interns (I hope I didn't miss anyone, if so sorry! I mean you to), you 
are an incredibly bright, fun, and great bunch of people and I am very pleased 
to have worked with you all. Carly, Atsuko, Floris, Isabella, Mariet, and Susanne 
I feel privileged to continue to collaborate with you and look forward to work 
with you in the future. Erno, thank you for all advise, and on your help to find 
a post-doc position, and I hope we will run into each other in the Big Apple at 
some point. To all of you, I am sure we will continue to meet in the future and 
am looking much forward to it.
Sabine what would I have done without you? Two major drug studies, one 
clinical study, all associated ethical, safety, and organizational issues, health 
screenings, blood sampling, genetic sampling, could I have placed a bigger 
burden on you somehow? yet you managed to keep everything in check and run 
smoothly. your contribution to my PhD is invaluable and I am very pleased to 
have worked with you in an always enjoyable setting.
The Donders is an incredible place and houses some of the smartest people 
I've ever met, who work on cutting-edge science in a highly competitive field, 
yet are able to maintain a very social, helpful, supportive, and stimulating 
atmosphere. A big thank you to the PIs who've been able to construct such a 
wonderful institute, and especially Roshan and Christian D for their scientific 
discussions and support. Some people I would like to mention separately. 
Hanneke we spend time together in London at the FIL and continued to interact 
at the Donders, you are the example of a great promising young scientist and 
a lovely person and I've learn a great deal from you. Hope to keep running into 
you in the next city we may find ourselves in. Stephen, I'm happy to have been 
reunited with your ever-intriguing character and to have been able to find our 
way through the SCR analyses together. Lennart thank you for sharing all your 
knowledge on fMRI analyses and for letting me take your thesis as an example. 
Niels we shared offices only briefly but I had great fun every time we were there 
together.
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Working at the Donders is especially pleasant and efficient due to its incredible 
organization and support that is provided by Tildie, Arthur, Sandra, Nicole, 
Marek, Sander, erik, uriel, rene, Edward, Paul, who cannot be appreciated 
enough.
Francesco thank you for allowing me to spend a "sabbatical" in your lab 
and subsequently taking me on as a post-doc. you're work has been a great 
inspiration, and I've truly enjoyed the opportunity to acquire some insight into 
systems neuroscience of memory and electrophysiology from you. It's been 
incredibly fun to work with you and learn from you. I highly appreciate all your 
efforts to explain all methods, techniques, and theories that exist in this field. 
Spending time in your lab has led me to a new level of nerdy-ness and I love it 
("can't we use an arduino for that?"). you've been an incredibly hospitable and 
fun person inside and outside that lab, a very stimulating mind to be around, 
and I feel fortunate to have met you. Together with Esther and Tim we're having 
an amazingly interesting time setting up a new lab, and despite sometimes 
frustrating slow progress you've maintained a great working atmosphere, so 
thank you all. I am sure great things will come out of the lab soon, and I hope 
that we will be able to continue our collaboration.
My latest endeavour into electrophysiology started at the UVA, and I would 
specifically like to thank Cyriel for allowing me to spend a wonderful time in 
your group. Conrado I've had a great time working with you and setting up our 
project, so thank you. And a further thank you goes out to everyone in the 
Cognitive and Systems Neuroscience group. 
Benno, Piray, Erika, Areg, and the others from the Roozendaal lab, our 
recent interactions and all your help has been very informative and enjoyable so 
thank you.
Richard, Lisa, Dorothy, Tomonori, Szu-Han, Adrian, and the others at the 
Morris lab in Edinburgh, thank you for having been incredibly helpful, and I 
truly enjoyed our scientific discussions, joint meetings, and visits to Edinburgh 
that have been very inspirational.
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Every now and again you get the opportunity to meet the who-is-who in 
science and at times they leave a mark on your scientific thinking. In my case 
some of the people to thank for this are Bruce McNaughton, Christian 
Buchel, Christina Alberini, Devon Mueller, Dominique deQuervain, 
Eleanor Maguire, Daniela Schiller, Georgy Buzsaki, Joe LeDoux, Karim 
Nader, Karl Friston, Liz Phelps (I highly anticipate working together in the 
future and would like to thank you for all the efforts you have made so far, 
its been interesting and flattering), Lynn Nadel, Edvar Moser, Mick Rugg, 
Paul Frankland, and Raphael Kalisch, thank you for some very interesting 
discussions.
Eelke we've been brothers since I was one year old, and we've been best friends 
ever since. Its quite incredible to always have someone around you can rely on, 
trust, talk to, play with, party with, see the world with, and discuss everything in 
life with. With you around I know we could face anything and always come out 
on top. your one of the brightest, hard-working, and most hilarious persons I 
know, and I am proud to have you as a brother. It's been amazingly interesting 
to discuss the overlap between business and science with you over the years, 
and our recent undertaking to develop talks for companies and begin our own 
start-up has been wonderful. Its impressive to see how much you've learned 
about neuroscience in a very short period, to the point that I think you would do 
a pretty good job at defending my thesis yourself.  Hence, I could not wish for a 
better paranimph, but more importantly, I could not wish for a better brother.
Dennis I've known you since I was seven, looked up against you, the club 
champion boys till 10 is an idol at that age. At 12 we became friends, or maybe 
more accurate, you adopted me as a little brother (yes little I know), a difference 
of three years is an enormous gap at that age. It grew over the years; went to 
practice together, started skateboarding together, going out, playing music, went 
to gigs, throughout those years I had an example to follow, someone to hang 
out with, and a friend to call on. As we grew up our friendship equated, yet you 
remained the most dependable and trustworthy friend I have. It's an incredible 
quality that comes natural to you. However far away, you were always close. I 
still have a pile of papers with emails we send each other during my year in the 
US, sharing everything that happened in life intermixed with the biggest pile of 
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nonsense that made roflmo a reality. Next, I moved to Amsterdam, you followed a 
little later, and we remained best friends over the years. I am incredibly happy to 
see that you seem to have found your place in life over the last couple of years, 
and wish you all the best. I may once again disappear to some far away place, 
but you've always been by my side, now as my paranimph, and I hope you'll 
always be. Simply put, I am just incredibly fortunate to have you as a friend
I've been incredibly privileged to have friends in high school that I still have 
today; Elmer, Migh (a special thank you for helping me design this thesis), 
Robin, Jarrik, many that I had known but truly became friends in Amsterdam; 
Daan, Ernie, Gerben, Hans, Jeroen, Laurens, Kreits, Matthieu; and others 
that became friends and joined the crew over the years; Alex, Eli, Johanneke, 
Kaspar, Liza, Lotte, Maya, Oscar, Saskia, and Tim. you are an incredible 
bunch of people and we've shared so many good times. A separate mention 
goes out to Marlous and Barbara; you've been the greatest photo-models, and 
possibly without you knowing it many people have remembered you well but 
subsequently forgotten you all in the name of science. Thomas, Thomas, Jitse, 
and Frederic I've had the best of times hanging out with you, going to concerts 
and festivals, could we please have another silly dancing competition? To all of 
you thank you.
This thesis was largely written whilst hanging out in bars with Tara 'biggest 
rock-star in neuroscience' till the wee hours of the night. I'd never thought 
I'd meet someone like you in one of the most peculiar places of the world. 
Neuroscience and music occupy a large part of my life and sharing a similar 
taste for both with someone is amazing. I've had a great time hanging out with 
you, going to concerts with you, sharing frustrations over elements of a PhD 
with you, and gaining insight on life with you. I hope to keep running into you 
wherever in the world, and keep sharing more awesome experiences, which 
inevitably happens with you around.
During a PhD, science can come to occupy ones mind completely, to an 
overwhelming point at times. Luckily there has always been one place where I 
could tune out, relax, and have fun: Chip & Charge. Throughout the years I've 
had a great time with so many people so thank you all. A special thanks to 
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the boys that have shown me every corner of the courts: Folkert, GP, Justin, 
Laurens, Luuk, the boys of HE1, and men of HE2; de 'matige finale spelers' 
Frederiek, Irlen, Miriam, Nienke, you're an incredible bunch and I sure hope 
you'll come over for diner wherever in the world I may end up; the 'party-gang' 
for sharing the love, when are we going again?
Lotte "I don't have time to explain the complexities of memory storage" you're 
on. 
KKK-GWL: Martijn, Steffan, and more recently Mark, roomies that you can play 
tennis with, go out with, have fun with, and that are simply just friends, what 
more can you wish for?
The "hele grote meneren" of JOS, this season was so much fun, so thank you, 
and I hope to join you for a few more matches this year. I've already heard talk 
of the 'k-word'.
Pa en Luus, het enige stukje opzettelijke Nederlands is aan jullie voorbehouden. 
Pap ik had hier nooit gestaan zonder jou. Biologisch gezien logisch, maar dat 
bedoel ik niet. Ik herinner me niet veel van mijn vroege jeugd, maar ik weet 
wel dat ik altijd een onvoorwaardelijke liefde heb gekend, altijd een veilige en 
vertrouwde plek om naar terug te keren, tot de dag van vandaag. Twee kleine 
blagen alleen opvoeden kan niet eenvoudig zijn, maar jij deed het, gaf ons een 
normaal leven. Ik heb het je niet altijd makkelijk gemaakt, maar je hebt me altijd 
alle vertrouwen en ruimte gegeven en gesteund waar nodig. Het is geweldig 
om een vader te hebben waar je altijd bij terecht kunt, mee kunt praten, advies 
kunt krijgen, kunt plagen, en mee kunt lachen en ik hoop dit nog heel lang met 
je te kunnen doen. Straks sta ik daar op een podium voor al die professoren in 
toga en dat heb ik vooral aan jou te danken, dus dan mag je best wel een beetje 
trots zijn, ook op jezelf (maar zullen we deze keer de foto's aan iemand anders 
overlaten?). Pap dank je wel. Luus je hebt Chris weer gelukkig gemaakt ik hoop 
dat je dit blijft doen, en daar ben ik je onnoemelijk dankbaar voor, maar ik ben 
je vanaf dag 1 gaan waarderen om jou. Je bent een onlosmakelijk deel van ons 
gezin, een geweldig lieve, slimme, ondersteunende vrouw, een bron van advies, 
en bied een plek om even tot rust te komen. Dank je wel, en ik hoop nog heel 
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lang van jou en je culinaire uitspattingen te genieten. Cobie en Harry er bestaat 
zoiets als een 'extended amygdala' en een 'extended family', die termen mogen 
jullie zelf opzoeken en zelf bedenken met welke ik jullie associeer. Jullie zijn de 
meest warme mensen die ik ken en ik ben blij dat jullie altijd in mijn leven zijn 
gebleven. Ik heb onnoemelijk veel met jullie gelachen, plezier gehad, en heel 
veel gedeeld, en hoop dit nog lang te blijven doen. En als ik nog een keer jullie 
herinneringen kan misbruiken voor mijn eigen wetenschappelijke gewin zal ik 
het zeker niet laten.
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